United States v. Wurzbach
| Decision Date | 03 April 1929 |
| Docket Number | No. 7638.,7638. |
| Citation | 31 F.2d 774 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES v. WURZBACH. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas |
John D. Hartman, U. S. Dist. Atty., of San Antonio, Tex.
Hugh R. Robertson, W. A. Wurzbach, and C. W. Anderson, all of San Antonio, Tex., for defendant.
There are six counts in the indictment for violations of Criminal Code, title 18, USCA § 208, three for "receiving money for a political purpose," and three for "being concerned in receiving money for a political purpose." The demurrer affirms that the indictment is defective, because it fails to state an offense against any law of the United States.
Omitting portions not pertinent to the inquiry raised by the demurrer, the section makes it unlawful for a Representative in Congress to receive, or be concerned in receiving, from an officer of the United States, any contribution for any political purpose whatever. The questioned portion of the indictment in substance charges that the defendant, while a Representative in Congress, received from a named officer of the government a definite sum of money, being a contribution received by defendant for a political purpose; that is to say, for the purpose of promoting his candidacy for the nomination in the Republican primaries held on July 24, 1926, for the office of Representative in the national Congress from the Fourteenth congressional district of Texas; the defendant having knowledge of the official capacity of the officer, and at the time of receiving said money well knew that it was contributed by said officer for the political purpose mentioned, contrary to the statute.
This indictment sets out the words of the statute, and likewise clearly states the political purpose for which the contribution was made. Chief Justice Taft, sitting as a Circuit Judge, held that an offense stated in the words of this statute is sufficient. U. S. v. Scott, (C. C.) 74 F. 213 (1895).
Political rights and political purposes are nearly related. 2 Bouvier, Law Dictionary; Anthony v. Burrow (C. C.) 129 F. 783.
The promotion of one's candidacy for nomination for the office of Representative in Congress is an exercise by the citizen of a political right. The receipt of money in furtherance of such an object is a contribution for a political purpose.
The Texas statutes regulating the nomination of candidates of political parties through primary elections are shown in chapter 13 of Vernon's Annotated Texas Civil Statutes (1925), volume 9, title 50, "Elections," chapter 13, "Nominations," page 85, being embraced in articles 3100 to 3167, inclusive. Article 3100 defines "primary election" to mean, an election held by the members of an organized political party to nominate candidates to be voted for at a general or special election. 3101 provides that on primary election day in 1926, and every two years thereafter, "candidates for Governor and for all other state offices to be chosen by the vote of the entire state, and candidates for Congress and all district offices are to be chosen, * * * to be nominated by each organized political party that cast one hundred thousand votes or more, * * * shall be nominated in primary elections by the qualified voters of such party." 3102, date of primary: Fourth Saturday in July, 1926, and every two years thereafter shall be general primary election day, and primary elections to nominate candidates for a general election shall be held on no other day, except, etc. The remaining articles, to include No. 3167, cover regulatory provisions pertinent to the chapter subject head.
The defendant contends that the words "for any political purpose whatever" should be interpreted to refer only to the political purposes of the federal government.
What is the extent and power of Congress to alter the laws of a state which prescribes times, places, and manner of holding primary nominating elections by political parties of their district candidates for Representatives? The source of power is found in article 1, § 4, of the Constitution, which provides: "The times, places and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives shall be prescribed in each state by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by law make or alter such regulations, except as to the places of choosing Senators."
Speaking generally, laws are limited in their effect to the extent of physical territory dominated and also to the authority exercised by the sovereignty proclaiming them. The states and the nation include the same physical territory, but their fields of legislation are made distinct and separate by the Constitution.
"The rights which candidates for nomination for the office of Senator of the United States may have in" a state primary nominating election "come wholly from the state law; and a conspiracy to deprive them of such rights by debauching the primary with illegal votes for an opposing candidate is not within the scope of section 19 of the Penal Code now 51, title 18, USCA, designed for the protection of rights and privileges secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." United States v. Gradwell, 243 U. S. 476, 37 S. Ct. 407, 61 L. Ed. 857; Newberry v. United States, 256 U. S. 232, 41 S. Ct. 469, 65 L. Ed. 913.
"The power to control party primaries for designating candidates for the Senate is not within the grant of power `to regulate the manner of holding elections' (art. 1, § 4) neither within the fair intendment of the words used nor the meaning ascribed to them by the framers of the Constitution; it is not necessary in order to effectuate the power expressly granted (article 1, § 8, cl. 18); and its exercise would interfere with purely domestic affairs of the states and infringe upon liberties reserved to the people." Newberry v. United States, supra, syllabus.
The ruling in the Newberry Case brought about repeal (43 Stat. 1074) of the particular section 8 of the then existing "Federal Corrupt Practices Act" (36 Stat. 822 and amendatory acts), in which Congress had provided for a regulation of the manner in which the states should conduct their primary nominating elections, upon the ground that the offending section 8 was in excess of the constitutional grant of power, and therefore void.
These two decisions definitely hold that the state nominating election primaries are wholly...
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