Maass v. Higgins Abendroth Estate v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Blacque Estate v. Same

• Decision Date: 03 March 1941
• Docket Number: 511,510,Nos. 274,s. 274
• Citation: 312 U.S. 443,85 L.Ed. 940,132 A. L.R. 1035,61 S.Ct. 631
• Parties: MAASS v. HIGGINS, Collector of Internal Revenue. ABENDROTH'S ESTATE et al. v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE. BLACQUE'S ESTATE et al. v. SAME
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

312 U.S. 443

61 S.Ct. 631

85 L.Ed. 940

MAASS

v HIGGINS, Collector of Internal Revenue.

ABENDROTH'S ESTATE et al.

v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE.

BLACQUE'S ESTATE et al.

v. SAME.

Nos. 274, 510, 511.

Argued Feb. 3, 1941.

Decided March 3, 1941.

Messrs. Homer S. Cummings, of Washington, D.C., and Wilbur C. Davidson, of New York City, for petitioner Maass.

Mr. Rollin Browne, of New York City, for petitioner City Bank Farmers Trust Co.

Mr. Richard H. Demuth, of Washington, D.C., for respondent.

Mr. Justice ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court.

In these cases we must decide whether, where an executor avails himself of the option extended by the estate tax law to value a decedent's gross estate as of one year after the decedent's death, rents, dividends, and interest received and accrued during the year are to be added to the value of the property to which they are attributable and included in the value of the gross estate. The question arises under § 302(j) of the Revenue Act of 1926 as added by § 202(a) of the Revenue Act of 1935.¹

No. 274 is a suit against the Collector to recover an overpayment of tax. The complaint alleged that the decedent died August 30, 1936; that in the estate's return the executors elected to have the value of the gross estate determined by valuing it as of one year after the decedent's death; that the Commissioner included in the estate a sum which was not in fact the decedent's property at the time of her death but represented income, namely, rents, dividends, and interest earned by the estate subsequent to the decedent's death; that the executors paid the tax and their claim for refund was rejected. The Collector's answer raised no material issue of fact. Each party moved for judgment on the pleadings. The court dismissed the complaint. ² The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed one judge dissenting.³

In Nos. 510 and 511, the executor of two decedents who died respectively October 9, 1936, and April 3, 1937, elected in its returns to have the gross estates valued as of one year after death or as of date of disposition. In each case the executor collected interest and dividends upon bonds and stocks forming part of the estate at decedent's death. The sums so collected were not reckoned in fixing the values of the estates, except such portion of them as accrued prior to death. The Commissioner determined deficiencies due to the failure to return them. The Board of Tax Appeals affirmed his action⁴ and the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the Board's decision.⁵

Although there was no conflict between decisions of Circuit Courts of Appeals, ⁶ we granted certiorari because of the importance of the question and the number of pending cases in which it is presented.

It is agreed that the purpose of subdivision (j) was to mitigate the hardship consequent upon shrinkage in the value of estates during the year following death. Congress enacted it in the light of the fact that, due to such shrinkages, many estates were almost obliterated by the necessity of paying a tax on the value of the assets at the date of decedent's death. About one year after the adoption of the subsection, the Treasury promulgated Art. 11 of Regulations 80 (1937 Ed.) in which it ruled that interest bearing obligations, such as bonds, embodied two promises, one to pay principal, the other to pay interest, both a part of the gross estate if the obligation was owned by the decedent at his death. It further ruled that in the case of leased real estate two factors were to be considered, the value of the realty and the value of the covenant to pay rent. With respect to stocks, it ruled that the value of the stock and the value of the right to dividends thereon were separable and each constituted an element of value to the decedent. The regulation required that if, during the year subsequent to death, rents, royalties, interest, or dividends were received by the decedent's estate, such portion thereof as had not accrued, or was not attributable to a period prior to death, should be returned in full and reckoned as part of the gross estate in any case where the executor elected, as permitted by subsection (j), to value the assets as of one year after the decedent's death or as of the date of disposition of any asset. In accordance with the regulation the deficiencies in the present cases were determined.

In the courts below, and before the Board of Tax Appeals, the Government contended that such items of income are in truth payments on account of principal and that, by such payments, the principal is reduced so that, when the capital asset is valued at the end of the period, its true value is not reflected unless there be added the interest, dividend, or other like payment received by the estate in the interim. In this court, the argument takes a somewhat different form. Reference is made to the fact that, under the option granted, a capital asset is to be valued either at the expiration of the year or at the time of disposition and it is urged that, as respects interest, rent or dividends, a disposition occurs at the date of the receipt of the item. In either aspect the validity of the contention depends upon the theory that, for purposes of estate tax valuation, the asset consists of two elements,—one the right of ownership the other the right to receive the income. It is said that both of these elements enter into the valuation made as of the date of death and if, in the subsequent period, the latter emerges in the shape of a payment that payment is to be attributable to the income right rather than to the right of ownership of the income producing property.

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