311 U.S. 205 (1940), 42, United States v. Falcone

Docket Nº:No. 42
Citation:311 U.S. 205, 61 S.Ct. 204, 85 L.Ed. 128
Party Name:United States v. Falcone
Case Date:December 09, 1940
Court:United States Supreme Court
 
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Page 205

311 U.S. 205 (1940)

61 S.Ct. 204, 85 L.Ed. 128

United States

v.

Falcone

No. 42

United States Supreme Court

Dec. 9, 1940

Argued November 18, 1940

CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Syllabus

One who sells materials knowing that they are intended for use, or will be used, in the production of illicit distilled spirits, but not knowing of a conspiracy to commit the crime, is not chargeable as coconspirator. P. 210.

109 F.2d 579 affirmed.

Certiorari, 310 U.S. 620, to review a Judgment reversing convictions of conspiracy.

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STONE, J., lead opinion

MR. JUSTICE STONE delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question presented by this record is whether one who sells materials with knowledge that they are intended for use or will be used in the production of illicit distilled spirits may be convicted as a coconspirator with a distiller who conspired with others to distill the spirits in violation of the revenue laws.

Respondents were indicted with sixty-three others in the Northern District of New York for conspiring to violate the revenue laws by the operation of twenty-two illicit stills in the vicinity of Utica, New York. The case was submitted to the jury as to twenty-four defendants, of whom the five respondents and sixteen operators of stills were convicted. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the conviction of the five respondents on the ground that as there was no evidence that respondents were themselves conspirators, the sale by them of materials, knowing that they would be used by others in illicit distilling, [61 S.Ct. 205] was not sufficient to establish that respondents were guilty of the conspiracy charged. 109 F.2d 579. We granted certiorari, 310 U.S. 620, to resolve an asserted conflict of the decision below with those of Courts of Appeals in other circuits. Simpson v. United States, 11 F.2d 591; Pattis v. United States, 17 F.2d 562; Borgia v. United States, 78 F.2d 550; Marino v. United States, 91 F.2d 691; see Backun v. United States, 112 F.2d 635. Compare Young v. United States, 48 F.2d 26.

All of respondents were jobbers or distributors who, during the period in question, sold sugar, yeast or cans,

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some of which found their way into the possession and use of some of the distiller defendants. The indictment, while charging generally that all the defendants were parties to the conspiracy, did not allege specifically that any of respondents had knowledge of the conspiracy, but it did allege that respondents Alberico and Nole brothers sold the materials mentioned knowing that they were to be used in illicit distilling. The Court of Appeals, reviewing the evidence, thought, in the case of some of the respondents, that the jury might take it that they were knowingly supplying the distillers. As to Nicholas Nole, whose case it considered most doubtful, it thought that his equivocal conduct "was as likely to have come from a belief that it was a crime to sell the yeast and the cans to distillers as from being in fact any further involved in their business." But it assumed for purposes of decision that all furnished supplies which they knew ultimately reached and were used by some of the distillers. Upon this assumption, it said,

In the light of all this, it is apparent that the first question is whether the seller of goods, in themselves innocent, becomes a conspirator with -- or, what is in substance the same thing, an abettor of -- the buyer because he knows that the buyer means to use the goods to commit a crime.

And it concluded that, merely because respondent did not forego a "normally lawful activity, of the fruits of which he knew that others were making an unlawful use," he is not guilty of a conspiracy.

The Government does not argue here the point which seems to be implicit in the question raised by its petition for certiorari -- that conviction of conspiracy can rest on proof alone of knowingly supplying an illicit distiller who is not conspiring with others. In such a case, as the Government concedes, the act of supplying or some other proof must import an agreement or concert of action between buyer and seller, which admittedly is not present

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here. Cf. Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112, 121;...

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