Walker v. Pointer, Civ. A. No. 3-2929-B.

• Citation: 304 F. Supp. 56
• Decision Date: 18 September 1969
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 3-2929-B.
• Parties: Cheryl WALKER, and James E. Walker v. G. M. POINTER and F. R. Branscome.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

304 F. Supp. 56

Cheryl WALKER, and James E. Walker v. G. M. POINTER and F. R. Branscome.

Civ. A. No. 3-2929-B.

United States District Court N. D. Texas, Dallas Division.

September 18, 1969.

Grover Hartt, Jr., Andress, Woodgate & Hartt, Dallas, Tex., for plaintiffs.

Lawrence R. Maxwell, Jr., Dallas, Tex., for defendants.

OPINION

HUGHES, District Judge.

This case involves the scope of 42 U.S.C. section 1982 which provides that:

"All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property."

Plaintiffs, Cheryl Walker and her brother, James E. Walker, filed a complaint in this court on December 26, 1968, alleging that on October 7, 1968 they rented an apartment from defendant, G. M. Pointer and signed a one year lease. The apartment was in a complex of several buildings at 14230 Heritage Circle in the City of Farmers Branch in Dallas County, Texas. Defendant F. R. Branscome was the manager. The lease provided for rental payments to be made on the first and fifteenth of each month. At the time of the lease Cheryl Walker was 20 years old and James Walker was 19. About noon on Saturday, December 14, 1968, a written notice¹ signed by F. R. Branscome was delivered to James Walker in the apartment stating that suit would be filed in the Justice Court to evict them unless he and his sister surrendered possession of the apartment by 4:00 o'clock of that day.

Plaintiffs further alleged that on December 16, 1968, at about 1:30 P.M. when neither of the plaintiffs were present, Branscome entered the apartment with three employees, who put their clothes and possessions in boxes and sheets and hauled them away in a truck. These facts are admitted by defendants.

Plaintiffs and defendants belong to the white race. At the time of this occurrence Cheryl Walker was employed in a racially integrated business and James was a student at North Texas State University, a predominantly white institution, attended also by a number of Negro students. Both had black friends who visited in the apartment on several occasions. It is the contention of plaintiffs that they were evicted because they had Negro guests and that such eviction was a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1982.

The defendants deny that the Walkers were evicted because they entertained blacks as guests. The contention of defendants is that the eviction was caused by the failure of the Walkers to pay the rent on time and by complaints from tenants of noise and disturbance in the apartment.

The first question to be decided is whether this Court has jurisdiction. The answer to the question centers on the perplexing and for this case crucial language of 42 U.S.C. § 1982. After a careful consideration of the facts and the law it is the opinion of this Court that section 1982 covers the situation alleged by plaintiffs and that jurisdiction attaches.

There are few cases construing section 1982, but one case, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 88 S.Ct. 2186, 20 L.Ed.2d 1189 (1968), is of major importance in discussing the statute. In that case plaintiffs alleged that defendants had refused to sell them a home for the sole reason one of the plaintiffs was a Negro. The Supreme Court held that section 1982 applies to all discriminations against Negroes whether from private or public sources in the sale or rental of property. There is no doubt that if the plaintiffs in this case had been Negroes, the statute would apply. The fact that they are white distinguishes this case and makes it in part one of first impression.

Section 1982 in its original form was part of section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.² The history of this Act, as outlined in Jones, reveals that it was passed to implement the Thirteenth Amendment which provides as follows:

"Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction."

The discussion of the Court in Jones indicates that the institution of slavery prompting the Thirteenth Amendment was ordinarily associated with the black man. Yet whites too have historically been susceptible to enslavement in many countries throughout the centuries. In this country white slavery was known to exist during the antebellum period in the South.³ Current statutes punishing practices relating to slavery continually refer to the victimization of "any person." 18 U.S.C. §§ 1581-1588. The bar against involuntary servitude has been invoked by the courts in numerous contexts where race is immaterial.⁴

The first six words of section 1982 appear to lead inescapably to the conclusion that the statute contemplates a reach as broad as the amendment upon which it is based. "All citizens of the United States" are to be protected. The inclusiveness of these words is reinforced by the Jones opinion which states that the rights granted in 1982 are granted "to all citizens without regard to race or color." (420, 88 S.Ct. 2193). Jones in a note refers to the following language in the Act of 1870: "the act to protect all persons * * * in their civil rights. * * * is hereby reenacted * * *." (436, 88 S.Ct. 2201). Hence it is clear that the language of the statute indicates its availability to white plaintiffs as part of a greater class of "all citizens."

In this case, according to plaintiffs' allegations, they are direct victims of black racial discrimination, discrimination directed at them because of their black associations. Since this discrimination has disturbed their leasehold, they should be as entitled to relief under section 1982 as if their skin was black.

There is much to recommend this particular application of 1982 to the instant case. First, it is not at odds with the law that does exist under 1982 and the Thirteenth Amendment. Second, it is supported by analogous cases under the Fourteenth Amendment. Third, to limit the availability of relief from black discrimination only to those whose skin is black would be to give the statute a racist construction incompatible with the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.

As observed earlier in this opinion, rudimentary application of the Thirteenth Amendment freedom from involuntary servitude was not extended on a basis of racial qualification but rather was responsive to whether any individual suffered from the wrong the amendment was created to cure. Making relief available to the white victim of discrimination against black people adheres to this earlier, established Thirteenth Amendment principle.

There is much in the language of Jones which would support protection of real property and personalty interests of any persons subjected to racial discrimination, whether on the basis of the color of their skin or the color of the skin of those with whom they choose to associate. The following statements seem particularly significant on this point. "We hold that § 1982 bars all⁵ racial discrimination, private as well as public, in the sale or rental of property, and that the statute, thus construed, is a valid exercise of the power of Congress to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment." (413, 88 S.Ct. 2189). "§ 1982 grants to all citizens, without regard to race or color, `the same right' to purchase and lease property `as is enjoyed by white citizens.'" (420, 88 S.Ct. 2193). "If § 1982 `means what it says' * * * then it must encompass every racially motivated refusal to sell or rent and cannot be confined to officially sanctioned segregation in housing." (421-422, 88 S.Ct. 2194). "When Congress provided in § 1 of the Civil Rights Act that the right to purchase and lease property was to be enjoyed equally throughout the United States by Negro and white citizens alike, it plainly meant to secure that right against interference from any source whatever, whether governmental or private". (423-424, 88 S.Ct. 2195). According to Senator Trumbull, "the bill would `break down all discrimination between black men and white men.'" (432, 88 S.Ct. 2199, emphasis in original). "It thus appears that, when the House passed the Civil Rights Act on March 13, 1866, it did so on the same assumption that had prevailed in the Senate: It too believed that it was approving a comprehensive statute forbidding all racial discrimination affecting the basic civil rights enumerated in the Act."⁶

Two Fourteenth Amendment cases indicate by analogy that protecting plaintiffs from the effects of racial discrimination against blacks would be rationally and legally supportable. In Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267, 83 S.Ct. 1122, 10 L.Ed.2d 338 (1963), four petitioners, including one white student, obtained reversals of their trespass convictions because they were adjudged victims of racial discrimination sufficiently involving state action. Though the court did not speak directly to the relative position of white petitioner, the reversal of his conviction can only be explained by a recognition of the court that he was a victim of discrimination against blacks and that he shared a position before the court with the blacks as one entitled to the same remedy.

Even stronger by analogy is the Third Circuit opinion, Valle v. Stengel, 176 F.2d 697 (1949). This case dealt with 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The statute states, "in terms that closely parallel those of § 1982",⁷ that all persons in the United States "shall have the same right * * to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as enjoyed by white citizens * * *." The following language from Valle v. Stengel indicates that with a statute similar to the one in the instant case the characer of the discrimination involved entitled whites in the company of black persons to relief.

* * * the plaintiffs

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