31 F.3d 1241 (3rd Cir. 1994), 93-5541, Giuffre v. Bissell

Docket Nº:93-5541.
Citation:31 F.3d 1241
Party Name:James J. GIUFFRE, v. Nicholas BISSELL; Richard Thornburg; Robert Smith; Russ Leffert; Sam Debella; Richard Meyers; County of Somerset, Appellants.
Case Date:August 04, 1994
Court:United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
 
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Page 1241

31 F.3d 1241 (3rd Cir. 1994)

James J. GIUFFRE,

v.

Nicholas BISSELL; Richard Thornburg; Robert Smith; Russ

Leffert; Sam Debella; Richard Meyers; County of

Somerset, Appellants.

No. 93-5541.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit

August 4, 1994

Argued May 2, 1994.

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Scott D. Rodgers (Argued), Welaj, Miller & Robertson, Somerville, NJ, for appellants.

Frank P. Arleo (Argued), Arseneault, Donohue, Sorrentino & Fassett, Chatham, NJ, for appellee.

Before: GREENBERG and GARTH, Circuit Judges, and ROBRENO, District Judge [*].

OPINION OF THE COURT

GARTH, Circuit Judge:

This appeal requires us to revisit the doctrine of absolute and qualified immunity in order to determine if we may review at this time the district court's order which denied summary judgment to the individual defendants. Insofar as the appellee Giuffre's complaint alleges violations of his Fifth, Sixth, and procedural Fourteenth Amendment rights, we hold that the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, and to that extent reverse the district court's order. We also hold that the district court correctly denied absolute immunity at this time for Somerset County Prosecutor Nicholas Bissell. Without expressing any views as to the merits of Giuffre's remaining claims, we dismiss the balance of the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

I.

The appellants, Prosecutor Bissell and five of his current and former investigative officers (collectively, "the appellant officials"), and the County of Somerset ("the County"), appeal the district court's order denying their motion for summary judgment, which was brought against the appellee, James J. Giuffre.

Giuffre's claims against the County and the appellant officials arose from Giuffre's arrest on May 10, 1990 following an official investigation by the Somerset County Prosecutor's Office and other investigative authorities of an alleged drug conspiracy. Within 24 hours of his arrest, and without representation by

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counsel, Giuffre conveyed ownership to the County of two building lots he owned in neighboring Hunterdon County. That transaction was ostensibly authorized under the forfeiture provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:64-1 1 because Giuffre signed a written statement admitting that the two building lots were purchased in part with illegal drug proceeds. The forfeited building lots were sold seven months later at public auction, and the drug charges against Giuffre were administratively dismissed by the Prosecutor's Office on October 31, 1991, after Giuffre cooperated in an ongoing drug investigation. Although the statute of limitations at this juncture has yet to run, Giuffre still has not been indicted. 2

On May 7, 1992, Giuffre filed the instant action, seeking compensatory and punitive damages against the County and against the appellant officials, both in their official and individual capacities, for violations of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, the United States Constitution, and New Jersey law. 3 In his complaint against the County and the officials, Giuffre also sought judgment rescinding the sale of his forfeited lots, and a declaratory judgment that the officials conspired to violate and/or violated his constitutional and civil rights, and conspired to deprive him of his property through fraud, duress and without due process of law.

The County and the officials moved for summary judgment, arguing, among other things, that the individual officials were entitled to qualified and/or absolute immunity. Their summary judgment motion was supported by the depositions of the appellant officials and other witnesses who denied the allegations in Giuffre's complaint. In opposition to summary judgment, Giuffre presented his own deposition evidence, which created a dispute of fact over the circumstances under which he conveyed title to his two building lots. After considering the parties' arguments and conflicting evidence, the district court on July 29, 1993 denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment.

The district court determined that summary judgment was inappropriate because Giuffre's deposition testimony raised genuine issues of material fact regarding: (1) the appellant officials' allegedly coercive and unconstitutional conduct toward Giuffre; (2) the

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existence of an alleged civil rights conspiracy; (3) the existence and effects of the County's alleged policy of targeting criminal defendants who owned substantial assets, and (4) the alleged failure of the County to train and supervise properly the appellant officials. The district court did not discuss at length the immunity defenses raised by the individual officials. The court ruled that Prosecutor Bissell was not entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity because Bissell's actions could be characterized as investigatory. It also ruled that none of the individual officials was entitled to qualified immunity because Giuffre had raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether any clearly established laws had been violated by the officials.

On appeal, the County and the officials contend, as they did before the district court, that they were entitled to summary judgment because: (1) Giuffre has failed to state a viable cause of action under Sec. 1983 for violations of his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution; (2) the officials lacked the requisite personal involvement and specific conduct to be held liable under Sec. 1983 for federal constitutional violations or under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act for state law violations; (3) the individual officers are shielded, in any event, from suit on Giuffre's federal and pendent state claims under principles of absolute and/or qualified immunity; and (4) there is insufficient evidence to hold the County liable under any of the legal theories stated by Giuffre.

We will affirm that portion of the July 29, 1993 order of the district court denying Prosecutor Bissell absolute immunity, and we will reverse that order only to the extent that it denies the officials qualified immunity for alleged violations of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, and the procedural due process guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment. We will dismiss the balance of this appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

II.

The County and the appellant officials urge us to reverse the district court's denial of their motion for summary judgment. Generally, we ordinarily have no jurisdiction to review orders denying summary judgment because such orders are not final within the requirements of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291. W.D.D., Inc. v. Thornbury Township, 850 F.2d 170, 171 (3d Cir.) (in banc), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 892, 109 S.Ct. 228, 102 L.Ed.2d 218 (1988).

The Supreme Court has held, however, that an order denying qualified or absolute immunity, to the extent that the order turns on an issue of law, is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2817-18, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). That is because the immunity doctrine does not serve merely as a public official's defense to liability; rather it shelters that official from having to stand trial. This immunity from suit is lost when a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial. Id. at 526-27, 105 S.Ct. at 2815-16; Brown v. Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097, 1105 (3d Cir.1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1218, 111 S.Ct. 2827, 115 L.Ed.2d 997 (1991). We thus have appellate jurisdiction to consider the immunity issues raised by the individual officials.

A.

Up to this point, Giuffre's claims for declaratory judgment and for judgment rescinding the forfeiture of his lots have not been ruled upon. In addition, the district court has refused to certify as final its order denying summary judgment on Giuffre's claims for money damages, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1292(b). 4 Giuffre's damage claims,

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however, are joined in his complaint with an ostensible claim for prospective injunctive relief. We have held in Prisco v. United States Dep't of Justice, 851 F.2d 93, 94 (3d Cir.1988), cert. denied sub nom. Smith v. Prisco, 490 U.S. 1089, 109 S.Ct. 2428, 104 L.Ed.2d 985 (1989), that the inclusion of a viable claim for prospective equitable relief bars interlocutory review of a district court's denial of immunity.

Our Prisco opinion explained why the Mitchell collateral order doctrine is not available for a joinder of claims for injunctive relief and money damages:

The marginal benefit to a governmental official from an interlocutory review of a ruling that proof of damages should not be heard is so slight that it cannot outweigh the systemic harms from permitting piecemeal interlocutory review of discrete issues in a case which, even against that official, will be ongoing.

Id. at 96. Although we alone among the courts of appeals adhere to such a rule, we nevertheless are bound to follow Prisco in those cases where a plaintiff states a colorable claim for injunctive relief in addition to a claim for damages. See, e.g., Burns v. County of Cambria, 971 F.2d 1015, 1019 (3d Cir.1992), cert denied sub nom. Roberts v. Mutsko, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 1049, 122 L.Ed.2d 357 (1993); see also Internal Operating Procedures, United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, Rule 9.1 ("The holding of a panel in a reported opinion is binding on subsequent panels.... in banc consideration is required [to overrule such a holding].").

Proper application of the Prisco rule requires an initial determination of whether a claim for injunctive relief is, on its face, colorable. Acierno v. Cloutier, 1994 WL 319783 * 8 (slip op. at 21) (3d Cir. July 7, 1994) ("Prisco allows us to 'examine[ ] the...

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