Marchwinski v. Howard

Decision Date18 October 2002
Docket NumberNo. 00-2115.,00-2115.
PartiesTanya L. MARCHWINSKI; Terri J. Konieczny; Westside Mothers, on behalf of all similarly situated persons, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Douglas E. HOWARD, in his official capacity as Director of the Family Independence Agency of Michigan, a governmental department of the State of Michigan, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Robert A. Sedler (argued and briefed), Detroit, MI, Graham A. Boyd (briefed), ACLU Drug Policy Litigation Project, New Haven, CT, for Appellees.

Morris J. Klau (argued and briefed), Office of the Attorney General, Detroit, Ml, for Appellant.

Paul D. Kamenar (briefed), Washington Legal Foundation, Washington, DC, for Amicus Curiae.

Daniel N. Abrahamson, The Lindesmith Center, Office of Legal Affairs, Oakland, CA, for Amicus Curiae American Public Health Association.

Before SUHRHEINRICH, SILER, and BATCHELDER, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge.

Defendant-appellant Douglas Howard, the director of the Michigan Family Independence Assistance program ("FIA"), appeals the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction based on Michigan's failure to identify a "special need" related to public safety that would allow the state — without a requirement of individualized suspicion — to drug test the plaintiff-appellees, a class of persons eligible for or receiving welfare assistance and subject to drug testing under MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 400.57l. Because we find that safety need only be a factor in the state's special need; that section 400.571 is supported by a public safety special need; and that under Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 91 S.Ct. 381, 27 L.Ed.2d 408 (1971), the condition attached by section 400.571 to the receipt of welfare benefits is constitutional, we reverse.

I.

In 1996, Congress passed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act ("PRWORA") that replaced the previous welfare entitlement program with the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program ("TANF"). Pub. L. 104-193, § 103, 110 Stat. 2113 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 601 et seq.). Among the general purposes for the PRWORA is the goal of increasing the flexibility of the states in providing assistance to needy families "so that children may be cared for in their own homes or in the homes of relatives." 42 U.S.C. § 601(a)(1). A state participating in the TANF program must submit to the Secretary of Health and Human Services a written document that includes, among other things, the state's plan for a program that will "provide[] assistance to needy families with (or expecting) children and provide[] parents with job preparation, work, and support services to enable them to leave the program and become self-sufficient." 42 U.S.C. § 602(A)(1). Only needy families who have or are expecting children are eligible for benefits under this program. 42 U.S.C. § 602(1)(A)(i). PRWORA explicitly provides that the Act "shall not be interpreted to entitle any individual or family to assistance under any State program funded under this part." 42 U.S.C. § 601(b). TANF permits states to drug test applicants for and recipients of these benefits and to impose sanctions where use of controlled substances is found. 21 U.S.C. § 862b.

In Michigan, the Family Independence Agency provides TANF block-grant moneys through the Family Independence Program ("FIP") to eligible families needing assistance. Section 400.571(1) of MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. expressly permits the FIA to condition eligibility for FIP assistance on the recipient's being tested for substance abuse. Section 400.571(2) requires the FIA "to implement a pilot program of substance abuse testing as a condition for family independence assistance eligibility in at least 3 counties, including random substance abuse testing."

The FIP's Program Eligibility Manual ("PEM"), which sets out the program's goals, notes that "[b]ecause having strong family relationships may be more difficult if there is substance abuse ... and because substance abuse is a barrier to employment" the state of Michigan has piloted drug testing. Under the pilot program, applicants for benefits are tested prior to receiving benefits; every six months twenty percent of recipients are randomly selected for drug screening. Testing is done by urinalysis (not in a direct line of sight, for greater privacy) and samples are tested only for illegal drugs. No individual will lose benefits or eligibility for benefits on the basis of one failed urinalysis. An individual who tests positive must go to a treatment agency for a determination of whether that person is a substance abuser; if appropriate, the agency will recommend and the individual must comply with a treatment plan. However, applicants who refuse to take the drug test without good cause and applicants who fail to complete the assessment process or do not comply with a required treatment plan within two months will be refused benefits. Aid recipients who refuse to submit to the random drug testing will lose a percentage of their benefits each month; after four months of failure to cooperate in the testing, such recipients will have all benefits withheld.

On September 30, 1999, the plaintiffs sued in the Eastern District of Michigan to preliminarily enjoin enforcement of section 400.571, arguing that the challenged Michigan law violated their Fourth Amendment rights because the required testing was done without particularized suspicion. The district court granted the injunction.

Howard appeals, arguing that the district court erred when it held that a public safety "special need" was the only interest that would justify a suspicionless search. Alternatively, Howard contends that Michigan's interest in the prevention of child abuse and neglect is a sufficient public safety concern.

II.

We review the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction for an abuse of discretion. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Mut. of Ohio v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass'n., 110 F.3d 318, 322 (6th Cir.1997). "A district court abuses its discretion when it relies on clearly erroneous findings of fact ... or when it improperly applies the law or uses an erroneous legal standard. Under this standard, this court must review the district court's legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error." Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass'n v. Bissell, 210 F.3d 595, 597 (6th Cir.2000) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

When determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction, a district court must consider four factors: "(1) whether the movant has a `strong' likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant would otherwise suffer irreparable injury; (3) whether issuance of a preliminary injunction would cause substantial harm to others; and (4) whether the public interest would be served by issuance of a preliminary injunction." Leary v. Daeschner, 228 F.3d 729, 736 (6th Cir.2000) (citation omitted). When considering these factors the district court should balance each factor against the others to arrive at its ultimate determination. Id.

Whether the plaintiffs have a strong likelihood of success on the merits is heavily dependent upon whether Michigan has a "special need" for its drug-testing program, and whether the government's interests outweigh the plaintiffs' reasonable expectation of privacy. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654-65, 115 S.Ct. 2386, 132 L.Ed.2d 564 (1995). Special needs are those government interests that go "beyond the normal need for law enforcement." Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987). The Supreme Court has ruled that government has a special need to conduct drug testing in several different circumstances where no particularized suspicion is present: testing of employees of the Customs Service who apply for positions directly involving interdiction of illegal drugs or positions requiring the agent to carry firearms, Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 109 S.Ct. 1384, 103 L.Ed.2d 685 (1989); testing of railroad employees involved in train accidents, Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989); testing of student athletes in an effort to prevent the spread of drugs among the student population, Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 115 S.Ct. 2386, 132 L.Ed.2d 564 (1995); and testing of students who participate in competitive extracurricular activities, Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, ___ U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 2559, 153 L.Ed.2d 735 (2002). This circuit has held that a school district has a special need to test applicants for all safety-sensitive positions in a school district, Knox County Educ. Ass'n v. Knox County Bd. of Educ., 158 F.3d 361 (6th Cir.1998); that a city has a special need to test its municipal bus drivers, Tanks v. Greater Cleveland Reg'l Transit Auth., 930 F.2d 475 (6th Cir.1991); and that a city has a special need to test its firemen and policemen, Penny v. Kennedy, 915 F.2d 1065 (6th Cir.1990).

In Earls, the most recent case decided by the Supreme Court pertaining to suspicionless drug testing, the Court found that the school district's interest in preventing drug abuse was sufficient to justify the testing program in light of the nationwide drug epidemic, the evidence provided by the district that drug abuse was a problem among its students and the "special responsibility" undertaken by the district to care for the children in its charge. Earls, 122 S.Ct. at 2567-68. The Court said that the students had diminished privacy interests because of the "public school environment where the State is responsible for maintaining discipline, health, and safety [and because s]choolchildren are routinely required to submit to physical examinations and vaccinations against disease." Id...

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