Shields v. Utah Idaho Cent Co

Citation59 S.Ct. 160,83 L.Ed. 111,305 U.S. 177
Decision Date05 December 1938
Docket NumberNo. 28,28
PartiesSHIELDS v. UTAH IDAHO CENT. R. CO
CourtUnited States Supreme Court

Messrs. Homer S. Cummings, Atty. Gen., and Robert H. Jackson, Sol. Gen., for petitioners.

Mr. J. A. Howell, of Ogden, Utah, and Robert E. Quirk, of Washington, D.C., for respondent.

[Argument of Counsel from page 178 intentionally omitted] Mr. Chief Justice HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents the questions of the effect of a determination by the Interstate Commerce Commission, for the purposes of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq., that the respondent is not an interurban electric railway, and of the scope of judicial review of that determination.

The Railway Labor Act, which applies to railroads engaged in interstate commerce, excepts any 'interurban' electric railway unless it is operating as a part of a general steam-railroad system of transportation.1 The Interstate Commerce Commission is 'authorized and directed upon request of the Mediation Board or upon complaint of any party interested to determine after hearing whether any line operated by electric power' falls within the exception. At the request of the Mediation Board, the Interstate Commerce Commission after hearing determined that the lines of respondent, the Utah Idaho Central Railroad Company, do not constitute an interurban electric railway. 214 I.C.C. 707. The Mediation Board ordered respondent to post the formal notice prescribed by Section 2, Eighth, of the Railway Labor Act.2 Respondent did not comply. Failure to publish the notice subjects 'the carrier, officer, or agent offending' to criminal penalties.3 Respondent, insisting that its line is an interurban electric railway and thus excepted from the Railway Labor Act, and alleging the invalidity of the Act, brought this suit against the United States Attorney for the District of Utah to restrain him from prosecuting any proceeding based upon an alleged violation of the Act.

The District Court took jurisdiction, permitted respondent to try the question de novo, decided that respondent was an interurban electric railway, and granted a permanent injunction. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 10 Cir., 95 F.2d 911. We granted certiorari. 304 U.S. 556, 58 S.Ct. 1055, 82 L.Ed. 1524. May 31, 1938.

As respondent, however characterized, is engaged in interstate transportation, the question whether it should be subjected to the requirements of the Railway Labor Act, relating to the adjustment of labor disputes, was one for the decision of Congress. These requirements were prescribed in the exercise by Congress of its constitutional control over interstate commerce. Texas & New Orleans R.R. Co. v. Railway Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 50 S.Ct. 427, 74 L.Ed. 1034; Virginian Railway Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 57 S.Ct. 592, 81 L.Ed. 789. As Congress was free to establish the categories which should be excepted, Congress could bring to its aid an administrative agency to determine the question of fact whether a particular railroad fell within the exception, and Congress could make that factual determination, after hearing and upon evidence, conclusive. St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 51, 56 S.Ct. 720, 725, 80 L.Ed. 1033. For that purpose Congress could create a new administrative agency or use one already existing. And as the questions of fact involved would relate to methods of railroad transportation, and thus to a field in which the Interstate Commerce Commission had peculiar expertness, Congress could fittingly commit the determination to that body.

Congress did not define the term 'interurban'. Despite the desirability of such a definition4 and the diffi- culties occasioned by its absence, the term is not so destitute of meaning that it can be denied effect as a valid description. Respondent, standing upon the exception, necessarily treats it as valid and hence as susceptible of application. That view presupposes that the term 'interurban' denotes distinguishing factual characteristics which on appropriate inquiry may be ascertained. We have so treated the term in other relations. Piedmont & Northern Rwy. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 286 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 541, 76 L.Ed. 1115; United States v. Chicago North Shore & Milwaukee R.R. Co., 288 U.S. 1, 53 S.Ct. 245, 77 L.Ed. 583. The conferring of authority upon the Interstate Commerce Commission to determine whether a particular electric railway is an interurban one cannot be regarded as an unconstitutional delegation of power. See United States v. Chicago North Shore & Milwaukee R.R. Co., supra, at pages 13, 14, 53 S.Ct. at pages 248, 249.

In the instant case, the Interstate Commerce Commission has made the determination contemplated by the statute and we are not concerned with the questions which might arise in its absence. The Commission's determination was one of fact. Shannahan v. United States, 303 U.S. 596, 599, 58 S.Ct. 732, 733, 734, 82 L.Ed. 1039. What effect shall be ascribed to it? The argument is pressed that the determination is at best persuasive and not in any wise binding upon the courts. It is urged that the Commission was restricted to determining whether respondent was operated as a part of a general steam-railroad system of transportation, which concededly it was not; that the determination of the Commission was not an 'order'; that Congress has not manifested an intention that the determination should be binding in judicial proceedings and that in the nature of things it could not be made binding in criminal prosecutions.

We are unable to agree with the view expressed in the court below that the Commission was confined to determining whether respondent was operated as a part of a general steam-railroad system of transportation. Before reaching that point—as to which there was no question—the Commission had to determine whether respondent was an 'interurban' line. That has been the administrative construction of the statutory provision5 and we see no reason to doubt its correctness.

In considering the effect of the Commission's determination, the fundamental question is the intent of Congress. The language of the provision points to definitive action. The Commission is to 'determine'. The Commission must determine 'after hearing'. The requirement of a 'hearing' has obvious reference 'to the tradition of judicial proceedings in which evidence is received and weighed by the trier of the facts'. The 'hearing' is 'the hearing of evidence and argument'. Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 480, 56 S.Ct. 906, 911, 80 L.Ed. 1288. And the manifest purpose in requiring a hearing is to comply with the requirements of due process upon which the parties affected by the determination of an administrative body are entitled to insist. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 91, 33 S.Ct. 185, 186, 57 L.Ed. 431. The Commission is not only authorized but 'directed' to give the hearing and make the determination when requested. We cannot think that a determination so prescribed and safeguarded was intended to have no legal effect. On the contrary, in view of the nature and purpose of the proceeding, we must regard the determination as binding on both the carrier and the Mediation Board. The latter having obtained the determination could not ignore it; neither could the carrier.

We have held that the determination of the Commission is not an 'order' reviewable under the Urgent De- ficiencies Act of October 22, 1913.6 Shannahan v. United States, supra. But we have not held that the determination of the Commission was not subject to judicial review by other procedure, a question which, as we said in the Shannahan Case, we had no occasion there to consider. Id., at page 603, 58 S.Ct. 735. The nature of the determination points to the propriety of judicial review. For, while the determination is made by the Interstate Commerce Commission for the purposes of the Railway Labor Act and not for further proceedings by the Commission itself, it is none the less a part of a regulatory scheme. It has the effect, if validly made, of subjecting the respondent to the requirements of the Railway Labor Act which was enacted to regulate the activities of transportation companies engaged in interstate commerce.7 The Mediation Board has ordered the posting of the prescribed notice that disputes between the carrier and its employees will be handled under the Railway Labor Act. Disobedience is immediately punishable and it is made the duty of the United States Attorney to institute proceedings against violators. Respondent has invoked the equity jurisdiction to restrain such prosecution and the Government does not challenge the propriety of that procedure. Equity jurisdiction may be invoked when it is essential to the protection of the rights asserted, even though the complainant seeks to enjoin the bringing of criminal actions. Philadelphia Company v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605, 621, 622, 32 S.Ct. 340, 345, 56 L.Ed. 570. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 37, 38, 36 S.Ct. 7, 8, 9, 60 L.Ed. 131, L.R.A.1916D, 545, Ann.Cas.1917B, 283. Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 214, 44 S.Ct. 15, 17, 68 L.Ed. 255. To support its contention that equitable relief is appropriate, respondent points to the peculiar difficulties which confront it under the congressional legislation. Congress has enacted two sets of statutes which involve the application of the same criterion. If respondent is subject to the Railway Labor Act, it is excluded from the application of the National Labor Relations Act;8 otherwise not. The Railroad Retirement Act of 19379 has a like proviso excepting interurban electric railways and authorizing the Interstate Commerce Commission to determine whether a particular electric railway falls within the exception. A similar provision is found in the Carriers Taxing Act of 193710 and in the Railroad...

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