304 U.S. 144 (1938), 640, United States v. Carolene Products Co.
|Docket Nº:||No. 640|
|Citation:||304 U.S. 144, 58 S.Ct. 778, 82 L.Ed. 1234|
|Party Name:||United States v. Carolene Products Co.|
|Case Date:||April 25, 1938|
|Court:||United States Supreme Court|
Argued April 6, 1938
[58 S.Ct. 780] APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
The Filled Milk Act of Congress of Mar. 4, 1923, defines the term Filled Milk as meaning any milk, cream, or skimmed milk, whether or not condensed or dried, etc., to which has been added, or which has been blended or compounded with, any fat or oil other than milk fat, so that the resulting product is in imitation or semblance of milk, cream, or skimmed milk, whether or not condensed, dried, etc.; it declares that Filled Milk, as so defined, "is an adulterated article of food, injurious to the public health, and its sale constitutes a fraud upon the public", and it forbids and penalizes the shipment of such Filled Milk in interstate commerce. Defendant was indicted for shipping interstate certain packages of an article described in the indictment as a compound of condensed skimmed milk and coconut oil made in the imitation or semblance of condensed milk or cream, and further characterized by the indictment in the words of the statute, as "an adulterated article of food, injurious to the public health."
1. That upon its face, and as supported by judicial knowledge, including facts found in the reports of the congressional committees, the Act is presumptively within the scope of the power to regulate interstate commerce and consistent with due process. Demurrer to the indictment should have been overruled. Hebe Co. v. Shaw, 248 U.S. 297. P. 147.
2. It is no valid objection that the prohibition of the Act does not extend to oleomargarine or other butter substitutes in which vegetable fats or oils replace butter. P. 151.
3. The statutory characterization of filled milk as injurious to health and as a fraud upon the public may, for the purposes of this case, be considered as a declaration of legislative findings deemed to support the Act as a constitutional exertion of the legislative power, aiding informed judicial review by revealing the rationale of the legislation, as do the reports of legislative committees. P. 152.
7 F.Supp. 500, reversed.
APPEAL under the Criminal Appeals Act from a judgment sustaining a demurrer to an indictment.
STONE, J., lead opinion
MR. JUSTICE STONE delivered the opinion of the Court
The question for decision is whether the "Filled Milk Act" of Congress of March 4, 1923 (c. 262, 42 Stat. 1486, 21 U.S.C. § 61-63),1 which prohibits the shipment in
interstate commerce of skimmed milk compounded with any fat or oil other than milk fat, so as to resemble milk or cream, transcends the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce or infringes the Fifth Amendment.
Appellee was indicted in the district court for southern Illinois for violation of the Act by the shipment in interstate commerce of certain packages of "Milnut," a compound of condensed skimmed milk and coconut oil made in imitation or semblance of condensed milk or cream. The indictment states, in the words of the statute, that Milnut "is an adulterated article of food, injurious to the public health," and that it is not a prepared food product of the type excepted from the prohibition of the Act. The trial court sustained a demurrer to the indictment on the authority of an earlier case in the same court, United States v. Carolene Products Co., 7 F.Supp. 500. The case was brought here on appeal under the Criminal Appeals Act of March 2, 1907, 34 Stat. 1246, 18 U.S.C. § 682. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has meanwhile, in another case, upheld the Filled Milk Act as an appropriate exercise of the commerce power in Carolene Products Co. v. Evaporated Milk Assn., 93 F. (2d) 202.
Appellee assails the statute as beyond the power of Congress over interstate commerce, and hence an invasion of a field of action said to be reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment. Appellee also complains that the
statute denies to it equal [58 S.Ct. 781] protection of the laws and, in violation of the Fifth Amendment, deprives it of its property without due process of law, particularly in that the statute purports to make binding and conclusive upon appellee the legislative declaration that appellee's product "is an adulterated article of food injurious to the public health and its sale constitutes a fraud on the public."
First. The power to regulate commerce is the power "to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed," Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 196, and extends to the prohibition of shipments in such commerce. Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137; Lottery Case, 188 U.S. 321; United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366; Hope v. United States, 227 U.S. 308; Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland R. Co., 242 U.S. 311; United States v. Hill, 248 U.S. 420; McCormick & Co. v. Brown, 286 U.S. 131. The power "is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations other than are prescribed by the Constitution." Gibbons v. Ogden, supra, 196. Hence, Congress is free to exclude from interstate commerce articles whose use in the states for which they are destined it may reasonably conceive to be injurious to the public health, morals or welfare, Reid v. Colorado, supra; Lottery Case, supra; Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45; Hope v. United States, supra, or which contravene the policy of the state of their destination. Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Central R. Co., 299 U.S. 334. Such regulation is not a forbidden invasion of state power either because its motive or its consequence is to restrict the use of articles of commerce within the states of destination, and is not prohibited unless by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. And it is no objection to the exertion of the power to regulate interstate commerce that its exercise is attended by the same incidents which attend the exercise of the police power of the states. Seven Cases v. United States, 239 U.S. 510, 514; Hamilton v. Kentucky
Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146, 156. The prohibition of the shipment of filled milk in interstate commerce is a permissible regulation of commerce, subject only to the restrictions of the Fifth Amendment.
Second. The prohibition of shipment of appellee's product in interstate commerce does not infringe the Fifth Amendment. Twenty years ago, this Court, in Hebe Co. v. Shaw, 248 U.S. 297, held that a state law which forbids the manufacture and sale of a product assumed to be wholesome and nutritive, made of condensed skimmed milk, compounded with coconut oil, is not forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment. The power of the legislature to secure a minimum of particular nutritive elements in a widely used article of food and to protect the public from fraudulent substitutions was not doubted, and the Court thought that there was ample scope for the legislative judgment that prohibition of the offending article was an appropriate means of preventing injury to the public.
We see no persuasive reason for departing from that ruling here, where the Fifth Amendment is concerned, and since none is suggested, we might rest decision wholly on the presumption of constitutionality. But affirmative evidence also sustains the statute. In twenty years, evidence has steadily accumulated of the danger to the public health from the general consumption of foods which have been stripped of elements essential to the maintenance of health. The Filled Milk Act was adopted by Congress after committee hearings, in the course of which eminent scientists and health experts testified. An extensive investigation was made of the commerce in milk compounds in which vegetable oils have been substituted for natural milk fat, and of the effect upon the public health of the use of such compounds as a food substitute for milk. The conclusions drawn from evidence presented at the hearings were embodied in reports of the
House Committee on Agriculture, H.R. No. 365, 67th Cong., 1st Sess., and the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, Sen.Rep. No. 987, 67th Cong., 4th Sess. Both committees concluded, as the statute itself declares, that the use of filled milk as a substitute for pure milk is generally injurious [58 S.Ct. 782] to health and facilitates fraud on the public.2
There is nothing in the Constitution which compels a legislature, either national or state, to ignore such evidence, nor need it disregard the other evidence which amply supports the conclusions of the Congressional committees that the danger is greatly enhanced where an inferior product, like appellee's, is indistinguishable from
a valuable food of almost universal use, thus making fraudulent distribution easy and protection of the consumer difficult.3
[58 S.Ct. 783] Here, the prohibition of the statute is inoperative unless the product is "in imitation or semblance milk, cream, or skimmed milk, whether or not condensed." Whether in such circumstances the public would be adequately protected by the prohibition of false labels and false branding imposed by the Pure Food and Drugs Act, or whether it was necessary to go farther and prohibit a substitute food product thought to be injurious to health if used as a substitute when the two are not distinguishable, was a matter for the legislative Judgment, and not that of courts. Hebe Co. v. Shaw, supra; South Carolina v. Barnwell Bros. Inc., 303 U.S. 177. It was upon this ground that the prohibition of the sale of oleomargarine made in imitation of butter was held not to infringe the Fourteenth...
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