310 U.S. 586 (1940), 690, Minersville School District v. Board of Education

Docket Nº:No. 690
Citation:310 U.S. 586, 60 S.Ct. 1010, 84 L.Ed. 1375
Party Name:Minersville School District v. Board of Education
Case Date:June 03, 1940
Court:United States Supreme Court
 
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Page 586

310 U.S. 586 (1940)

60 S.Ct. 1010, 84 L.Ed. 1375

Minersville School District

v.

Board of Education

No. 690

United States Supreme Court

June 3, 1940

Argued April 25, 1940

CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Syllabus

1. A state regulation requiring that pupils in the public schools, on pain of expulsion, participate in a daily ceremony of saluting the national flag whilst reciting in unison a pledge of allegiance to it "and to the Republic for which it stands; one Nation indivisible, with liberty and justice for all" -- held within the scope of legislative power, and consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment, as applied to children brought up in, and entertaining, a conscientious religious belief that such obeisance to the flag is forbidden by the Bible and that the Bible, as the Word of God, is the supreme authority. P. 591.

2. Religious convictions do not relieve the individual from obedience to an otherwise valid general law not aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious beliefs. P. 594.

3. So far as the Federal Constitution is concerned, it is within the province of the legislatures and school authorities of the several States to adopt appropriate means to evoke and foster a sentiment of national unity among the children in the public schools. P. 597.

4. This Court cannot exercise censorship over the conviction of legislatures that a particular program or exercise will best promote in the minds of children who attend the common schools an attachment to the institutions of their country, nor overrule the local judgment against granting exemptions from observance of such a program. P. 598.

108 F.2d 683, reversed.

CERTIORARI, 309 U.S. 645, to review the affirmance of a

decree (24 F.Supp. 271; opinion, 21 F.Supp. 581) which perpetually enjoined the above-named School District, the members of its board of education, and its superintendent of public schools from continuing to enforce an order expelling from the public schools certain minors (suing in this case by their father as next friend), and from

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requiring them to salute the national flag as a condition to their right to attend.

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FRANKFURTER, J., lead opinion

MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER delivered the opinion of the Court.

A grave responsibility confronts this Court whenever, in course of litigation, it must reconcile the conflicting claims of liberty and authority. But when the liberty invoked is liberty of conscience, and the authority is authority to safeguard the nation's fellowship, judicial conscience is put to its severest test. Of such a nature is the present controversy.

Lillian Gobitis, aged twelve, and her brother William, aged ten, were expelled from the public schools of Minersville, Pennsylvania, for refusing to salute the national flag as part of a daily school exercise. The local Board of Education required both teachers and pupils to participate in this ceremony. The ceremony is a familiar one. The right hand is placed on the breast and the following pledge recited in unison: "I pledge allegiance to my flag, and to the Republic for which it stands; one nation indivisible, with liberty and justice for all." While the words are spoken, teachers and pupils extend their right hands in salute to the flag. The Gobitis family are affiliated with "Jehovah's Witnesses," for whom the Bible as the Word of God is the supreme authority. The children

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had been brought up conscientiously to believe that such a gesture of respect for the flag was forbidden by command of Scripture.1

The Gobitis children were of an age for which Pennsylvania makes school attendance compulsory. Thus, they were denied a free education, and their parents had to put them into private schools. To be relieved of the financial [60 S.Ct. 1012] burden thereby entailed, their father, on behalf of the children and in his own behalf, brought this suit. He sough to enjoin the authorities from continuing to exact participation in the flag salute ceremony as a condition of his children's attendance at the Minersville school. After trial of the issues, Judge Maris gave relief in the District Court, 24 F.Supp. 271, on the basis of a thoughtful opinion at a preliminary stage of the litigation, 21 F.Supp. 581; his decree was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, 108 F.2d 683. Since this decision ran counter to several per curiam dispositions of this Court,2 we granted certiorari to give the matter full reconsideration. 309 U.S. 645. By their able submissions, he Committee on the Bill of Rights of the American Bar Association and the American Civil Liberties Union, as friends of the Court, have helped us to our conclusion.

We must decide whether the requirement of participation in such a ceremony, exacted from a child who refuses

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upon sincere religious grounds, infringes without due process of law the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.

Centuries of strife over the erection of particular dogmas as exclusive or all-comprehending faiths led to the inclusion of a guarantee for religious freedom in the Bill of Rights. The First Amendment, and the Fourteenth through its absorption of the First, sought to guard against repetition of those bitter religious struggles by prohibiting the establishment of a state religion and by securing to every sect the free exercise of its faith. So pervasive is the acceptance of this precious right that its scope is brought into question, as here, only when the conscience of individuals collides with the felt necessities of society.

Certainly the affirmative pursuit of one's convictions about the ultimate mystery of the universe and man's relation to it is placed beyond the reach of law. Government may not interfere with organized or individual expression of belief or disbelief. Propagation of belief -- or even of disbelief -- in the supernatural is protected, whether in church or chapel, mosque or synagogue, tabernacle or meetinghouse. Likewise, the Constitution assures generous immunity to the individual from imposition of penalties for offending, in the course of his own religious activities, the religious views of others, be they a minority or those who are dominant in government. Cantwell v. Connecticut, ante, p. 296.

But the manifold character of man's relations may bring his conception of religious duty into conflict with the secular interests of his fellow men. When does the constitutional guarantee compel exemption from doing what society thinks necessary for the promotion of some great common end, or from a penalty for conduct which appears dangerous to the general good? To state the

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problem is to recall the truth that no single principle can answer all of life's complexities. The right to freedom of religious belief, however dissident and however obnoxious to the cherished beliefs of others -- even of a majority -- is itself the denial of an absolute. But to affirm that the freedom to follow conscience has itself no limits in the life of a society would deny that very plurality of principles which, as a matter of history, underlies protection of religious toleration. Compare Mr. Justice Holmes in Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355. Our present task, then, as so often the case with courts, is to reconcile two rights in order to prevent either from destroying the other. But, because, in safeguarding conscience, we are dealing with interests [60 S.Ct. 1013] so subtle and so dear, every possible leeway should be given to the claims of religious faith.

In the judicial enforcement of religious freedom, we are concerned with a historic concept. See Mr. Justice Cardozo in Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U.S. at 265. The religious liberty which the Constitution protects has never excluded legislation of general scope not directed against doctrinal loyalties of particular sects. Judicial nullification of legislation cannot be justified by attributing to the framers of the Bill of Rights views for which there is no historic warrant. Conscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long struggle for religious toleration, relieved the individual from obedience to a general law not aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious beliefs.3 The mere possession of religious convictions

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which contradict the relevant concerns of a political society does not relieve the citizen...

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