Aldridge v. Georgia Hospitality & Travel Ass'n, 39812

• Decision Date: 07 July 1983
• Docket Number: No. 39812,39812
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court
• Parties: ALDRIDGE et al. v. GEORGIA HOSPITALITY & TRAVEL ASSOCIATION.

Page 708

304 S.E.2d 708

251 Ga. 234

ALDRIDGE et al. v. GEORGIA HOSPITALITY & TRAVEL ASSOCIATION.

No. 39812.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

July 7, 1983.

George P. Dillard, Gail C. Flake, Decatur, for Stanley P. Aldridge et al.

John D. Marshall, Branch & Swann, Atlanta, for Georgia Hospitality & Travel Ass'n.

SMITH, Justice.

County boards of health are authorized by state law to inspect food service establishments (restaurants) and tourist courts (hotels and motels) and issue permits for their operation. No person may lawfully operate a restaurant, hotel or motel in Georgia without a health inspection permit. See OCGA §§ 26-2-371 & 31-28-2 (Code Ann. §§ 88-1002, 88-1102). Appellant Aldridge is one of five members of the DeKalb County Board of Health (the Board), which is authorized to make health inspections and issue permits in DeKalb County. Appellee Georgia Hospitality & Travel Association (GHTA) is an unincorporated voluntary trade association organized to promote the business interests of the hotels, motels, restaurants and various travel-related industries which comprise its membership. An undetermined number of GHTA members do business in DeKalb County.

In October 1981 the Board adopted a schedule of fees, ranging from $50 to $100, it planned to charge for the inspection of hotels, motels and restaurants in DeKalb County. State law is silent as to the imposition of fees for the inspection of hotels, motels and restaurants. Id. In June 1982 GHTA filed this lawsuit, seeking a declaration that the fees were unlawful, an injunction prohibiting the collection of further fees, and return of any fees already paid to the Board by its DeKalb County members. The Board moved to dismiss, contending that (1) GHTA lacked standing to sue on behalf of its DeKalb County members; (2) the superior court lacked jurisdiction because GHTA failed to exhaust its administrative remedies prior to filing suit; and (3) GHTA failed to state a claim for relief in that OCGA § 31-3-4 (Code Ann. § 88-204) expressly authorized imposition of the inspection fees.

The trial court rejected each of the Board's contentions, denied the motion to dismiss, and certified the case for immediate review by this court. We granted the Board's application for appeal and now affirm.

1. First we address the issue of GHTA's standing to sue as a representative of its member hotel, motel, and restaurant establishments which are subject to the DeKalb County inspection fees. The parties to this appeal have cited no Georgia cases, and we are aware of none, which squarely address the question of "associational standing" as asserted by GHTA in this case. ¹ There is, however, ample federal precedent and legal commentary on this issue. See, e.g., Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333, 341, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 2440, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2211, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975); Georgia Hospital Assoc. v. Dept. of Medical Assistance, 528 F.Supp. 1348, 1352 (N.D.Ga.1982); Comment, 56 Notre Dame Law. 546 (1981); Comment, Associational Third-Party Standing and Federal Jurisdiction Under Hunt, 64 Iowa L.Rev. 121 (1978). We adopt the three-part test for standing of associations set out in Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, supra: "[A]n association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit." 432 U.S. at 343, 97 S.Ct. at 2441.

GHTA meets this test. Each member hotel, motel, or restaurant operating in DeKalb County suffers direct economic injury by the assessment of county inspection fees, and would have standing to bring an individual lawsuit challenging the fee system. This action is germane to the stated purposes of GHTA, which include monitoring of industry-related legislation, education of its members, and promotion of the hospitality and travel industry in general. Finally, this suit is primarily seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and does not present complicated issues of individual damages. Thus the relief requested does not require the participation of individual GHTA members. Cf. Equitable Life &c. Society v. Tinsley Mill Village, 249 Ga. 769, 294 S.E.2d 495 (1982).

We note three policy reasons, apart from the concerns embodied in the Hunt test, which favor associational standing in this case. First, the record clearly demonstrates that GHTA is a zealous advocate of its members' interests, and has provided adequate representation in this suit. Second, allowing associations to represent their members' interests in appropriate cases promotes judicial economy. One litigant can, in a single lawsuit, adequately represent many members with similar interests, thus avoiding repetitive and costly separate actions. This is particularly true where, as in this case, the contested administrative action involves fees so small that separate court challenges by aggrieved members may not be economically feasible. A third policy favoring standing for GHTA in this case was noted by the trial court. Associations are generally less susceptible than individuals to retaliation by those officials responsible for executing the challenged policies.

We therefore affirm the trial court's finding that GHTA possessed standing to assert its members' rights in this action.

2. The second issue is whether any administrative remedies were available to GHTA, and, if so, whether GHTA was required to exhaust them before bringing this action in superior court.

The trial judge found that the Administrative Procedure Act, OCGA § 50-13-1 et seq., (Code Ann. § 3A-101 et seq.) does not apply to county boards of health, and we agree. County boards of health are not included within the OCGA § 50-13-2 (Code Ann. § 3A-102) definition of "agency," and the Court of Appeals has held that the health boards are not instrumentalities of the Department of Human Resources, Ga. Dept. of Human Resources v. Demory, 138 Ga.App. 888, 227 S.E.2d 788 (1976). Since the Board is not a state agency, APA appeal procedures simply do not apply to policies implemented by it.

Nor does the state statute governing county boards of health provide GHTA or its members with an avenue of administrative appeal from the Board's assessment of inspection fees. OCGA § 31-5-3(a)(1) (Code Ann. § 88-305) provides: "Any person who is a party to a proceeding and who is aggrieved or adversely affected by any final order or action of a county board of health or agency may have review thereof by appeal to the department ..." (Emphasis supplied.) This code section is inapplicable here because there was no "proceeding" or hearing conducted by the Board to which GHTA could have been a party. The Board further argues that the appeal procedures applicable to county boards of health, OCGA § 37-1-40 (Code Ann. § 88-307), should have been exhausted by GHTA prior to filing suit. We disagree. Although § 37-1-40 (Code Ann. § 88-307) requires that county boards of health conduct a hearing before adopting rules and regulations, it appears from the record that no such hearing was held in this case. Therefore § 37-1-40 (Code Ann. § 88-307) has no application to this dispute. Because there were no administrative appeal procedures available to GHTA, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies urged by the Board is inapposite. Cf. Cobb Co. Health Dept. v. Henson, 226 Ga. 801, 177 S.E.2d 710 (1970). The trial court's ruling on this point was correct.

3. We turn now to the merits of this appeal. The Board contends that its motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should have been granted. The Board's position is that its fee schedule was clearly authorized by OCGA § 31-3-4 (Code Ann. § 88-204) which empowers county boards of health to "make contracts and establish fees for the provision of mental and other public health services. No person shall be denied services on the basis of his inability to pay." The Board maintains that health inspections of hotels, motels and restaurants constitute the provision of "other public health services"...