Golonka v. State, Dept. of Ed., Docket No. 50152

• Decision Date: 25 March 1981
• Docket Number: Docket No. 50152
• Citation: 308 N.W.2d 425,106 Mich.App. 28
• Parties: Lynn GOLONKA and the South Redford Education Association, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. STATE of Michigan, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION and the South Redford SchoolDistrict, Defendant-Appellee. 106 Mich.App. 28, 308 N.W.2d 425
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 425

308 N.W.2d 425

Lynn GOLONKA and the South Redford Education Association Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. STATE of Michigan, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION and the South Redford SchoolDistrict, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 50152.

106 Mich.App. 28, 308 N.W.2d 425

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

March 25, 1981.

Released for Publication July 13, 1981.

[106 MICHAPP 29] Daniel J. Hoekenga, Southfield, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., Richard P. Gartner, Asst. Atty. Gen., for Dept. of Ed.

Thomas P. Hustoles, Detroit, for South Redford School Dist.

Before T. M. BURNS, P. J., and MAHER and RILEY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

The question on appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying plaintiff Golonka's motion for summary judgment, the practical effect of which was to deny her request for a writ of mandamus which would have compelled the Michigan[106 MICHAPP 30] Department of Education to certify her as a teacher consultant. ¹

Plaintiff Golonka, certified by the State Board of Education as a general education teacher and a special education teacher, taught in the South Redford School District. As stipulated to by the parties, for more than ten years she has taught handicapped students with learning disabilities, who have been mainstreamed ² with nonhandicapped students. She had not, however, completed at least one year of teaching experience in a special education classroom as a special education teacher. Because of her impending layoff as a general education teacher, she and the South Redford School District sought to determine whether the State Board of Education would approve her as a teacher consultant under rule 340.1790, 1979 AC R 340.1790.

[106 MICHAPP 31] Rule 340.1790 was promulgated by the State Board of Education pursuant to its authority under the Special Education Code and provides as follows:

"Rule 90. A teacher consultant for special education programs and services shall meet the following requirements for full approval by the state board of education:

"(a) Full approval by the state board of education as a teacher in 1 or more areas of special education.

"(b) A minimum of 3 years of satisfactory teaching experience, including at least 1 year of experience teaching handicapped pupils.

"(c) Recommendation to the department, by letter, by the employing superintendent or his designee for approval as a teacher consultant. Evidence of experience and training shall be submitted with the request for approval." (Emphasis added.)

A representative from the South Redford School District sent a letter to the State Department of Education seeking its response to the following inquiry.

"Two of our laid off teachers are fully certified by the state board of education in one or more areas of special education. Although neither teacher has taught in a selfcontained classroom, both have taught many identified handicapped students that have been mainstreamed into their classrooms. Does their work with mainstreamed students qualify them for teacher consultant approval?"

The State Department's response was that "(a) person must have worked in a special education classroom as a special education teacher." In reliance upon this response, the South Redford School District refused to assign plaintiff Golonka to a position as a teacher consultant. She then began [106 MICHAPP 32] direct correspondence with the State Department of Education. The defendant department interpreted the phrase "at least 1 year of experience teaching handicapped pupils" to mean that a teacher consultant must have at least one year of experience teaching handicapped people in a self-contained, special education classroom. Therefore, the department argued, even though plaintiff Golonka had taught handicapped students who had been mainstreamed into her general education classroom, she was not certifiable as a teacher consultant because she had not spent at least one year teaching handicapped students in a self-contained, special education classroom.

On August 28, 1979, plaintiff Golonka filed a complaint seeking a writ of mandamus to compel defendants to certify her as a teacher consultant under Rule 340.1790. In response to an order to show cause issued by the trial judge, the defendant Department of Education argued that the writ should be denied since, according to its interpretation of Rule 340.1790, plaintiff Golonka did not meet the requirements necessary to be a certified teacher consultant.

On December 10, 1979, plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment in which they claimed that defendants had failed to set forth a valid defense, GCR 1963, 117.2(2), and that there were no genuine issues of material fact, GCR 1963, 117.2(3). At a subsequent hearing held on this motion wherein both parties stipulated that there were no genuine issues of material fact, the trial court denied plaintiffs' motion and instead granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. Plaintiffs appeal as of right.

We note at the outset that had the trial court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, it would have been issuing mandamus.

[106 MICHAPP 33] The issuing of writs of mandamus is discretionary with the trial judge, and an appellate court will not disturb the trial court's ruling absent an abuse of discretion. Carlson v. City of Troy, 90 Mich.App. 543, 547, 282 N.W.2d 387 (1979). In order for a writ of mandamus to be issued, a plaintiff must have a clear legal right to performance of the specific duties sought to be compelled. Id. The trial judge was not convinced that plaintiffs were entitled to mandamus as a matter of law and suggested that plaintiffs move for a declaratory judgment rather than for summary judgment. When plaintiffs persisted with their motion for summary judgment, the trial court denied it on the ground that plaintiffs were not entitled to mandamus.

The trial judge took the position that he should defer to the administrative expertise of the Department of Education and that he should not substitute his judgment for the department's. He also concluded...