Loren v. Sasser

• Decision Date: 17 October 2002
• Docket Number: No. 02-11090. Non-Argument Calendar.,02-11090. Non-Argument Calendar.
• Citation: 309 F.3d 1296
• Parties: Nicole LOREN, Bettie J. Newbold, and Charlene Janke, by and through Veronica Aguirre, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Charles M. SASSER, Jr., Hernando Beach, Inc., a Florida corporation, Hernando Beach South Property Owners Association, Inc., a Florida corporation, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

309 F.3d 1296

Nicole LOREN, Bettie J. Newbold, and Charlene Janke, by and through Veronica Aguirre, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Charles M. SASSER, Jr., Hernando Beach, Inc., a Florida corporation, Hernando Beach South Property Owners Association, Inc., a Florida corporation, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 02-11090. Non-Argument Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

October 17, 2002.

Nicole Loren, Chicago, IL, pro se.

Frank A. Miller, Brooksville, FL, J. Robert McCormack, Albinson, Persante & McCormack, P.A., Clearwater, FL, for Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.

Before BIRCH, CARNES, and HULL, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

This appeal presents the issue of whether a deed-restricted subdivision must accommodate handicapped individuals under federal and state fair housing statutes beyond allowances in the property owners' regulations as well as constitutional challenges under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court granted partial summary judgment to the corporate developer and property owners' association on allegations of discrimination in violation of federal and state fair housing statutes and appellants' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights relating to placement of a chain-link fence and "For Sale" sign in their front yard. A jury determined that there was no discriminatory intent involved in the denial of appellants' application for a deck and wheelchair ramp to be constructed on the front of their home, which verdict also is challenged for sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

In 1997, plaintiff-appellant Nicole Loren jointly bought and moved into a home located at 4065 Jewfish Drive in Hernando Beach South,¹ a deed-restricted subdivision, consisting of approximately 425 lots, in Hernando Beach, Florida.² Loren resided in the house with her handicapped mother, plaintiff-appellant Bettie J. Newbold, who suffers from chronic osteoarthritis, high blood pressure, and has two artificial knees that cause her difficulty in using stairs,³ and plaintiff-appellant Charlene Janke, her step-aunt, who is severely mentally retarded, blind, and has a guide dog.⁴ Loren provides caretaking services for both her mother and her step-aunt. Prior to purchasing the house, Loren was given a copy of the deed restrictions for Hernando Beach South. Specifically, the deed restrictions provide as to improvements to the house and lot:

IMPROVEMENTS. No building, addition, accessory, fence, television antenna or signal receiver, landscaping or other structure or improvement shall be commenced, erected, placed or maintained upon any lot, nor shall any exterior addition to or change or alteration be made until complete written plans and specifications showing the nature, kind, size (including the size and square footage of each separate room or area), driveway layout, shape, color, height, floor plan, materials, location and approximate costs of same have been submitted and approved in writing ....

R1-1-Attach. A at 1, ¶ 1 (emphasis added).

After moving into the house, appellants requested permission to construct a four-foot, chain-link fence in the front yard. The purposes for requesting the fence were "allowing JANKE to begin adjusting to her outdoor surroundings and feel secure and safe outdoors as well as indoors, to enjoy the sun and fresh air, to have her dog nearby without fear that the dog would run off or bite someone approaching the property; and affording NEWBOLD and LOREN a respite from continuous supervision without fear of JANKE wandering off." R1-1-9. Defendant-appellee Hernando Beach, Inc., the corporate developer of Hernando Beach South, through its president, defendant-appellee Charles M. Sasser, Jr., denied the request and advised Loren that fences were not permitted on the front of homes but could be constructed on the side or back of a house consistent with the deed restrictions and approvals accorded other property owners in the subdivision.⁵ Because appellants' residence was a corner lot, Sasser further informed that such a fence might inhibit visibility of drivers at that intersection and, consequently, be a safety hazard.

Loren subsequently requested permission to construct a deck and wheelchair ramp on the front of the house. Appellees initially denied the request for a deck and wheelchair ramp because Loren failed to provide an adequate drawing. After submitting a more detailed drawing, appellees denied Loren's second request for a deck and wheelchair ramp because of safety concerns for Newbold and Janke. Sasser suggested that, for the safety of the handicapped individuals, the deck and ramp should be built in the garage, which would be the safest and most appropriate place for the ramp. Because the deck and wheelchair ramp were intended for the front of the house, Sasser further informed Loren that her proposed deck and wheelchair ramp did not conform with other approved decks in the subdivision, which were on the back of the houses. Shortly after making the requests for the chainlink fence, deck, and wheelchair ramp, Newbold and Janke fell down the stairs leading to the garage and sustained various injuries.

The denials of Loren's requests, combined with Newbold and Janke's fall, prompted Loren to decide to move from the subdivision. The deed restrictions in Hernando Beach South prohibit homeowners from displaying any "signs or advertisements" on the property, unless specifically approved.⁶ R1-1 Attach. A-2, ¶ 9. Loren requested permission to put a "For Sale" sign on the property to expedite sale of the house, which defendant-appellee Hernando Beach South Property Owners Association, Inc. ("HBSPOA") denied.⁷ Loren sought a preliminary injunction enjoining HBSPOA from enforcing the sign restriction, which was denied by the district court. Nevertheless, Loren placed a generic "For Sale" sign in the yard, sold the house, and relocated to Chicago, Illinois.⁸

Loren, Newbold, and Janke, who originally were represented by counsel, filed a six-count complaint against Sasser, Hernando Beach, Inc., and HBSPOA. Counts I and II allege discrimination in violation of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq., and the Florida Fair Housing Act, Fla. Stat. § 760.20 et seq.,⁹ for refusing permission to construct a chain-link fence in the front yard. Specifically, they alleged that the requested front-yard fence was a reasonable modification necessary to afford Newbold and Janke safe and full enjoyment of the property. Counts III and IV alleged discrimination in violation of federal and state fair housing statutes for refusing permission to construct a deck and wheelchair ramp on the front of the house. Counts V and VI sought an injunction and damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and asserted that appellees' refusal to waive the deed restriction prohibiting "For Sale" signs, combined with the threat of judicial enforcement, constituted a violation of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

Hernando Beach, Inc. and HBSPOA filed a motion to dismiss Counts V and VI and argued that Loren, Newbold, and Janke did not state a cause of action upon which relief could be granted because they failed to satisfy the factors required for injunctive relief. Sasser filed a motion to dismiss all counts in the complaint because he was acting in his capacity as president of Hernando Beach, Inc., and not in his individual capacity.

While these motions were pending, HBSPOA filed a motion for summary judgment as to Counts V and VI and argued that it was not a state actor as required to bring a suit pursuant to § 1983. Hernando Beach, Inc. also filed a motion for summary judgment as to Counts I through VI. Sasser contemporaneously filed a motion for summary judgment and incorporated the arguments made by Hernando Beach, Inc., as well as the arguments that he made in his motion to dismiss.

After conducting a hearing on these motions,¹⁰ the district judge issued an order granting in part and denying in part appellees' motions. Regarding the sign-restriction counts, the district judge found that appellees were not state actors, which is required to bring suit under § 1983. Thus, he granted summary judgment to all three appellees as to Counts V and VI.¹¹

The district judge then addressed the reasonable-accommodation claims. Regarding the chain-link fence claims, appellees argued that they were entitled to summary judgment because (1) appellants failed to submit complete written plans of the proposed fence for approval as required by the deed restrictions; and (2) the denial of the request for a chain-link fence in the front yard was not unreasonable and did not discriminate against handicapped persons because they could put a chain-link fence in their back yard. As required, the district judge viewed the evidence most favorably toward appellants and presumed that Loren correctly filed the request for the front-yard, chain-link fence. Nonetheless, the district judge found that appellees were entitled to summary judgment on the chain-link fence counts, Counts I and II, because Loren, Newbold, and Janke "ha[d] not established that this accommodation, even if reasonable, was denied with discriminatory intent or was necessary to afford Plaintiffs `equal opportunity to use and enjoy' their dwelling." R5-100-12. Regarding the deck-and-ramp counts, the district judge found that plaintiffs had produced some evidence from which a factfinder could conclude that denial of appellants' application to construct a deck and wheelchair ramp was discriminatory. Id. Accordingly, the district judge denied appellees' motion for summary judgment regarding the deck-and-ramp counts, Counts III and IV, which proceeded to trial.¹²

Following a four-day trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of appellees and determined that they did not discriminate by refusing to approve the request for a deck and wheelchair ramp on the front of the house.¹³ The...