Mobil Oil Corp. v. City of Rocky River

• Citation: 67 O.O.2d 38,309 N.E.2d 900,38 Ohio St.2d 23
• Decision Date: 10 April 1974
• Docket Number: No. 73-95,73-95
• Parties: , 67 O.O.2d 38 MOBIL OIL CORP., Appellee, v. CITY OF ROCKY RIVER et al., Appellants.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Ohio

Page 23

38 Ohio St.2d 23

309 N.E.2d 900, 67 O.O.2d 38

MOBIL OIL CORP., Appellee, v. CITY OF ROCKY RIVER et al., Appellants.

No. 73-95.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

April 10, 1974.

Syllabus by the Court

In an appeal, pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2506, which challenges the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance as applied, the issue for determination is whether the ordinance, in proscribing a landowner's proposed use of his land, has any reasonable relationship to the legitimate exercise of police power by the municipality.

Appellee, Mobil Oil Corporation, contracted to purchase a parcel of real property located in the city of Rocky River, on the southeast corner of Center Ridge and Spencer Roads, for the purpose of constructing a gasoline service station. Because the zoning ordinance restricted the land to single-family residential use, appellee lee petitioned Rocky River city council for rezoning to permit operation of a gasoline service station. This request was denied on February 15, 1971.

On March 2, 1971, appellee applied for a building permit and a certificate of occupancy in order to construct its gas station. This application was refused by the building commissioner for the reason that a service station was not a permitted use under the existent zoning law. In a March 12, 1971, letter to the building commissioner, appellee requested an opportunity to be heard before the Rocky River Board of Zoning and Building Appeals on the permit refusal. The commissioner's response indicated that appellee might appear before the board '* * * for the purpose of a request for a zoning use change.' With his letter the commissioner enclosed forms for a variance request, instructing appellee to fill them out and submit them to him. This was done.

At its April 8, 1971, meeting, the board of zoning and building appeals refused to entertain appellee's appeal for the reason, as stated in the minutes of that meeting:

'* * * Mr. Morash stated the board will refuse to hear arguments requesting changes in zoning as requested by Mobil Oil Corporation, because Ordinance 1127.04 specifically prohibits the Board of Zoning Appeals from granting variances in regard to 'Use."

Appellee then, pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2506, appealed to the Court of Common Pleas from the board's refusal to hear evidence upon, or to overrule, the building commissioner's denial of the requisite permits. Alleged as grounds for appeal were abuse of discretion by the Board of Zoning Appeals, abuse of municipal police power, and a denial of appellee's constitutional rights.

After an essentially de novo hearing, the Court of Common Pleas upheld the board's refusal to order issuance of the permits. In so doing, the court commented:

'If the decision herein rested solely upon a determination of the court as to whether the Center Ridge Frontage was validly zoned for single-family dwelling, the court would concur with the contentions of plaintiff * * * (that the zoning was unconstitutional).' However, the trial court went on to say:

'The issue to be decided by the court is not whether a single family dwelling zoning is or is not valid. This is the issue presented:

'Is the failure of the * * * city of Rocky River to zone the subject property so that a gasoline service station may be constructed thereon so arbitrary or unreasonable as to be violative of constitutional guarantees?"

The Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court's formulation of the issue, stating:

'* * * the issue before the Common Pleas Court was the validity of the existing zoning ordinance as it applied to * * * (Mobil Oil Corporation's) property.' Observing that the lower court had already found the single family zoning to be unreasonable, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas and directed the building commissioner to issue the appropriate permit.

The cause is now before this court pursuant to allowance of a motion to certify the record.

Calfee, Halter & Griswold, Brian M. Eisenberg and Robert J. Amsdell, Cleveland, for appellee.

Kelley, McCann & Livingstone, Walter C. Kelley, Jr., Stephen M. O'Bryan and Frank H. Lord, director of law, Cleveland, for appellants.

STERN, Justice.

The basic question raised here concerns the proper formulation of the issue that is presented to a trial court in an appeal, pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2506, which challenges the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance as applied. Our decision in State ex rel. Sibarco Corp. v. City of Berea (1966), 7 Ohio St.2d 85, 218 N.E.2d 428, made it clear that zoning restrictions may be constitutionally questioned by a landowner who appeals an adverse administrative decision to the Court of Common Pleas. It is not fatal to such an appeal that the constitutional claim was not initially argued before the administrative officer or board, for the issue of constitutionality can never be administratively determined. Nor is it fatal that the adverse decision appealed from was non-discretionary or ministerial, since it is the validity of the underlying ordinance, insofar as it has compelled that administrative decision, which is being challenged.

In the present case, appellee's appeal stems from the denial of the requisite building permit. The building commissioner exercised no discretion in refusing appellee's request; his action was mandated by the zoning ordinance under which he operated. The Rocky River Board of Zoning and Building Appeals was, likewise, without power to vary the strict letter of that ordinance. Its consequent decision, which effectively upheld the building commissioner's action, involved no discretionary judgment. Thus, although any allegation by appellee in the Common Pleas Court of abuse of discretion was unfounded, appellee was entitled to challenge the constitutionality of the zoning ordinance as it had been applied to its property.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals had divergent views as to the correct formulation of the issue involved. The former believed that the zoning ordinance could only be struck down if its proscription of a gasoline service station was found unconstitutional, while the latter believed the ordinance would be invalid if its single-family use restriction on appellee's property was not reasonably related to the public health, safety or welfare. The Court of Appeals thus viewed appellee's proposed use, i. e., a gasoline service station, as being a matter of relief only, and essentially irrelevant to the constitutional issue involved.

Both parties have drawn our attention to a number of analogous Illinois cases. Since the Illinois courts do handle a prodigious amount of zoning litigation, a review of their approach will be helpful.

In Sinclair Pipe Line Co. v. Village of Richton Park (1960), 19 Ill.2d 370, 167 N.E.2d 406, the Supreme Court of Illinois discussed what relief would be appropriate in a declaratory judgment action, once a litigant had successfully demonstrated the unconstitutionality of the zoning restrictions on his land. The Court, at page 378, 167 N.E.2d at page 411, observed:

'* * * Normally the land owner is interested particularly in a specific use which he proposes, and so it is natural that he will try the case and the judge will reach his decision in terms of the reasonableness of excluding that specific use.'

With that in mind, the court went on to criticize the potential results of a judgment that merely declared the existent zoning invalid, thereby leaving the property 'unzoned,' stating:

'* * * two equally undesirable consequences may ensue * * * The municipality may rezone the property to another use classification that still excludes the one proposed, thus making litigation necessary as to the validity of the new classification * * * (or) a decree which was induced by evidence which depicted a proposed use in a highly favorable light would not restrict the property owner to that use, and he might thereafter use the property for an entirely different purpose.'

The court then concluded that, to avoid those difficulties, a trial court should frame its decree in terms of the record before it, and the use contemplated by the landowner.

Appellee has cited a number of Illinois decisions which apply the Sinclair rationale to fact patterns unlike the one before us. However, Shultz v. Village of Lisle (1972), 53 Ill.2d 39, 289 N.E.2d 614, involved facts that are strikingly similar to those presented by the instant controversy. There, plaintiffs sought a declaration that the local zoning ordinance, as applied to their property, was null and void. Their prayer for relief asked the court to order issuance of a permit to construct a gasoline service station. At trial the village admitted that the single-family use restriction on the property was not proper, but argued that neither was plaintiffs' proposed use. The trial court first held the zoning restriction to be unconstitutional, then found the plaintiffs' proposed use reasonable and granted the requested relief. This judgment was affirmed on appeal, but was reversed by the Illinois Supreme Court as being a misapplication of Sinclair, supra. The court made clear that plaintiffs' proposed use was integrally related to a determination of constitutionality of the zoning ordinance:

At pages 42, 43, 289 N.E.2d at page 616, the court said:

'* * * In testing the validity of the zoning ordinance in this case we are only concerned with the validity of the ordinance insofar as it prohibits this proposed use.

'* * *

'Shaping the order of the court to the facts of the particular case * * * we hold that the prohibiting of the use of plaintiffs' property for a gasoline service station is reasonably related to the public health, safety, morals and welfare * * *.' (Emphasis added.)

The rationale employed by the Illinois Supreme Court in Shultz is compelling, although we note that all Illinois cases either cited by appellee, or discussed above, involved actions for...