Union Pacific Railroad Company v. Woodahl

Decision Date10 February 1970
Docket NumberCiv. No. 810.
Citation308 F. Supp. 1002
PartiesUNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY; Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific Railroad Company; Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company; Great Northern Railway Company; and Northern Pacific Railway Company, Plaintiffs, v. Bob WOODAHL, Attorney General of the State of Montana; John L. Adams, Jr., as County Attorney of Yellowstone County, Montana, and as Class Representative on behalf of each and every County Attorney in the State of Montana, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Montana

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Cale Crowley, Crowley, Kilbourne, Haughey, Hanson & Gallagher, Billings, Mont., for plaintiffs.

Robert L. Woodahl, Atty. Gen. of Montana, Helena, Mont., and Charles C. Lovell, Asst. Atty. Gen., Great Falls, for defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

BATTIN, District Judge.

In this action under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. Section 2201, plaintiff railroad companies seek a judgment declaring certain Montana statutes unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.1 Plaintiffs also seek to have defendants enjoined from prosecuting any actions pursuant to the Montana statutes. A motion for summary judgment has been filed by plaintiffs with a brief in support thereof. With a supporting brief, defendants have filed consolidated motions which may be summarized as follows:

1. A motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that:
(a) The complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted;
(b) The court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit;
(c) Relief may only be granted by a three-judge panel;
(d) No justiciable controversy exists;
(e) The suit is an improper class action; and
(f) The State of Montana has not consented to the suit.
2. A motion for an order changing venue to the Helena Division of the United States District Court for the District of Montana.

Plaintiffs have filed an affidavit of an attorney who appeared in behalf of the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific Railroad Company during the 1969 Montana Legislative Assembly. The affidavit states in part that employees of plaintiffs have indicated that efforts will be made to enforce the state law without regard to whether the operation of railroads in Montana affects interstate commerce. John L. Adams, one of the defendants, has filed an affidavit in which he states that he knows of no criminal charges which have been filed against any of the plaintiffs in Yellowstone County, or in any other county for violation of Section 41-1124, Revised Codes of Montana, 1947. He further states that he knows of no such criminal charges which are contemplated.

THE STATUTES

The 1907 Montana Legislature passed a statute2 regulating the hours of labor of certain employees of railroads operated "in whole or in part" within the state. The statute was approved on February 5, 1907. The 1969 Montana Legislature amended the statute by deleting the word "steam" before "railroads" at the beginning of the first sentence, and reducing the maximum consecutive hours of labor from sixteen to twelve. As it appears today, therefore, the statute provides as follows:

"Railway employees — hours of labor. On all lines of railroads or railways operated in whole or in part within this state, the time of labor of locomotive engineers, locomotive firemen, conductors, trainmen, operators, and agents acting as operators, employed in running or operating the locomotive engines or trains on or over such railroads or railways in this state, shall not at any time exceed twelve (12) consecutive hours, or to be on duty for more than sixteen (16) hours in the aggregate in any twenty-four (24) hour period. At least eight (8) hours shall be allowed them off duty before said engineers, firemen, conductors, trainmen, operators, and agents acting as operators, are again ordered or required to go on duty; provided, however, that nothing in this section shall be construed to allow any engineer, fireman, conductor, or trainman to desert his locomotive or train in case of accident, storms, wrecks, washouts, snow blockade, or any unavoidable delay arising from like causes, or to allow said engineer, fireman, conductor, or trainman to tie up any passenger or mail train between terminals."
Sec. 41-1123, Repl. Vol. 3 (Part 2), Revised Codes of Montana, 1947.

On March 4, 1907, less than a month after the original Montana statute was approved, Congress enacted a similar law regulating the hours of service of railroad employees. 34 Stats. 1415-1417, March 4, 1907, Chapter 2939, Section 1, 45 U.S.C. Sections 61-64. Section 61, 45 U.S.C., provides that the term "employees" means "persons actually engaged in or connected with the movement of any train." Section 62, 45 U.S. C., relating to the hours of labor provides in part as follows:

"It shall be unlawful for any common carrier, its officers, or agents, subject to sections 61-64 of this title to require or permit any employees subject to said sections to be or remain on duty for a longer period than sixteen consecutive hours, and whenever any such employee of such common carrier shall have been continuously on duty for sixteen hours he shall be relieved and not required or permitted again to go on duty until he has had at least ten consecutive hours off duty; and no such employee who has been on duty sixteen hours in the aggregate in any twenty-four-hour period shall be required or permitted to continue or again go on duty without having had at least eight consecutive hours off duty: * * *."

Both the Montana and the federal acts provide criminal sanctions for violations of the maximum hours of labor.3 The maximum penalty under the Montana law is a five hundred dollar fine or sixty days in jail. In addition, the railroad is liable in damages for injuries resulting from the violations. The maximum penalty under the federal law is a fine of five hundred dollars.

CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES

Plaintiffs contend that the federal statute became the supreme law of the land upon its enactment, and that the Montana statute then became void. Plaintiffs further contend that the conflict between the statutes is clear and cannot be reconciled by statutory construction; that a three-judge court would not have jurisdiction because only the federal supremacy clause is involved; that jurisdiction to enter a declaratory judgment is vested in this court because, under 28 U.S.C. Section 1337, the action arises under an Act of Congress regulating commerce; and that this suit is not premature because the state has threatened enforcement of the statute. Defendants, on the other hand, contend that this court should abstain from declaring the Montana law unconstitutional because the law has not been construed in the courts of the state and no threat of irreparable harm exists. Defendants further contend that the suit is prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution because it is against a sovereign state by citizens of other states; that the suit is premature because the state has not manifested an intent to enforce the statute; that there is no actual controversy to support a suit for a declaratory judgment; and that a three-judge tribunal is required by 28 U.S.C. Section 2281. Defendants also assert that the suit is an improper class action and that venue must be changed to the Helena Division.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
VENUE

Rule 4 of the Rules of Procedure of the United States District Court for the District of Montana provides in part:

"All civil cases are assignable to that Division of the District wherein they properly belong by conformity as near as may be possible to the laws of the State of Montana governing the place of trial in the Courts thereof, * * *"

Defendants contend that the Montana Supreme Court held in State ex rel. Fulton v. District Court, 139 Mont. 573, 366 P.2d 435 (1961) that actions against public officials acting in their public capacity must be brought in the First Judicial District (Helena). The case does not propose such a broad rule. The action was for a writ of prohibition against the District Court for Montana's Eighth Judicial District wherein a suit was filed against the State Board of Equalization. The court stated, at 139 Mont. 581, 366 P.2d 440:

"While not necessary to a determination of the issue before us, we should mention that section 93-2902, R.C.M., 1947, would require the venue of this action to be in the First Judicial District, and section 84-1508, R. C.M., 1947, also requires it."

Section 84-1508, R.C.M.1947, has no application here, since it empowers the District Court for the First Judicial District to compel the attendance of witnesses to testifiy before the State Board of Equalization. Section 93-2902, R.C. M.1947, however, does apply. It provides in part:

"Actions for the following causes must be tried in the county where the cause, or some part thereof, arose, subject to the like power of the court to change the place of trial:
* * * * * *
"2. Against a public officer, or person specially appointed to execute his duties, for an act done by him in virtue of his office; or against a person who, by his command or in his aid, does anything touching the duties of such office."

Section 93-2904 provides that in all other cases the action will be tried "in the county in which the defendants, or any one of them, may reside at the commencement of the action." On the basis of these statutes plaintiffs argue that either the Helena Division or the Billings Division of the United States District Court for the District of Montana is a proper venue for this action. In the opinion of the court, plaintiffs' view is in "conformity as near as may be possible to the laws of the State of Montana." Some of the defendants reside in each division and part of the basis of the action involves each division. Furthermore, the Billings Division encompasses twenty counties. Hence,...

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