Edwards v. Oberndorf

• Decision Date: 06 February 2003
• Docket Number: No. 02-CV-347.,02-CV-347.
• Citation: 309 F.Supp.2d 780
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia
• Parties: Johnnie Lang EDWARDS, a/k/a Samuel Jones, Plaintiff, v. Meyera E. OBERNDORF, individually and in her official capacity as Mayor of the City of Virginia Beach, A.M. Jacocks, Jr., individually and in his capacity as Chief of Police of the Virginia Beach Police Department, Scott E. Wichtendahl, in his official capacity as Police Officer in and for the Virginia Beach Police Department, R. Lamb, in his official capacity as Police Officer in and for the Virginia Beach Police Department, Paul Lanteigne, individually and in his official capacity as Sheriff of the Virginia Beach Correctional Department — Jail, Robert J. McCabe, individually and in his official capacity as Sheriff of the Norfolk Correctional Department-Jail, and Richard D. Holcomb, individually and in his capacity as Commissioner of the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles, Defendants.

309 F.Supp.2d 780

Johnnie Lang EDWARDS, a/k/a Samuel Jones, Plaintiff, v. Meyera E. OBERNDORF, individually and in her official capacity as Mayor of the City of Virginia Beach, A.M. Jacocks, Jr., individually and in his capacity as Chief of Police of the Virginia Beach Police Department, Scott E. Wichtendahl, in his official capacity as Police Officer in and for the Virginia Beach Police Department, R. Lamb, in his official capacity as Police Officer in and for the Virginia Beach Police Department, Paul Lanteigne, individually and in his official capacity as Sheriff of the Virginia Beach Correctional Department — Jail, Robert J. McCabe, individually and in his official capacity as Sheriff of the Norfolk Correctional Department-Jail, and Richard D. Holcomb, individually and in his capacity as Commissioner of the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles, Defendants.

No. 02-CV-347.

United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Norfolk Division.

February 6, 2003.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

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Johnnie Lang Edwards, Norfolk, VA, for Plaintiff.

Leslie Louis Lilley, Kimberly Rouse Van Essendelft, S. Lawrence Dumville, Norris & St. Clair PC, Virginia Beach, VA, Eric Karl Gould Fiske, Richmond, VA, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

BRADBERRY, United States Magistrate Judge.

This matter is before the Court on defendants' motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment. On May 8, 2002, plaintiff brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Norfolk Division. On September 6, 2002, Richard D. Holcomb filed a motion for summary judgment, and Robert J. McCabe filed a motion to dismiss. On September 10, 2002, Meyera E. Oberndorf, A.M. Jacocks, Jr., Scott E. Wichtendahl, and R. Lamb filed a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, a motion for summary judgment. On October 4, 2002, Paul Lanteigne filed a motion for summary judgment. On January 6, 2003, the matters came on for hearing. For the following reasons, defendants' respective motions are GRANTED.

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Background

On May 8, 2000, plaintiff was arrested for driving under the influence in the City of Virginia Beach by Officer Scott E. Wichtendahl. On June 28, 2000, petitioner was tried and convicted, as charged, in the Virginia Beach General District Court. Petitioner appealed to the Circuit Court of Virginia Beach, and the case was tried, de novo, on October 19, 2000, and again resulted in plaintiff's conviction. Plaintiff appealed to the Virginia Court of Appeals, arguing that his conviction was invalid because he was not offered a breathalyzer or blood test. On September 24, 2001, the court affirmed the conviction. Plaintiff's subsequent appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia was dismissed on April 4, 2002. Plaintiff then filed a petition to set aside the judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia, but the petition was denied on June 7, 2002.

Plaintiff alleges that his due process rights were violated because he was arrested without being offered a breathalyzer or blood test. Plaintiff further alleges that his due process rights were violated and that he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment, when he was held in an "administrative strip cell," without notice of a charge or an opportunity to be heard, while the Virginia Beach City Jail (VBCJ) determined the status of plaintiff's outstanding capias issued by the Norfolk General District Court.¹

On September 6, 2002, defendant Holcomb filed a motion for summary judgment, and defendant McCabe filed a motion to dismiss. On September 10, 2002, defendants Oberndorf, Jacocks, Wichtendahl, and Lamb filed a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, a motion for summary judgment. On October 4, 2002, defendant Lanteigne filed a motion for summary judgment. The issues were argued before the Court on January 6, 2003, and the matters are now ripe for consideration.

B. Issues

1. Whether plaintiff's claims against McCabe survive a motion to dismiss standard;

2. Whether plaintiff's claims against Holcomb and Lanteigne survive a motion for summary judgment standard; and

3. Whether plaintiff's claims against Oberdorf, Jacocks, Wichtendahl, and Lamb survive a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, a motion for summary judgment standard.

II. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A. Motion to Dismiss Standard

In ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the complaint is construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, and her allegations are taken as true. See Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 598, 109 S.Ct. 1378, 103 L.Ed.2d 628 (1989) (citing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974)); Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421, 89 S.Ct. 1843, 23 L.Ed.2d 404 (1969); Higgins v. Medical Coll. of Hpt. Rds., 849 F.Supp. 1113, 1117 (E.D.Va.1994). The complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears to a certainty that plaintiff can prove no facts in support of her claim which would entitle her to relief. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); GE Inv. Private Placement Partners II v. Parker, 247 F.3d 543, 548 (4th Cir.2001); Martin Marietta Corp. v. Int'l Telecommuns. Satellite Org., 991 F.2d 94, 97 (4th Cir.1992); Johnson v. Mueller, 415 F.2d 354, 355 (4th Cir.1969). The courts must construe the complaint liberally in favor of plaintiffs, even if recovery appears remote and unlikely. See Jenkins, 395 U.S. at 421, 89 S.Ct. 1843. In ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion, the court primarily considers the allegations in the complaint but may consider attached exhibits and documents incorporated by reference. See Simmons v. Montgomery County Police Officers, 762 F.2d 30, 31 (4th Cir.1985); Wolford v. Budd Co., 149 F.R.D. 127, 129-32 (W.D.Va.1993).

B. Motion for Summary Judgment Standard

As set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party can show by affidavits, depositions, admissions, answers to interrogatories, the pleadings, or other evidence, "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." F ED.R.CIV.P. 56(c). Rule 56 mandates entry of summary judgment against a party who "after adequate time for discovery and upon motion ... fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

The moving party is not entitled to summary judgment if there is a genuine issue of material fact in dispute. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A genuine issue of fact exists if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for a nonmoving party. See id. In other words, summary judgment appropriately lies only if there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict. See id.

Finally, as the Fourth Circuit explained, [w]e must draw any permissible inference from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Summary judgment is appropriate only where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, such as where the non-moving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of the case that the non-moving party has the burden to prove.

Tuck v. Henkel Corp., 973 F.2d 371, 374 (4th Cir.1992) (citations omitted).

C. Defendants and Their Respective Motions

1. Meyera E. Oberndorf

Plaintiff brings this action against Oberndorf, Mayor of the City of Virginia Beach, individually and in her official capacity. Oberndorf has moved to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary judgment.

Plaintiff only mentions Oberndorf once in his original complaint. Specifically, plaintiff states that Oberndorf "oversees the Municipal Offices/Departments and is legally responsible for the overall operation of the Virginia Beach Police Department/Division under her jurisdiction." (Compl.¶ 3.) Plaintiff alleges no personal action against Oberndorf. Furthermore, the doctrine of respondeat superior does not exist under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 663, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). The Court finds that plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against Oberndorf, individually or in her official capacity. Accordingly, Oberndorf's motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

2. A.M. Jacocks, Jr.

Plaintiff brings this action against Jacocks, Chief of Police in the City of Virginia Beach, individually and in his official capacity. Jacocks has moved to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary judgment.

Again, plaintiff only mentions Jacocks once in his original complaint. Specifically, plaintiff states that Jacocks "is legally responsible for the opverall [sic] operations of the Police Department and each sub-division thereof." (Compl.¶ 4.) Plaintiff alleges no personal action against Jacocks. Further, the doctrine of respondeat superior is not a basis for liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 663, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). The Court finds that plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against Jacocks, personally or in his individual capacity. Accordingly, Jacocks' motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

3. Scott E. Wichtendahl

Plaintiff brings this action against Scott E. Wichtendahl, a Virginia Beach police officer, individually and in his official capacity.² Wichtendahl moved to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary judgment.

Plaintiff alleges that he was wrongfully arrested for driving under the influence and subsequently convicted of the offense by the improper...