Lyne v. Western Union Tel. Co

• Decision Date: 25 October 1898
• Citation: 31 S.E. 350,123 N.C. 129
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: LYNE . v. WESTERN UNION TEL. CO.

31 S.E. 350

123 N.C. 129

LYNE .

v.WESTERN UNION TEL. CO.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Oct. 25, 1898.

Trial—Instructions—Telegram—Negligence in Delivery—Damages.

1. The court need not charge in the language of the instructions asked, if, where proper, they are given in substance.

2. A telegraph company was in the habit of going to the back door of the post office when the general delivery window was closed for addresses of parties unknown to it. On this occasion the messenger found the window closed, and saw a light in the office, but did not go back to inquire. One of the clerks was there at the time who could have given him the address wanted. Held sufficient to go to the jury on the question of negligence in delivering a telegram.

3. The addressee of a telegram may recover for mental anguish and suffering caused by the negligence of the company in delivering it, and this though it does not disclose the relation of the parties.

Appeal from superior court, Wake county; Timberlake, Judge.

Action by Maggie E. Lyne against the Western Union Telegraph Company. There was a Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Robert C. Strong, for appellant.

Shepherd & Busbee, for appellee.

FURCHES, J. The plaintiff is the widow of R. G. Lyne, who was called by her "Gregory." The plaintiff alleges: That at 9 o'clock p. m. on the 23d day of October, 1897, J. B. Lyne, a brother-in-law of plaintiff and a brother of her husband, sent her the following telegram: "Richmond, Va., Oct. 23, 1897. To Mrs. R. G. Lyne, Care Mrs. Mattie Worth-am, Raleigh, N. C: Gregory met accident; not live more 24, 26 hours. J. B. Lyne." That this telegram was received at the office of the defendant in Raleigh, N. C, and that it was not delivered to her until 1 o'clock p. m., October 24th. That this delay in the delivery of the telegram was caused by the negligence of the defendant and its agents. That by and on account of said negligence she was unable to reach the city of Richmond until the morning of the 25th of October, and not until after the death of her husband. That said negligence caused her great pain and mental suffering, for which she demands damages in this action. The defendant admitted receiving the message, denied all allegations of negligence, sets up contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, and denies her right to recover, and especially denies her right to recover damages for mental anguish and suffering. It appeared on the trial that the message was received at the Richmond office at 10:10 p. m., October 23d, and at the Raleigh office at 10:28 of the same day; that it was put in the hands of Eugene Cole, one of the messenger boys of the defendant, for delivery; that he did not know the address or residence of Mrs. Wortham; that he examined the city directory, and did not find it there; that he then went to the hotels in the city, and failed to find it on their registry; that he then went to the post office, where he was in the habit of going for such information, and found the general delivery window closed; that he saw a light in the office, but did not go to the back door to inquire for the address of Mrs. Wortham, but returned with the message, undelivered, to the Raleigh office of the defendant. It was in evidence that the delivery messengers of the defendant were in the habit of going to the post office for such information, and that when it was after office hours, and the general delivery window was closed, they were in the habit of going to the back door of the post office, and making the inquiry there; that one of the clerks of the post office was in there at the time the messenger went to the post office, and, if he had gone to the back door and inquired, the post-office clerk would have given him the address of Mrs. Wortham; that Mrs. Worth-am resided at 110 Salisbury street, within a few hundred yards of the defendant's Raleigh office, but had only resided there a few months, and her residence was not known to the defendant. There was other evidence inthe case, which we deem it unnecessary to give or refer to, as the case turns upon what we have given and the instructions of the court. There were some exceptions to evidence, and, without discussing these, it is sufficient to say they have been considered, and that we are of the opinion they cannot be...