Chicot County Drainage Dist v. Baxter State Bank

Citation308 U.S. 371,60 S.Ct. 317,84 L.Ed. 329
Decision Date02 January 1940
Docket NumberNo. 122,122
PartiesCHICOT COUNTY DRAINAGE DIST. v. BAXTER STATE BANK et al
CourtUnited States Supreme Court

Messrs. E. L. McHaney, Jr., S. Lasker Ehrman, and Grover T. Owens, all of Little Rock, Ark., for petitioner.

Mr. G. W. Hendricks, of Little Rock, Ark., for respondents.

Mr. Chief Justice HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court.

Respondents brought this suit in the United States District Court for the Western Division of the Eastern District of Arkansas to recover on fourteen bonds of $1,000 each, which had been issued in 1924 by the petitioner, Chicot County Drainage District, organized under statutes of Arkansas,1 and had been in default since 1932.

In its answer, petitioner pleaded a decree of the same District Court in a proceeding instituted by petitioner to effect a plan of readjustment of its indebtedness under the Act of May 24, 1934,2 providing for 'Municipal-Debt Readjustments'. The decree recited that a plan of readjustment had been accepted by the holders of more than two-thirds of the outstanding indebtedness and was fair and equitable; that to consummate the plan and with the approval of the court petitioner had issued and sold new serial bonds to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation in the amount of $193,500 and that these new bonds were valid obligations; that, also with the approval of the court, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation had purchased outstanding obligations of petitioner to the amount of $705,087.06 which had been delivered in exchange for new bonds and canceled; that certain proceeds had been turned over to the clerk of the court and that the disbursing agent had filed his report showing that the Reconstruction Finance Corporation had purchased all the old bonds of petitioner other than the amount of $57,449.30. The decree provided for the application of the amount paid into court to the remaining old obligations of petitioner, that such obligations might be presented within one year, and that unless so presented they should be forever barred from participating in the plan of readjustment or in the fund paid into court. Except for the provision for such presentation, the decree canceled the old bonds and the holders were enjoined from thereafter asserting any claim thereon.

Petitioner pleaded this decree, which was entered in March, 1936, as res judicata. Respondents demurred to the answer. Thereupon the parties stipulated for trial without a jury.

The evidence showed respondents' ownership of the bonds in suit and that respondents had notice of the proceeding for debt readjustment. The record of that proceeding, including the final decree, was introduced. The District Court ruled in favor of respondents and the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 8 Cir., 103 F.2d 847. The decision was placed upon the ground that the decree was void because, subsequent to its entry, this Court in a proceeding relating to a municipal district in Texas had declared the statute under which the District Court had acted to be unconstitutional. Ashton v. Cameron County District, 298 U.S. 513, 56 S.Ct. 892, 80 L.Ed. 1309. In view of the importance of the question we granted certiorari. October 9, 1939. 308 U.S. 532, 60 S.Ct. 84, 84 L.Ed. —-.

The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442, 6 S.Ct. 1121, 1125, 30 L.Ed. 178; Chicago, Indianapolis & Louisville Rwy. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566, 33 S.Ct. 581, 584, 57 L.Ed. 966. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects, with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal, and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.3 Without attempting to review the different classes of cases in which the consequences of a ruling against validity have been determined in relation to the particular circumstances of past transactions, we appropriately confine our consideration to the question of res judicata as it now comes before us.

First. Apart from the contention as to the effect of the later decision as to constitutionality, all the elements necessary to constitute the defense of res judicata are present. It appears that the proceedings in the District Court to bring about a plan of readjustment were conducted in complete conformity to the statute. The Circuit Court of Appeals observed that no question had been raised as to the regularity of the court's action. The answer in the present suit alleged that the plaintiffs (respondents here) had notice of the proceeding and were parties, and the evidence was to the same effect, showing compliance with the statute in that respect. As parties, these bondholders had full opportunity to present any objections to the proceeding, not only as to its regularity, or the fairness of the proposed plan of readjustment, or the propriety of the terms of the decree, but also as to the validity of the statute under which the proceeding was brought and the plan put into effect. Apparently no question of validity was raised and the cause proceeded to decree on the assumption by all parties and the court itself that the statute was valid. There was no attempt to review the decree. If the general principles governing the defense of res judicata are applicable, these bondholders, having the opportunity to raise the question of invalidity, were not the less bound by the decree because they failed to raise it. Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352, 24 L.Ed. 195; Case v. Beauregard, 101 U.S. 688, 692, 25 L.Ed. 1004; Baltimore Steamship Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316, 319, 325, 47 S.Ct. 600, 601, 604, 71 L.Ed. 1069; Grubb v. Public Utilities Commission, 281 U.S. 470, 479, 50 S.Ct. 374, 378, 74 L.Ed. 972.

Second. The argument is pressed that the District Court was sitting as a court of bankruptcy, with the limited jurisdiction conferred by statute, and that, as the statute was later declared to be invalid, the District Court was without jurisdiction to entertain the proceeding and hence its decree is open to collateral attack. We think the argument untenable. The lower federal courts are all courts of limited jurisdiction, that is, with only the jurisdiction which Congress has prescribed. But none the less they are courts with authority, when parties are brought before them in accordance with the requirements of due process, to determine whether or not they have jurisdiction to entertain the cause and for this purpose to construe and apply the statute under which they are asked to act. Their determinations of such questions, while...

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    • California Supreme Court
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    ...another way, with no intimation that whoever disagrees must be mean or inane.'18 See also Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank (1940) 308 U.S. 371, 374, 60 S.Ct. 317, 84 L.Ed. 329; Aero Spark Plug Co. v. B. G. Corporation (1942) 2 Cir., 130 F.2d 290, 298 (Frank, J., concurri......
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    ...court has the authority to determine whether it in fact has subject matter jurisdiction. Chicot Co. Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 376, 60 S. Ct. 317, 319, 84 L.Ed. 329 (1940). In the federal judicial system, the lower courts are "all courts of limited jurisdiction, that......
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    ...§ 1441, necessitate a determination of the existence of a court's relevant jurisdiction. Chicot Cty. Drainage Dist. v. Baxter St. Bank , 308 U.S. 371, 376, 60 S.Ct. 317, 84 L.Ed. 329 (1940) (noting that "[t]he lower federal courts are all courts of limited jurisdiction, ... [b]ut none the l......
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3 books & journal articles
  • Retroactive Adjudication.
    • United States
    • Yale Law Journal Vol. 130 No. 2, November 2020
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    ...the puzzle of novel precedent in these terms, we solve it. SAMUEL BESWICK (1.) Chicot Cty. Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 374 (2.) See infra Section I.D. (3.) 576 U.S. 644, 675 (2015). (4.) See, e.g., Peter Nicolas, Backdating Marriage, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 395, 395-96, 42......
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