Barnett v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co.

Citation304 Mass. 564,24 N.E.2d 662
PartiesBARNETT et al. v. JOHN HANCOCK MUT. LIFE INS. CO.
Decision Date28 December 1939
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Exceptions from Superior Court, Worcester County; Dowd, Judge.

Action by Mae D. Barnett and others against the John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company to recover for accidental death under a double indemnity provision in a life insurance policy. Verdict for plaintiffs and defendant brings exceptions.

Exceptions sustained.

D. Whitcomb, of Worcester, for plaintiffs.

C. W. Proctor, of Worcester, for defendant.

RONAN, Justice.

This is an action of contract to recover for accidental death under a double indemnity provision in a life insurance policy, which provided that the defendant, ‘Upon receipt of due proof of the death of the insured * * * caused solely by external, violent and accidental means, of which there is a visible wound or contusion on the exterior of the body (except in case of drowning or of internal injuries revealed by an autopsy), and that such death occurred * * * as a direct result thereof, independently and exclusive of all other causes, * * * and provided further that the death of the Insured was not caused directly or indirectly by disease or bodily or mental infirmity * * *’ will pay a certain sum. The insured was injured on February 4, 1938, when the automobile which he was operating skidded along the road and into a tree. He sustained a laceration two and one-half inches long, on the right forehead, which was treated at a hospital where he was taken and in which he was confined for nine days. He spent the next ten days at home. Thereafter he began his duties as a travelling salesman on February 24, 1938, working two hours on that day and two hours on February 25 and February 28, 1938. He quit work on March 1, 1938, on account of illness. On March 18, 1938, he was taken to a Worcester Hospital where he stayed until April 8, 1938; he was then taken to a Boston hospital and died there on May 5, 1938. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs. The case is here upon the defendant's exception to the denial of its motion for a directed verdict, to the refusal of the judge to grant certain requests for instructions, and to portions of the charge.

There was evidence that the insured was thirty-five years of age, and that he was strong, robust and in good physical condition when he was injured on February 4, 1938. At the hospital where the laceration on his forehead was first treated, the attending surgeon believed that he had sustained a fairly serious concussion, and when he saw him again, late in February, he looked poorly, had lost considerable weight, and had no memory of the accident. Beginning March 1, 1938, he was confined to his home on account of pneumonia, which developed into empyema, an infection of the lining of the lung that caused the formation of pus between the lung and the chest wall. He was taken to a Worcester hospital. His condition did not improve, but indicated that he was suffering from an infection located in some part of his body other than his chest. There was testimony that bacteria, generated by the empyema, reached the brain tissue and localized at a point where the resistance of the tissue had been lowered by the accident and formed a brain abscess, and that from the brain as a focal point the bacteria was transmitted to the heart where it caused endocarditis. There was also testimony that the bacteria from the empyema was disseminated into the blood stream and reached both the brain and the heart. The jury could find that the infection of both these organs was caused by the empyema which resulted from pneumonia.

The question is whether this latter disease can be attributed solely and exclusively to the automobile accident. The insured was not suffering from this disease at the time of the accident. Pneumonia bacteria get into the system through the respiratory tract where they may remain harmless for days or months until a person's resistance is so lowered that they can impart themselves to the tissues and set up this disease. If, at the time of the accident, pneumonia germs were in his system and, as a result of the accident, his power of resistance was so lowered that these germs became active and developed into pneumonia, then the jury were warranted in finding that the accident alone was the cause of this disease and that the death of the insured was ‘caused solely by external, violent and accidental means * * * independently and exclusive of all other causes.’ Freeman v. Mercantile Mutual Accident Association, 156 Mass. 351, 30 N.E. 1013,17 L.R.A. 753;Bohaker v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 215 Mass. 32, 102 N.E. 342, 46 L.R.A.,N.S., 543; Collins v. Casualty Co. of America, 224 Mass. 327, 112 N.E. 634, L.R.A.1916E, 1203; Kramer v. New York Life Ins. Co., 293 Mass. 440, 200 N.E. 390;Ballam v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 295 Mass. 411, 3 N.E.2d 1012, 108 A.L.R. 1.

It was also open to the jury to find that, after the accident, the insured, as he went about his business, exposed himself to the bacteria which ‘are circulating around everywhere’; and that, on account of his weakened physical condition resulting from the accident, the bacteria developed into pneumonia. The fact that the bacteria entered the body of the insured after the accident would not prevent them from being the efficient and active cause of the damage they wrought if, upon the evidence, such damage was directly traceable to the accident. Larson v. Boston Elevated Railway Co., 212 Mass. 262, 98 N.E. 1048;Charles v. Boston Elevated Railway Co., 230 Mass. 536, 120 N.E. 69;Binns v. Blake, 289 Mass. 70, 193 N.E. 550;Wallace v. Ludwig, 292 Mass. 251, 198 N.E. 159. The jury could find that one of the effects of the accident was to render the insured peculiarly susceptible to attack by bacteria which, but for the accident, he would have successfully warded off; and that the change in his general physical condition, due to the accident, constituted a predisposing tendency to bacterial infection. The presence of bacteria in the respiratory tract could be found to be a mere condition as long as the insured possessed his normal and usual power of resistance. It could also be found that their virulence was directly and solely attributable to the accident, and that the resulting pneumonia was within the coverage of the policy. The existence of such a malady would not be due to a cause different from or independent of the accident. A disease entirely caused by an accident is, within contemplation of law and within a proper construction of the policy, a part of the injury incurred by the accident. Freeman v. Mercantile Metual Accident Association, 156 Mass. 351, 30 N.E. 1013,17 L.R.A. 753; Mogé v. Société de Bienfaisance St. Jean Baptiste, 167 Mass. 298, 45 N.E. 749,35 L.R.A. 736;Hatch v. United States Casualty Co., 197 Mass. 101, 104, 83 N.E. 398, 14 L.R.A.,N.S., 503, 125 Am.St.Rep. 332,14 Ann.Cas. 290;Kramer v. New York Life Ins. Co., 293 Mass. 440, 200 N.E. 390;Ballam v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 295 Mass. 411, 3 N.E.2d 1012, 108 A.L.R. 1;Sheehan v. AEtna Life Ins. Co., Mass., 6 N.E.2d 777;Scanlan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 7 Cir., 93 F.2d 942.

On all the evidence including the medical testimony which the jury could have believed, they were warranted in finding that the accident alone was the proximate cause of his death. There was no error in refusing to grant the defendant's motion for a directed verdict. Freeman v. Mercantile Mutual Accident Association, 156 Mass. 351, 30 N.E. 1013,17 L.R.A. 753;Sheehan v. AEtna Life Ins. Co., Mass., 6 N.E.2d 777;Kramer v. New York Life Ins. Co., 293 Mass. 440, 200 N.E. 390.

The defendant contends that the plaintiffs did not furnish it with due proof of a death resulting in the manner described in the double indemnity provision of the policy. The proof consisted of a statement from one of the plaintiffs, a statement from each of the two physicians who attended the insured, a certificate from the undertaker and a letter from one Nester, who, the jury could find, was acting as the agent of the plaintiffs. The statement of one of the plaintiffs was made upon a blank form apparently furnished by the defendant. All the questions were answered. There was no mention of the accident. There...

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3 cases
  • Barnett v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • December 28, 1939
  • La Barge v. United Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • Oregon Supreme Court
    • January 23, 1957
    ...restricted recovery to those whose hearts and other organs are free from infirmities. It seems reasonable to infer that in the John Hancock Mut. Life Insurance Co. case, which we have just reviewed, the insured might have lived for many years even though his heart was diseased. But, whether......
  • Washington v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • June 8, 1977
    ...107 N.E.2d 805 (1952); Howe v. National Life Ins. Co., 321 Mass. 283, 288--289, 72 N.E.2d 425 (1947); Barnett v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 304 Mass. 564, 569, 24 N.E.2d 662 (1939). Due proof in connection with a policy of the type involved in this case is provided when the proof furn......

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