Chandler v. O'BRYAN

• Citation: 311 F. Supp. 1121
• Decision Date: 23 April 1969
• Docket Number: No. C 68-26.,C 68-26.
• Parties: Stephen S. CHANDLER, Plaintiff, v. W. H. Pat O'BRYAN, Defendant.
• Court: United States District Courts. 10th Circuit. Western District of Oklahoma

311 F. Supp. 1121

Stephen S. CHANDLER, Plaintiff, v. W. H. Pat O'BRYAN, Defendant.

No. C 68-26.

United States District Court, W. D. Oklahoma.

April 23, 1969.

Carl L. Shipley, Washington, D. C., for plaintiff.

Irwin Goldbloom, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., as amicus curiae.

Reagan M. Martin and Harvey L. Davis, Dallas, Tex., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

BATTISTI, District Judge.

Plaintiff moved for summary judgment of his declaratory judgment action, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on August 12, 1969. Briefs were filed and a hearing was convened on February 27, 1970, to consider defendant's objections that there are material factual disputes which bar a rendering of judgment on this motion under Rule 56(c).

A motion for summary judgment shall be granted if the moving party shows "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(c), F.R. Civ.P. Plaintiff has the affirmative burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all the material facts which entitle him to judgment as a matter of law. 2 Moore's Federal Practice 56.153. The moving party must sustain his burden by facts of which the Court will take judicial notice, and the Court may take judicial notice of its records and files. 2 Moore's Federal Practice 56.119. The Court, therefore, takes judicial notice of the entire record before this Court in Civil Action No. 67-88 and in No. 68-26; of information useful to analysis of the issues in this case in Civil Action No. 66-8; of Case No. 170-787 in the Oklahoma state court; and of the records and proceedings in D. C., 249 F.Supp. 51 and 10 Cir., 352 F.2d 987 which involved the same parties and concerned matters relevant to and leading to the issues involved in the present case. The Court also has the benefit of pleadings, affidavits, and oral testimony.

Whether the evidence reveals that a genuine issue of fact exists depends on the legal question presented. The precise legal issue in the present action can be fully understood only in the context of the complete factual background.

Plaintiff is a duly appointed United States District Judge for the Western District of Oklahoma. Defendant is an Oklahoma attorney and certified public accountant. They have been in litigation for literally a decade. On September 25, 1963, O'Bryan filed suit in the District Court of Oklahoma County against Judge Chandler, seeking damages for malicious prosecution, libel, and slander. The cause of action grew out of Judge Chandler's activities before a grand jury on November 9, 1961, which resulted in a criminal indictment against O'Bryan. The case was removed to Federal Court in No. 63-339, and O'Bryan's motion to remand was overruled. The Court found that Judge Chandler's activities were not beyond the scope of his jurisdiction as a district judge, and therefore he was judicially immune from civil liability. O'Bryan v. Chandler, 249 F.Supp. 51 (D.C., 1964). The Court ordered dismissal of the action in the state court.

O'Bryan appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. On November 30, 1965, the Tenth Circuit ruled to affirm the decision of the District Court. O'Bryan v. Chandler, 352 F.2d 287 (1965). The Court set forth the governing principles at page 988:

"It is settled doctrine that a Judge is not liable in damages for acts performed in a judicial capacity unless there is a `clear absence of all jurisdiction' over the subject matter. This is true, even though the Judge's acts are in excess of his jurisdiction and done maliciously, corruptly, or arbitrarily. Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 20 L. Ed. 646. This court, in Ryan v. Scoggin, 10 Cir., 245 F.2d 54, 58, announced the rules in these words:

* * * `It is only in instances in which a judge acts or proceeds in the clear absence of any color of jurisdiction or proceeds officially in respect to a cause or matter over which the court is clearly without any color of jurisdiction that he may be subjected to personal liability * * *.'"

The Court went on to discuss the judge's activities before the grand jury. It concluded: "We cannot agree with O'Bryan's contentions that Judge Chandler's conduct was clearly in absence of any jurisdiction * * *." Id at p. 989. For these acts "Judge Chandler could not be held liable in damages." Id at p. 990.

Shortly after the rendering of the Tenth Circuit's affirmance, on December 8, 1965, O'Bryan filed Case No. 170-787 in the District Court of Oklahoma County against Judge Chandler, seeking damages for an alleged libel committed by Judge Chandler against O'Bryan in the publication of a certain document. This document was prepared by Judge Chandler in connection with the matter pending before the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in August of 1965. Substantial portions of the document were thereafter contained in the judge's brief submitted to the Court of Appeals. However, O'Bryan alleged that Judge Chandler communicated this document, containing alleged defamatory matter, to Mr. John Clabes, an editor of an Oklahoma City newspaper, on August 15; the briefs were filed on August 18, 1965.

The question before the Court is precisely this: Should the actions of Judge Chandler in publishing the allegedly defamatory statements be merged into the subsequent holding of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals that the judge's conduct was judicially immune from civil liability? More particularly was the statement, in the context in which it was made, so intimately connected with the litigation concerning Judge Chandler's earlier conduct that it must be construed as an incidental part of that litigation. If so, the finding of judicial immunity by the Tenth Circuit may be construed to cover under its penumbra all acts which Judge Chandler undertook to win his litigation.

Before this issue can be faced squarely, it is necessary to take up the question of this Court's jurisdiction in this action. Such discussion should help to further highlight the preciseness of the question before the Court.

Judge Chandler removed Case No. 170-787 from the District Court of Oklahoma County on January 7, 1966, in Civil Action No. 66-8. O'Bryan filed a motion to remand to the state court. Judge Austin, sitting by assignment, heard the motions and granted O'Bryan's motion to remand on the ground that no federal question (judicial immunity) was presented. Whether his finding in this regard was correct is immaterial to the issue before this Court. After trial in the Oklahoma state court, which rendered a verdict against Judge Chandler, he again removed to this Court; and O'Bryan again moved for remand in Action No. 67-88. This motion to remand has been held in abeyance while plaintiff's motion for summary judgment of his action for declaratory judgment in the instant case No. 68-26 is considered.

In assuming jurisdiction of this action, the Court had to first grapple with two procedural obstacles. It was argued by defendant that the declaratory judgment action was a disguised attempt by plaintiff to obtain a review of Judge Austin's remand order, which review is prohibited by 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). In a memorandum opinion of June 12, 1969, this Court decided that the declaratory judgment action should be construed as containing issues distinguishable from those before Judge Austin. In that libel action, Judge Austin examined the document in question with the view to determining whether it, in itself, was an official act protected by judicial immunity. This Court viewed the issue before it to be whether Judge Chandler's actions could be construed as part of his defense of the malicious prosecution action then before the Court of Appeals—as such, those actions could be said to merge with the final judgment of that court, covering all actions of Judge Chandler regarding the litigation.

The other question had to do with whether this Court would be violating 28 U.S.C. § 2283, which states: "A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate...