Milton v. Wainwright

• Decision Date: 06 November 1969
• Docket Number: No. 69-705-Civ-CF.,69-705-Civ-CF.
• Citation: 306 F. Supp. 929
• Parties: George William MILTON, Petitioner, v. Louie L. WAINWRIGHT, Director, Division of Corrections, State of Florida, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

306 F. Supp. 929

George William MILTON, Petitioner, v. Louie L. WAINWRIGHT, Director, Division of Corrections, State of Florida, Respondent.

No. 69-705-Civ-CF.

United States District Court S.D. Florida.

November 6, 1969.

Bruce E. Lazar, of Dubbin, Schiff, Berkman & Dubbin, Miami, Fla., for petitioner, George William Milton.

Jesse J. McCrary, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Miami, Fla., for respondent, Louie L. Wainwright.

FULTON, Chief Judge.

Beginning in June of 1957 George William Milton told friends he was going with a girl named Minnie Lee Claybon who had a steady job and gave him money. He didn't like her, he said, because she was ugly, and he'd rather not be seen on the streets with her, but he liked her money. George was a boxer. He was going to be a champion, he said, another Joe Louis. He had the build for it, at 6 feet 2 inches, and 185 pounds. All he needed was Minnie's money so he could buy equipment and finish training. In March of 1958 George and Minnie rented an apartment together in Miami. George asked the landlord if he knew of a good insurance company. During March and April of that year George took out three life insurance policies on Minnie, with a combined value of $8,500, payable in the event of accidental death. George didn't have much money. In fact at one point he had to hock some clothes for $2.00, but he kept those insurance premiums paid. During those same two months George repeatedly contacted his girlfriend, Lucille Williams, telling her he would soon be coming into a lot of money and would meet her in New York, where they would be married.

Late in the afternoon of May 31, 1958, George bought a cheap, eight-year old car. The back doors were equipped with safety devices which could be used to seal them from the outside so that children couldn't get out. George and Minnie had no children, although Minnie was several months pregnant. Sometime that night George secured the safety locks so that the rear doors, which had been open when he bought the car, were sealed. He took Minnie out that evening, and it was very late when they returned home. Minnie had been drinking and was asleep. George put her into the back seat and drove to the Miami River. There, in the predawn of June 1, he aimed his car at the only portion of river bank in the area not blocked by pilings or boats, a seventeen foot gap, put the machine into high gear, stepped on the accelerator, and jumped clear just as the car went into the river. His shoulder was hurt by impact with the ground, causing him to roll into the river, from which he was rescued several moments later by a boat captain roused by his shouts. Minnie, if she ever woke up, found herself trapped with windows closed and doors sealed. But that was all right, according to George, because Minnie was only a young Negro girl and the law doesn't care how many Negroes get murdered. Besides, he had committed the perfect crime, with no witnesses, as he later bragged.

This was the tale the witnesses told at the three-day first degree murder trial in November, 1958. The jury returned a verdict of guilty, with a recommendation of mercy, and the Court sentenced George to life in prison. That was eleven years ago, and as the years have passed George Milton has petitioned and repetitioned both Florida and Federal Courts in his efforts to overthrow this conviction. So numerous have been his court proceedings that in its response to an earlier habeas corpus petition filed in this Court, Case No. 67-234-Civ.-CF, the State despaired of its normal practice of delineating prior history of a habeas corpus claim and merely noted that such a recital in this case "* * * would unnecessarily burden this Court to wade through the matters."

Milton charges that he would not have been convicted if the State had not been allowed to introduce into evidence an oral confession, which he claims was involuntary. In the earlier habeas corpus proceeding before this Court, the State acknowledged the facts to be as petitioner alleged, and furnished a transcript of his trial, which included an extensive hearing on his voluntariness claim. Believing that all pertinent facts had been brought out at petitioner's trial, this Court considered the merits of the petition and entered an Order denying the relief sought. Because important Constitutional questions are involved, this Court certified that probable cause existed for an appeal of its Order. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals did not review the merits of petitioner's claim, holding instead that Milton had not exhausted his State remedies, despite the State's assertion that he had. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of this Court but suggested that Milton reapply for State relief. Milton v. Wainwright, 396 F.2d 214 (5 Cir. 1968). Milton has now done this. On September 3, 1968, the sentencing court denied relief under a Fla.R.Crim.P. 1.850, 33 F.S.A. motion, without hearing, having considered only the records and files in the case. Thereafter, the Florida Supreme Court refused to docket Milton's State habeas corpus petition on the ground that the rules of that Court do not require the docketing of successive petitions upon issues previously determined in that or any other Court.

This Court thus found itself in exactly the same position as it was before ruling upon the previous petition, except that this time the Court of Appeals had said that the available materials had a "remarkable, if not quite adequate, completeness." Milton v. Wainwright, supra, at 215. The State was given an opportunity to hold an evidentiary hearing and refused to do so. In view of the Appellate Court's observation that the available facts are not complete, this Court felt mandated to order an evidentiary hearing in this cause. It therefore appointed counsel for Milton and scheduled a hearing.

At the hearing both sides represented to the Court that they had carefully investigated this matter and could unearth no facts not included in the State trial court record. The State admits the facts alleged by Milton, and relies solely, on the law to sustain its position. Despite repeated questioning by the Court, counsel for Milton insisted that the record is factually complete. Therefore, the hearing in this Court consisted entirely of legal argument.

The factual basis for Milton's involuntariness claim is simple. He was indicted for the first degree murder of Minnie Lee Claybon, also known as Minnie Milton, and was incarcerated pending trial. Archie Langford, a police officer, was placed in the cell with Milton, who was told that the officer was being held on investigation of a murder charge. The officer remained in the cell with Milton one night, the following day, and part of a second day. During that time Milton was not told of his cellmate's connection with the police force. Under instructions from his superiors, the officer questioned Milton as opportunities presented themselves in an effort to elicit from him evidence concerning the crime. The testimony of this police officer as to statements made to him by Milton during this period of joint incarceration comprises the oral confession which Milton charges was involuntary.

Milton argues that the oral confession was inadmissible because it was obtained by coercive methods and, therefore, involuntarily given. This allegation was exhaustively heard and determined adversely to Milton by the trial judge at his original trial. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 this determination is presumed correct. The opportunity afforded Milton at his trial to establish the alleged involuntary character of the confession comported fully with the most recent decisions outlining the requirements of due process.

In Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376-377, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 1780-1781, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964), the United States Supreme Court emphasized:

the defendant's constitutional right at some stage in the proceedings to object to the use of the confession and to have a fair hearing and a reliable determination on the issue of voluntariness, a

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