American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno

Decision Date01 February 1999
Docket NumberNo. CIV. A. 98-5591.,CIV. A. 98-5591.
Citation31 F.Supp.2d 473
PartiesAMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, et al. v. Janet RENO, in her official capacity as Attorney General of the United States.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania
MEMORANDUM

REED, District Judge.

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech." Although there is no complete consensus on the issue, most courts and commentators theorize that the importance of protecting freedom of speech is to foster the marketplace of ideas. If speech, even unconventional speech that some find lacking in substance or offensive, is allowed to compete unrestricted in the marketplace of ideas, truth will be discovered. Indeed, the First Amendment was designed to prevent the majority, through acts of Congress, from silencing those who would express unpopular or unconventional views.

Despite the protection provided by the First Amendment, unconventional speakers are often limited in their ability to promote such speech in the marketplace by the costs or logistics of reaching the masses, hence, the adage that freedom of the press is limited to those who own one. In the medium of cyberspace, however, anyone can build a soap box out of web pages and speak her mind in the virtual village green to an audience larger and more diverse than any the Framers could have imagined. In many respects, unconventional messages compete equally with the speech of mainstream speakers in the marketplace of ideas that is the Internet, certainly more than in most other media.

But with freedom come consequences. Many of the same characteristics which make cyberspace ideal for First Amendment expression — ease of participation and diversity of content and speakers — make it a potentially harmful media for children. A child with minimal knowledge of a computer, the ability to operate a browser, and the skill to type a few simple words may be able to access sexual images and content over the World Wide Web. For example, typing the word "dollhouse" or "toys" into a typical Web search engine will produce a page of links, some of which connect to what would be considered by many to be pornographic Web sites. These Web sites offer "teasers," free sexually explicit images and animated graphic image files designed to entice a user to pay a fee to browse the whole site.

Intending to address the problem of children's access to these teasers, Congress passed the Child Online Protection Act ("COPA"), which was to go into effect on November 29, 1998. On October 22, 1998, the plaintiffs, including, among others, Web site operators and content providers, filed this lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of COPA under the First and Fifth Amendments and seeking injunctive relief from its enforcement. Two diametric interests — the constitutional right of freedom of speech and the interest of Congress, and indeed society, in protecting children from harmful materials — are in tension in this lawsuit.

This is not the first attempt of Congress to regulate content on the Internet. Congress passed the Communications Decency Act of 1996 ("CDA") which purported to regulate the access of minors to "indecent" and "patently offensive" speech on the Internet. The CDA was struck down by the Supreme Court in Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 117 S.Ct. 2329, 138 L.Ed.2d 874 (1997) ("Reno I") as violative of the First Amendment. COPA represents congressional efforts to remedy the constitutional defects in the CDA.

Plaintiffs attack COPA on several grounds: (1) that it is invalid on its face and as applied to them under the First Amendment for burdening speech that is constitutionally protected for adults, (2) that it is invalid on its face for violating the First Amendment rights of minors, and (3) that it is unconstitutionally vague under the First and Fifth Amendments. The parties presented evidence and argument on the motion of plaintiffs for a temporary restraining order on November 19, 1998. This Court entered a temporary restraining order on November 20, 1998, enjoining the enforcement of COPA until December 4, 1998. (Document Nos. 29 and 30). The defendant agreed to extend the duration of the TRO through February 1, 1999. (Document No. 34). The parties conducted accelerated discovery thereafter. While the parties and the Court considered consolidating the preliminary injunction hearing with a trial on the merits, the Court, upon due consideration of the arguments of the parties, ultimately decided that it would proceed only on the motion for preliminary injunction. (Document No. 39). There necessarily remains a period for completion of discovery and preparation before a trial on the merits.

The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the entire action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of standing in addition to her arguments in response to the motion for preliminary injunction. (Document No. 50). The plaintiffs filed a response to the motion to dismiss (Document No. 69), to which the defendant filed a reply. (Document No. 81).

On the motion of plaintiffs for preliminary injunction, the Court heard five days of testimony and one day of argument on January 20, 1999 through January 27, 1999. In addition, the parties submitted briefs, expert reports, declarations from many of the named plaintiffs, designated portions of deposition transcripts, and documentary evidence for the Court's review. Based on this evidence and for the reasons that follow, the motion to dismiss will be denied and the motion for a preliminary injunction will be granted.

I. The Child Online Protection Act

In what will be codified as 47 U.S.C. § 231, COPA provides that:

(1) PROHIBITED CONDUCT.-Whoever knowingly and with knowledge of the character of the material, in interstate or foreign commerce by means of the World Wide Web, makes any communication for commercial purposes that is available to any minor and that includes any material that is harmful to minors shall be fined not more than $50,000, imprisoned not more than 6 months, or both.

(2) INTENTIONAL VIOLATIONS.-In addition to the penalties under paragraph (1), whoever intentionally violates such paragraph shall be subject to a fine of not more than $50,000 for each violation. For purposes of this paragraph, each day of violation shall constitute a separate violation.

(3) CIVIL PENALTY.-In addition to the penalties under paragraphs (1) and (2), whoever violates paragraph (1) shall be subject to a civil penalty of not more than $50,000 for each violation. For purposes of this paragraph, each day of violation shall constitute a separate violation.

COPA specifically provides that a person shall be considered to make a communication for commercial purposes "only if such person is engaged in the business of making such communication." 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(2)(A). A person will be deemed to be "engaged in the business" if the

person who makes a communication, or offers to make a communication, by means of the World Wide Web, that includes any material that is harmful to minors, devotes time, attention, or labor to such activities, as a regular course of such person's trade or business, with the objective of earning a profit as a result of such activities (although it is not necessary that the person make a profit or that the making or offering to make such communications be the person's sole or principal business or source of income). A person may be considered to be engaged in the business of making, by means of the World Wide Web communications for commercial purposes that include material that is harmful to minors, only if the person knowingly causes the material that is harmful to minors to be posted on the World Wide Web or knowingly solicits such material to be posted on the World Wide Web.

47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(2)(B).

Congress defined material that is harmful to minors as:

any communication, picture, image, graphic image file, article, recording, writing, or other matter of any kind that is obscene or that-

(A) the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find, taking the material as a whole and with respect to minors, is designed to appeal to, or is designed to pander to, the prurient interest;

(B) depicts, describes, or represents, in a manner patently offensive with respect to minors, an actual or simulated sexual act or sexual contact, an actual or simulated normal or perverted sexual act, or a lewd exhibition of the genitals or post-pubescent female breast; and

(C) taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors.

Id. at § 231(e)(6). Under COPA, a minor is any person under 17 years of age. Id. at § 231(e)(7).

COPA provides communicators on the Web for commercial purposes affirmative defenses to prosecution under the statute. Section 231(c) provides that:

(c) AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE.-

(1) DEFENSE.-It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this section that the defendant, in good faith, has restricted access by minors to material that is harmful to minors-

(A) by requiring use of a credit card, debit account, adult access code, or adult personal identification number;

(B) by accepting a digital certificate that verifies age; or

(C) by any other reasonable measures that are feasible under available technology.

The disclosure of information collected in implementing the affirmative defenses is restricted in § 231(d):

(d) PRIVACY PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS.-

(1) DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION LIMITED.-A person making a communication described in subsection (a)-

(A) shall not disclose any information collected for the purposes of restricting access to such communications to individuals 17 years of age or older without the prior written or electronic consent of-

(i) the individual concerned, if the individual is an adult; or

(ii)...

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