31 N.W. 457 (Minn. 1887), Craver v. Christian
| Citation | 31 N.W. 457, 36 Minn. 413 |
| Opinion Judge | Vanderburgh, J. |
| Party Name | Charles P. Craver v. John A. Christian and others |
| Attorney | P. M. Babcock, for appellants. Weed Munro and Edwin Stone, for respondent. |
| Case Date | February 11, 1887 |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Page 457
Plaintiff brought this action in the district court for Hennepin county, to recover damages for injuries received while working in defendants' flouring-mill, under the circumstances detailed in the opinion. The action was tried before Lochren, J., and the plaintiff had a verdict. A new trial was refused, and the defendants appealed. A former appeal in the action is reported, 34 Minn. 397.
Order affirmed.
OPINION
The principles involved in the cases of Sherman v. Chicago, Mil. & St. Paul Ry. Co., 34 Minn. 259, (25 N.W. 593;) Craver v. Christian, 34 Minn. 397, (26 N.W. 8;) and Barbo v. Bassett, 35 Minn. 485, (29 N.W. 198;) -- and which were considered by this court in the determination thereof, -- will necessarily lead to an affirmance of the order refusing a new trial in this case.
It will be seen that the liability of the defendants in these cases is not rested solely upon the ground that the machinery or instrumentalities provided were not fenced or covered, but rather upon the [36 Minn. 414] ground that, assuming that the evidence tended to show that the machinery used or place of employment was unsafe and dangerous to the servant, the jury might find that the master had failed in some duty which he owed the servant, so that it might be determined that the latter did not assume the risk of the danger incident to the use of the machinery.
In Anderson v. Morrison, 22 Minn. 274, it was held that "if an employer should set an adult, who had capacity to take care of himself, and who knew the risks, to do a dangerous work, of course the employer would not be liable for an injury occurring to the employe in doing the work; and it would be the same if the employe were a minor, but of sufficient capacity to avoid the danger." And so the rule is stated generally in Sullivan v. India Mfg. Co., 113 Mass. 396: Neglect to fence or cover is not of itself sufficient to make the master liable. He must have been guilty of some negligence in the premises, thus failing in some duty owed to the employe. "He went to work in the place pointed out by the defendants. He thus consented to the dangers attending the work, all of which were apparent; and, if he had sufficient knowledge and capacity to comprehend them, he cannot now complain that such place might, at moderate expense, have been made safer."
The question resolves itself, then, into one in respect to the negligent conduct of the master under the circumstances of each particular case. It must be conceded, therefore, if the machinery is in fact found to be dangerous, that
Page 458
the duties growing out of the relations of master and servant in any particular case, as respects the use of it, are not affected by the fact that similar machinery is ordinarily left unprotected by other employers. Nor is it material that the original object of covering the gearing alleged to be dangerous, and by which plaintiff was injured, was to keep out dust, if the result was to afford protection, and the plaintiff was not notified, either in fact or by the circumstances, of the removal of such protection. It is manifest that, if practicable, dangerous machinery should be covered so as to remove the risk, or, if not done, that the employe should have reasonable notice of the risks incurred by it. Russell v. Minn. & St. L. Ry. Co., 32 Minn. 230, (20 N.W. 147.)
[36 Minn. 415] In Barbo v. Bassett, supra, the cogs by which the plaintiff's hand was injured had been uncovered subsequent to his employment, without his knowledge, and he had not noticed the change. It was held to be a fair question for the jury, upon the evidence in that case, whether, considering the nature of plaintiff's duties and occupation in the mill in respect to the location of the machinery in question, the change might not have escaped his observation without negligence on his part.
In Sherman v. Chicago, Mil. & St. Paul Ry. Co., supra, the evidence tended to show that the space between the main and guard rail in a railway track, usually designated as "the frog," was dangerous to employes engaged in coupling cars, etc., and that in the yard where plaintiff's intestate had been accustomed to work, and some time before he was killed, the defendant had adopted the device of inserting wooden blocks in the angle made by the rails, to prevent accidents from the danger referred to....
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