Fritz v. White Consolidated Industries, Inc.

• Decision Date: 13 June 2003
• Parties: CATHERINE FRITZ et al., Respondents,<BR>v.<BR>WHITE CONSOLIDATED INDUSTRIES, INC., Appellant. (Appeal No. 3.)
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

306 A.D.2d 896

762 N.Y.S.2d 711

CATHERINE FRITZ et al., Respondents,

v.WHITE CONSOLIDATED INDUSTRIES, INC., Appellant. (Appeal No. 3.)

Decided June 13, 2003.

Present — Green, J.P., Hurlbutt, Kehoe, Gorski and Hayes, JJ.

It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously reversed on the law without costs, the motion is granted and a new trial is granted.

Memorandum

Plaintiffs commenced this action to recover for property damage arising from a fire that occurred on November 18, 1991. The fire allegedly started in a dehumidifier manufactured by defendant. Although four causes of action were asserted in the complaint, only the causes of action for strict products liability and breach of implied warranty were submitted to the jury, and Supreme Court properly instructed the jury with respect to those causes of action. With respect to the strict products liability cause of action, the jury rendered a verdict finding, inter alia, that the dehumidifier was defective when it left defendant's control and finding plaintiff Catherine Fritz 40% at fault and defendant 60% at fault for plaintiffs' property damage. With respect to the breach of implied warranty cause of action, the jury rendered a verdict in favor of defendant, finding that the dehumidifier was fit to be used for its ordinary purposes. Defendant's attorney objected to the verdict on the ground that it was inherently inconsistent for the jury to find that the dehumidifier was both defective and fit to be used for its ordinary purposes. Upon questioning the jury to clarify the verdict, the court determined that the inconsistency could be resolved by asking the jury to find whether the dehumidifier was fit to be used for its ordinary purposes on the date of the fire, rather than on the date on which it left defendant's control. Defendant's attorney objected to that revised question on the ground that it did not set forth the appropriate standard for determining whether there was a breach of implied warranty. The court overruled the objection, and the jury returned a verdict finding that the dehumidifier was not reasonably fit to be used for its ordinary purposes on the date of the fire and that the dehumidifier was a substantial factor in causing the fire. Defendant moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, contending that the evidence established that the dehumidifier was not defective when it was sold and, alternatively, defendant sought a new trial based on the inconsistent verdict. The court denied defendant's motion, and this appeal ensued.

Contrary to defendant's contention, the court properly refused to grant defendant judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Plaintiffs presented testimony with respect to both causes of action that the design of the dehumidifier was defective because it failed to incorporate secondary protection to the overload mechanism. Thus, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, we conclude that there is a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences that could lead rational persons to conclude that the dehumidifier was defective (see generally Cohen v Hallmark Cards, 45 NY2d 493, 499 [1978]; Cramer v Benedictine Hosp., 301 AD2d 924, 928-929 [2003]; see also CPLR 4404 [a]). Defendant further contends that plaintiffs failed to prove that the dehumidifier was operating at the time of the fire and that the verdict is therefore against the...