Morrissey v. Powell

• Citation: 23 N.E.2d 411,304 Mass. 268
• Parties: MORRISSEY v. POWELL.
• Decision Date: 04 October 1939
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

304 Mass. 268

23 N.E.2d 411

MORRISSEY

v.POWELL.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Berkshire.

Oct. 4, 1939.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Berkshire County; D. F. Dillon, Judge.

Action of tort for personal injuries sustained in automobile accident by James J. Morrissey against George Powell. Verdict for the defendant, and the plaintiff brings exceptions.

Exceptions sustained.

F. J. Quirico, of Pittsfield, for plaintiff.

No brief for defendant.

COX, Justice.

The jury returned a verdict for the defendant in this action of tort for personal injuries, alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff as the result of the negligent operation of a motor vehicle by the defendant on August 9, 1937. The defendant admitted that he had had some beer about four hours prior to the happening of the accident in question. It was agreed that, on August 9, 1937, the defendant pleaded guilty in the District Court to a charge of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor at the time the accident in question occurred; that the case was continued to August 30, 1937, when the defendant was permitted to withdraw his plead of ‘guilty’ and to plead ‘not guilty,’ and, after a trial, the complaint was dismissed. The plaintiff offered to prove these facts by the records of the District Court or by a duly certified copy, and also by proper questions put to the defendant as a witness. The defendant waived the necessity of producing the original records of the District Court and also the necessity of asking the defendant the specific questions ‘necessary to bring out the above facts.’ He objected to the competency of ‘such’ evidence, stating that he raised no question as to the method of proof of the facts and admitted such to be the facts. The trial judge excluded the evidence, and the plaintiff's exception to its exclusion presents the only issue in the case.

A plea of guilty is an admission of the material facts alleged in the complaint or indictment, Commonwealth v. Ayres, 115 Mass. 137; compare Commonwealth v. Lannan, 13 Allen 563, 569, and in so far as it amounts to an admission of facts material in the trial of a civil case in which the person so pleading is a party, it is admissible as evidence against him. Dzura v. Phillips, 275 Mass. 283, 289, 290, 175 N.E. 629. See Blackman v. Coffin, Mass., 15 N.E.2d 469. But such a plea, even when followed by a conviction, is not necessarily conclusive as to the facts admitted, and the record of a conviction based upon a plea of guilty is received ‘not as a judicial act, having the force and effect of a judgment, but as a solemn confession of the very matter charged in the civil action.’ Mead v. Boston, 3 Cush. 404, 407. The plea may be explained and reasons shown for entering it. Buxton v. Somerset Potters' Works, 121 Mass. 446; Der Minasian v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., Mass., 3 N.E.2d 17, and cases cited. See Leary v. Keith, 256 Mass. 157, 158, 152 N.E. 245. The ‘best evidence’ rule as to the production of written evidence does not apply to the admissions of parties inasmuch as what a party admits against himself may reasonably be taken as true. Smith v. Palmer, 6 Cush. 513, 521;Loomis v. Wadhams, 8 Gray 557, 559, 562. On the other hand, when a defendant has been convicted of a crime not based upon his plea of guilty, the conviction is not conclusive when that issue arises in a civil proceeding to which the Commonwealth is not a party, Silva v. Silva, Mass., 7 N.E.2d 601;Blackman v. Coffin, Mass., 15 N.E.2d 469, and in the trial of a civil case a party is not entitled to show that he has been acquitted in a criminal prosecution involving the subject matter of the civil action (Fowle v. Child, 164 Mass. 210, 214, 41 N.E. 291,49 Am.St.Rep. 451) as an adjudication or as evidence that the party charged was guiltless. Der Minasian v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., Mass., 3 N.E.2d 17.

We are aware of no case in this Commonwealth where the precise question to be decided has been considered. There is a conflict of authority on the question whether after the withdrawal of a plea of guilty and the entry of a plea of not guilty, the former plea may be shown. In the case of Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 224, 47 S.Ct. 582, 71 L.Ed. 1009, it was held that a plea of guilty withdrawn by leave of court is not admissible on the trial of the issue arising on the substituted plea of not guilty. It was there said that the effect of the court's order permitting the withdrawal was to adjudge that the plea of guilty ‘be held for naught,’ and that its subsequent use as evidence against the defendant was in direct conflict with that determination. Cases are cited in the opinion in support of this proposition as well as cases where a different view is taken, and where it is held that the plea is a statement of guilt having the same effect as if made out of court; that it is received on the principle which permits a confession of the accused in a lower court to be shown against him at his trial in the higher court; that it is not received as conclusive, and like an extra-judicial confession, is not sufficient without other evidence. See State v. Carta, 90 Conn. 79, 96 A. 411, L.R.A.1916E, 634;People v. Steinmetz, 240 N.Y. 411, 416, 148 N.E. 597. In this Commonwealth a plea of guilty in a lower court where the defendant is held for the grand jury is admissible against the accused at the trial upon the subsequent indictment. Commonwealth v. Haywood, 247 Mass. 16, 19, 20, 141 N.E. 571. Where a defendant pleads guilty in the lower court, and upon his conviction appeals to the Superior Court, it has been held that while the appeal vacates the judgment, it does not change the issue, which has...