31 124 Overmyer Co Inc of Ohio v. Frick Company 8212, 69

Citation92 S.Ct. 775,405 U.S. 174
Decision Date24 February 1972
Docket NumberNo. 69,69
Parties. 31 L.Ed.2d 124 D. H. OVERMYER CO., INC., OF OHIO, et al., Petitioners, v. FRICK COMPANY. —5
CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Syllabus

After a corporation (Overmyer) had defaulted in its payments for equipment manufactured and being installed by respondent company (Frick), and Overmyer under a post-contract arrangement had made a partial cash payment and issued an installment note for the balance, Frick completed the work, which Overmyer accepted as satisfactory. Thereafter Overmyer again asked for relief and, with counsel for both corporations participating in the negotiations, the first note was replaced with a second, which contained a 'cognovit' provision in conformity with Ohio law at that time whereby Overmyer consented in advance, should it default in interest or principal payments, to Frick's obtaining a judgment without notice or hearing, and issued certain second mortgages in Frick's favor, Frick agreeing to release three mechanic's liens, to reduce the monthly payment amounts and interest rate, and to extend the time for final payment. When Overmyer, claiming a contract breach, stopped making payments on the new note, Frick, under the cognovit provision, through an attorney unknown to but on behalf of Overmyer, and without personal service on or prior notice to Overmyer, caused judgment to be entered on the note. Overmyer's motion to vacate the judgment was overruled after a post-judgment hearing, and the judgment court's decision was affirmed on appeal against Overmyer's contention that the cognovit procedure violated due process requirements. Held: Overmyer, for consideration and with full awareness of the legal consequences, waived its rights to prejudgment notice and hearing, and on the facts of this case, which involved contractual arrangements between two corporations acting with advice of counsel, the procedure under the cognovit clause (which is not unconstitutional per se) did not violate Overmyer's Fourteenth Amendment rights. Pp. 182—188.

Affirmed.

Russell Morton Brown, Washington, D.C., for petitioners.

Gregory M. Harvey, Philadelphia, Pa., for respondent.

Mr. Justice BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents the issue of the constitutionality, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, of the cognovit note authorized by Ohio Rev.Code § 2323.13.1

The cognovit is the ancient legal device by which the debtor consents in advance to the holder's obtaining a judgment without notice or hearing, and possibly even with the appearance, on the debtor's behalf, of an attorney designated by the holder.2 It was known at least as far back as Blackstone's time. 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *397.3 In a case applying Ohio law, it was said that the purpose of the cognovit is 'to permit the note holder to obtain judgment without a trial of possible defenses which the signers of the notes might assert.' Hadden v. Rumsey Products, Inc., 196 F.2d 92, 96 (CA2 1952). And long ago the cognovit method was described by the Chief Justice of New Jersey as 'the loosest way of binding a man's property that ever was devised in any civilized country.' Alderman v. Diament, 7 N.J.L. 197, 198 (1824). Mr. Dickens noted it with obvious disfavor. Pickwick Papers, c. 47. The cognovit has been the subject of comment, much of it critical.4

Statutory treatment varies widely. Some States specifically authorize the cognovit.5 Others disallow it.6 Some go so far as to make its employment a misdemeanor.7 The majority, however, regulate its use and many prohibit the device in small loans and consumer sales.8

In Ohio the cognovit has long been recognized by both statute and court decision. 1 Chase's Statutes, c. 243, § 34 (1810); Osborn v. Hawley, 19 Ohio 130 (1850); Marsden v. Soper, 11 Ohio St. 503 (1860); Watson v. Paine, 25 Ohio St. 340 (1874); Clements v. Hull, 35 Ohio St. 141 (1878). The State's courts, however, give the instrument a strict and limited construction. See Peoples Banking Co. v. Brumfield Hay & Grain Co., 172 Ohio St. 545, 548, 179 N.E.2d 53, 55 (1961).

This Court apparently has decided only two cases concerning cognovit notes, and both have come here in a full faith and credit context. National Exchange Bank v. Wiley, 195 U.S. 257, 25 S.Ct. 70, 49 L.Ed. 184 (1904); Grover & Baker Sewing Machine Co. v. Radcliffe, 137 U.S. 287, 11 S.Ct. 92, 34 L.Ed. 670 (1890). See American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156, 53 S.Ct. 98, 77 L.Ed. 231 (1932).

I

The argument that a provision of this kind is offensive to current notions of Fourteenth Amendment due process is, at first glance, an appealing one. However, here, as in nearly every case, facts are important. We state them chronologically:

1. Petitioners D. H. Overmyer Co., Inc., of Ohio, and D. H. Overmyer Co., Inc., of Kentucky, are segments of a warehousing enterprise that counsel at one point in the litigation described as having built 'in three years . . . 180 warehouses in thirty states.' The corporate structure is complex. Because the identity and individuality of the respective corporate entities are not relevant here, we refer to the enterprise in the aggregate as 'Overmyer.'

2. In 1966 a corporation, which then was or at a later date became an Overmyer affiliate, executed a contract with the respondent Frick Co. for the manufacture and installation by Frick, at a cost of $223,000, of an automatic refrigeration system in a warehouse under construction in Toledo, Ohio.

3. Overmyer fell behind in the progress payments due from it under the contract. By the end of September 1966 approximately $120,000 was overdue. Because of this delinquency, Frick stopped its work on October 10. Frick indicated to Overmyer, however, by letter on that date, its willingness to accept an offer from Overmyer to pay $35,000 in cash 'provided the balance can be evidenced by interest-bearing judgment notes.'

4. On November 3 Frick filed three mechanic's leins against the Toledo property for a total of $194,031, the amount of the contract price allegedly unpaid at that time.

5. The parties continued to negotiate. In January 1967 Frick, in accommodation, agreed to complete the work upon an immediate cash payment of 10% ($19,403.10) and payment of the balance of $174,627.90 in 12 equal monthly installments with 6 1/2% interest per annum. On February 17 Overmyer made the 10% payment and executed an installment note calling for 12 monthly payments of $15,498.23 each beginning March 1, 1967. This note contained no confession-of-judgment provision. It recited that it did not operate as a waiver of the mechanic's liens, but it also stated that Frick would forgo enforcement of those lien rights so long as there was no default under the note.

6. Frick resumed its work, completed it, and sent Overmyer a notice of completion. On March 17 Overmyer's vice president acknowledged in writing that the system had been 'completed in a satisfactory manner' and that it was 'accepted as per the contract conditions.'

7. Subsequently, Overmyer requested additional time to make the installment payments. It also asked that Frick release the mechanic's liens against the Toledo property. Negotiations between the parties at that time finally resulted in an agreement in June 1967 that (a) Overmyer would execute a new note for the then-outstanding balance of $130,997 and calling for payment of that amount in 21 equal monthly installments of $6,891.85 each, beginning June 1, 1967, and ending in February 1969, two years after Frick's completion of the work (as contrasted with the $15,498.23 monthly installments ending February 1968 specified by the first note); (b) the interest rate would be 6% rather than 6 1/2%; (c) Frick would release the three mechanic's liens; (d) Overmyer would execute second mortgages, with Frick as mortgagee, on property in Tampa and Louisville; and (e) Overmyer's new note would contain a confession-of-judgment clause. The new note, signed in Ohio by the two petitioners here, was delivered to Frick some months later by letter dated October 2, 1967, accompanied by five checks for the June through October payments. This letter was from Overmyer's general counsel to Frick's counsel. The second mortgages were executed and recorded, and the mechanic's liens were released. The note contained the following judgment clause:

'The undersigned hereby authorize any attorney designated by the Holder hereof to appear in any court of record in the State of Ohio, and waive this issuance and service of process, and confess a judg- ment against the undersigned in favor of the Holder of this Note, for the principal of this Note plus interest if the undersigned defaults in any payment of principal and interest and if said default shall continue for the period of fifteen (15) days.'

8. On June 1, 1968, Overmyer ceased making the monthly payments under the new note and, asserting a breach by Frick of the original contract, proceeded to institute a diversity action against Frick in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Overmyer sought damages in excess of $170,000 and a stay of all proceedings by Frick under the note. On July 5 Judge Frankel vacated an ex parte stay he had theretofore granted. On August 7 Judge Mansfield denied Overmyer's motion for reinstatement of the stay. He concluded, 'Plaintiff has failed to show any likelihood that it will prevail upon the merits. On the contrary, extensive documentary evidence furnished by defendant indicates that the plaintiff's action lacks merit.'

9. On July 12, without prior notice to Overmyer, Frick caused judgment to be entered against Overmyer (specifically against the two petitioners here) in the Common Pleas Court of Lucas County, Ohio. The judgment amount was the balance then remaining on the note, namely, $62,370, plus interest from May 1, 1968, and costs. This judgment was effected through the appearance of an Ohio attorney...

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