Singer Sons v. Union Pac Co Kansas City, Mo v. Singer Sons
Citation | 311 U.S. 295,61 S.Ct. 254,85 L.Ed. 198 |
Decision Date | 16 December 1940 |
Docket Number | 35,Nos. 34,s. 34 |
Parties | L. SINGER & SONS et al. v. UNION PAC. R. CO. KANSAS CITY, MO., v. L. SINGER & SONS et al |
Court | United States Supreme Court |
Messrs. Ruby D. Garrett and John M. Cleary, both of Kansas City, Mo., for petitioners L. Singer & Sons and others.
Messrs. William E. Kemp and John M. Cleary, both of Kansas City, Mo., for petitioner Kansas City, Mo.
Messrs. Henry N. Ess, of Kansas City, Mo., and Thomas W. Bockes, of Omaha, Neb., for respondent Union Pac. R. Co.
Undertaking to proceed under Paragraphs 18, 20 and 21, Section 402, Transportation Act, 1920,1 41 Statutes 456, 477, U.S.C. Title 49, § 1, 49 U.S.C.A. § 1, petitioners, by bill filed December 30, 1938, in the United States District Court, Western District of Missouri, 26 F.Supp. 721, asked a decree enjoining respondent from constructing or operating an alleged extension.
The bill describes them thus:—
Answering, the respondent alleged that petitioners were not parties 'in interest' within Paragraph 20, Sec. 402, Transportation Act and had no right to sue. The District Court sustained this defense and dismissed the bill. Upon appeal its action was affirmed. The matter is here by certiorari.
The Circuit Court of Appeals, 8 Cir., 109 F.2d 493, 495, made the following summation of the bill—'The complaint of the plaintiffs shows that they are commission merchants doing business on the Kansas City, Missouri, produce market, an old and well-estab- lished market which adequately serves the consuming public in its vicinity and receives produce from, and ships produce to, other states; that Kansas City, Missouri, is now engaged in constructing new market buildings for this market at a cost of about $500,000; that the market has suitable and adequate transportation facilities of all kinds; that the adjoining city of Kansas City, Kansas, proposes to build and is building a 'food Terminal' or produce market on a tract of land which it owns, at a cost of about $4,000,000, of which $1,710,000 is a grant from the Public Works Administration of the United States, and that the balance of the necessary funds will be procured by a sale of the City's bonds to the defendant railroad company; that the defendant proposes, at an expense of some $500,000, to furnish trackage to serve this Kansas City, Kansas, market; that this trackage constitutes an extension of the defendant's lines of railroad, for the construction of which it has procured no certificate of convenience and necessity from the Interstate Commerce Commission as required by law; that the construction and operation of the proposed extension in Kansas City, Kansas, will adversely affect and will destroy the business and properties of the plaintiffs and the large investments which they have made in and adjacent to the Kansas City, Missouri, produce market; that it will create an unnecessary and uncalled for rival market at an inconvenient place without creating any more produce to be handled or any more customers to be served; that it will result in the unnecessary duplication of railroad facilities at a cost of $500,000 without increasing the amount of freight to be handled; that it will divert traffic from other railroads which are now adequately handling the traffic to the Kansas City, Missouri, produce market, and will cause destructive competition between the defendant and other railroads and will cause a wasteful and needless expendi- ture of money by the defendant; that 'for each and all of the reasons aforesaid, the construction and operation, or the construction, or the operation of the said extension or extensions of railroad by the defendant to said proposed produce market in Kansas City, Kansas, will directly and adversely affect the property interests of the plaintiffs and the public generally by bringing about a material change in the transportation situation, and will constitute an unnecessary burden upon interstate commerce, directly and adversely affecting the welfare of plaintiffs and the public interest."
It is not alleged that the respondent has ever served the produce market in Kansas City, Missouri, or that petitioners make or receive shipments over its lines or that the proposed extension will deprive them of any shipping facilities. Evidently the real purpose was to obstruct construction of a competitor and the theory upon which the proceeding rests would permit petitioners to sue if any railroad should extend its lines to any market competing with the market at Kansas City, Missouri.
Concerning the purport of the allegations of the bill, the Circuit Court of Appeals rightly said:
It declared that the question whether petitioners were 'parties in interest' within Paragraph 20 must be determined upon consideration of Western Pacific California R. Co. v. Southern Pacific, 284 U.S. 47, 52 S.Ct. 56, 76 L.Ed. 160, and concluded
A dissenting opinion by Judge Stone likewise relied upon Western Pacific California Railroad Co. v. Southern Pacific Company, but took the view that the challenged action might directly and substantially affect petitioners' welfare since their financial interests would suffer from the proposed rival market which could not come into existence without the proposed extension.
The purpose and effect of paragraphs 18, 20 and 21 were much considered in Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 270 U.S. 266, 46 S.Ct. 263, 70 L.Ed. 578, and Western Pacific California Railroad Co. v. Southern Pacific Company, 284 U.S. 47, 52 S.Ct. 56, 76 L.Ed. 160.
In the first of these causes a railroad sought to prevent another from building an extension. The meaning of the term 'party in interest' was not discussed. But the opinion asserts that by the Transportation Act of 1920, ...
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