Lawson v. Royal Riding Stables, Inc.
| Decision Date | 01 April 1940 |
| Parties | LAWSON v. ROYAL RIDING STABLES, Inc. (two cases). |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Exceptions from Superior Court, Berkshire County; Dillon, Judge.
Actions of tort by Gilbert Lawson, Jr., by next friend, and by Gilbert Lawson, Sr., against Royal Riding Stables, Incorporated, for damages for personal injuries suffered when struck by horse and for consequential damages resulting from such injuries. On plaintiffs' exceptions to verdict entered by the court for defendant, notwithstanding jury's verdict in each action for $300 for plaintiffs.
Exceptions sustained, and judgment rendered for plaintiffs.H. L. Harrington, of Adams, for plaintiff.
W. J. Donovan, of Adams, for defendant.
The first of these two actions was brought on behalf of a minor, hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff, to recover damages for personal injuries received when struck by a horse on the premises of the defendant. The second action was brought by his father to recover consequential damages resulting from such injuries. The cases were tried together before a jury and there was a verdict for the plaintiff and for his father. Thereafter, upon leave reserved, the judge entered a verdict for the defendant in each case. G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 231, § 120. To this the plaintiffs excepted.
Viewing the evidence in its aspects most favorable to the contentions of the plaintiffs the jury would have been warranted in finding the facts here related.
The defendant, a corporation, owned and operated, in the town of Adams, a stable where horses were kept ‘for riding, selling and exchange.’ A man named Katz was president, treasurer and manager of the defendant corporation. A man named Andrews was employed by the corporation as a stableman. Other employees received their instructions from Katz, and Andrews ‘had nothing to do about the other employees' work.’ A boy named Brown was also employed at the stable, and another boy, whose name was Clayton, ‘worked there at odd times.’ At the time of the plaintiff's injury Andrews and Clayton were the only employees of the defendant on the premises.
There was on the premises a building used as a stable for the horses. Behind the building was ‘a large pasture.’ There was an office in a corner on the first floor of the building and a door from the office provided access to the stable from the area in front of the building. In front of the building and between it and the street, the defendant maintained a ‘pony pen’ where children rode ponies.
The plaintiff, a twelve year old boy, for some time before the day of his accident had ‘frequented’ the premises of the defendant. He had often led ponies ridden by children in the ‘pen’ and had received tips from their parents for such service. There was no evidence that Katz ever requested the plaintiff to render such services or paid him therefor, or that Katz personally ever asked the plaintiff to do anything on the premises. There was evidence that the plaintiff did ‘odd jobs' at the stable such as watering, feeding and cleaning horses at the request of Andrews, and that Katz was sometimes present when such requests were made by Andrews. On one occasion, in the absence of Andrews, the employee Brown requested the plaintiff to do some work and Katz was present when the request was made and when the work was done.
On the day of the accident a man came to the stable to look at the horses. At the request of Katz ‘to bring up a horse’ for the visitor to inspect, Andrews did so. A little later Katz asked Andrews ‘to get the roan horse’ referring to a large roan horse weighing fourteen hundred and fifty to fifteen hundred pounds. The roan horse ‘was then, with other horses, loose at the far end of the pasture.’ There was evidence that this horse was gentle and during the period of the defendant's ownership had exhibited no viciousness.
Katz and the visitor and Andrews were inside the stable when Katz directed Andrews ‘to get the roan horse.’ Upon the order being given, Andrews went in to the office and to its outer door. There were then three boys, including the plaintiff, at the ‘pony pen.’ At the office door Andrews called for two boys ‘to help catch the horses.’ There was evidence that Katz could have heard Andrews' request. Upon the summons of Andrews, one of the three boys remained at the ‘pen’ and the other two boys, one of whom was the plaintiff, came through the office and into the stable passing Katz and the visitor in the stable and going out the rear door. There was evidence that Katz was in a position to see the boys as they went by.
Andrews remained outside the rear door of the stable while the plaintiff and the other boy who was called from the ‘pony pen’ and a third boy, named Clayton, went to the end of the pasture and drove the horses, including the roan horse, up to the stable and into a narrow lane at the end of the stable and there the horses stopped. Andrews who continued to remain at the rear door of the stable told the boys to stop the roan horse if it tried to come out of the lane. The boys let the other horses out into the pasture and stood in a line at the outlet of the lane to block the escape of the roan horse. Then the roan horse started to run out of the lane. It ‘wanted to follow’ the other horses. It came ‘charging back’ toward the other horses. It ‘went for’ the plaintiff. He tried to get out of its way by climbing a manure pile but the horse ‘went over him’ and ‘trampled him.’ There was no evidence that the plaintiff had ever before participated in such an operation.
The fundamental question here in dispute is whether the evidence warranted a finding that such a relationship existed between the defendant and the plaintiff at the time of the injury as to impose on the defendant the duty to use ordinary care for the plaintiff's safety. The defendant contends that the plaintiff in what he did was merely a volunteer, and hence, since there was no evidence of wanton or wilful or reckless misconduct chargeable to the defendant, it could not be found liable.
The evidence did not warrant the finding of the existence of the relationship of master and servant created under an express contract of hire. It is, however, not necessary that there be an express contract of hire in order to create a relationship between a master and another...
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