Graustein v. Boston & M.R.R.

• Decision Date: 12 September 1939
• Citation: 22 N.E.2d 594,304 Mass. 23
• Parties: GRAUSTEIN v. BOSTON & M. R. R.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

304 Mass. 23

22 N.E.2d 594

GRAUSTEIN

v.BOSTON & M. R. R.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

Sept. 12, 1939.

Action by William A. Graustein against the Boston & Maine Railroad to recover on claims assigned to plaintiff. From an order allowing defendant's motion to dismiss, plaintiff appeals.

Order reversed and motion denied.Appeal from Superior Court, Middlesex County; O'Connell, Judge.

W. A. Graustein, of Cambridge, pro se.

R. W. Hall, of Boston, for appellee.

COX, Justice.

This is an appeal by the plaintiff from the order of a judge of the Superior Court allowing the defendant's motion to dismiss. The allegations of the plaintiff's declaration, in so far as they are material, are in substance that the ‘Frank H. Davis Company Co-partners,’ having three claims against the defendant, duly assigned them and the causes of action to the plaintiff in accordance with the writing annexed, which reads in part as follows: ‘* * * Frank H. Davis Company, Co-partners * * * in consideration of one (1) dollars and other valuable considerations to it paid by William A. Graustein * * * the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, do hereby sell, assign and transfer, as security to said William A. Graustein all our rights, title and interest in * * * [certain] claims against Boston and Maine Railroad * * * [then follows a description of the claims]. To have and to hold the same to the said William A. Graustein, with power irrevacable to collect the same in his own name, or in the name of Frank H. Davis Company. In witness whereof the said Frank H. Davis Company has caused these presents to be signed this 8 day of April 1937. Frank H. Davis Co. seal by John F. Davis.’

The grounds of the motion to dismiss are: ‘1. That the action or right of action, if any, in the Plaintiff is based on an assignment, copy whereof is attached to the Plaintiff's Declaration. 2. That it appears from the pleadings in the case that said assignment is void as to execution. 3. That it appears from the pleadings in the case that said assignment is void as champertous and without consideration. Wherefore the Defendant says that the Plaintiff has not a sufficient title to support the action.’ The indorsement, ‘Motion allowed,’ appears upon the motion. The record consists of copies of the writ, which is dated Paril 17, 1937, the plaintiff's declaration, the defendant's motion to dismiss, its answer, and the plaintiff's appeal.

Technically, a motion to dismiss raises only matter apparent on the record. Crosby v. Harrison, 116 Mass. 114;Finance Corp. of New England v. Parker, 251 Mass. 372, 377, 146 N.E. 696. Compare White v. E. T. Slattery Co., 236 Mass. 28, 30, 31, 127 N.E. 597. The motion in the case at bar sets forth no facts not already apparent on the record and is founded solely upon it. The parties make no other contention. The order entered on the motion was ‘founded upon matter of law apparent on the record,’ and, if allowed to stand, it is ‘decisive of the case.’ The appeal, therefore, under G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 231, § 96, is properly before us. Summers v. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co., Mass., 16 N.E.2d 670.

We are of the opinion that it was error to allow the motion to dismiss.

1. By the provisions of G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 231, § 5, the assignee of a nonnegotiable legal chose in action which has been assigned in writing may maintain an action thereon in his own name, but subject to all defences and rights of counterclaim, recoupment or set-off to which the defendant would have been entitled had the action been brought in the name of the assignor. Although the assignment is ‘as security to said William A. Graustein,’ nevertheless upon the record it cannot be said that the plaintiff is not an assignee within the provisions of said section 5, Assignments may be made as security. Boston Heating Co. v. Middleborough Savings Bank, 288 Mass. 433, 436, 437, 193 N.E. 12. Compare Sherwin-Williams Co. v. J. Mannos & Sons, Inc., 287 Mass. 304, 316, 191 N.E. 438, and cases cited.

2. It cannot be said upon the record that the assignment is void as to execution. Frank H. Davis Company is alleged to be ‘Co-partners.’ It is true that the assignment does not set forth the individual names of the alleged ‘Co-partners,’ but it purports to be executed in the name of the partnership. Compare Ostrom v. Jocobs, 9 Metc. 454, 457;Patch v. Wheatland, 8 Allen 102. The partnership is not being sued, compare Haskins v. D'Este, 133 Mass. 356; neither are the questions of the authority to attach the seal or of its materiality before us on this record. Compare Alfano v. Donnelly, 285 Mass. 554, 556, 189 N.E. 610. There is nothing to identify John F. Davis who purported to sign for the alleged partnership, but questions which might arise under G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 108A, §§ 4 and 9, upon a disclosure of the facts, as to the right of a partner or another to act as an agent of the partnership are not before us. Under the provisions of G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 231, § 30, an allegation that a party is an assignee is taken as admitted...