308 F.Supp. 959 (N.D.Ill. 1970), 68 C 2311, Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc.

Docket Nº:68 C 2311.
Citation:308 F.Supp. 959
Party Name:Mary Burke SPROGIS, Plaintiff, v. UNITED AIR LINES, INC., a Corporation, Defendant.
Case Date:January 21, 1970
Court:United States District Courts, 7th Circuit, Northern District of Illinois
 
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Page 959

308 F.Supp. 959 (N.D.Ill. 1970)

Mary Burke SPROGIS, Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED AIR LINES, INC., a Corporation, Defendant.

No. 68 C 2311.

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.

Jan. 21, 1970

Richard F. Watt, Irving M. King and Sheli Z. Rosenberg, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff.

Stuart Bernstein, Mayer, Friedlich, Spiess, Tierney, Brown & Platt, Chicago, Ill., for defendant.

Page 960

PERRY, District Judge.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

This action, having been considered on the motion of the Plaintiff for summary judgment in her behalf and the cross-motion for summary judgment filed by the Defendant, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:

Findings of Fact

1. This action arises under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.

2. Plaintiff is a female who was employed by Defendant as an airline stewardess until discharged by Defendant from that position on or about June 19, 1966.

3. Defendant is a Delaware Corporation, having its principal office in Elk Grove Village, Cook County, Illinois, which is within the Northern District of Illinois.

4. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer, among other practices, to fail or refuse to hire any individual or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of sex, except where sex is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.

5. Defendant maintained a policy applying solely to females employed as stewardesses, requiring that they be unmarried when first employed and that they thereafter remain unmarried while so employed. The policy of Defendant, as in effect at the time of Plaintiff's discharge, called for the discharge of any stewardess who married.

6. Defendant employs both male and female employees; there is no policy, as described in Paragraph 5 above, which has been maintained or enforced against male employees, including male flight cabin attendants or stewards. Under the policy described in Paragraph 5, Defendant has dismissed from their positions females employed as stewardesses immediately upon notification of the marriage of such employees, but no action is or has been taken against male employees upon marriage, and male employees have been permitted to continue employment without regard to marital status.

7. Pursuant to the above policy Defendant discharged Plaintiff as a stewardess on or about June 19, 1966, for the sole reason that she is a female and became married while in the employ of Defendant in the capacity as stewardess.

8. On...

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