Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission v. Uniontown Area School Dist., KENSINGTON-ARNOLD

Citation455 Pa. 52,313 A.2d 156
Decision Date04 December 1973
Docket NumberKENSINGTON-ARNOLD
PartiesPENNSYLVANIA HUMAN RELATIONS COMMISSION, Appellee, v. UNIONTOWN AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellant. PENNSYLVANIA HUMAN RELATIONS COMMISSION, Appellee, v. NEW CASTLE AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellant. PENNSYLVANIA HUMAN RELATIONS COMMISSION, Appellee, v. NEWSCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellant.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Herbert Margolis, Ray, Buck, Margolis, Mahoney & John, Uniontown, for Uniontown Area School Dist.

Jonathan Solomon, Solomon & Solomon, New Castle, for New Castle Area School Dist.

Robert J. Key, New Kensington, for New Kensington-Arnold School Dist.

Jay Harris Feldstein, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Pa. Human Relations Comm'n, Pittsburgh, for appellee.

Before JONES, C.J., and EAGEN, O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX and MANDERINO, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

POMEROY, Justice.

The appeals now before us are from the decision of the Commonwealth Court in Philadelphia School District v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, 6 Pa.Cmwlth. 281, 294 A.2d 410 (1972), in which that court affirmed orders issued by the Commission to five school districts (Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Uniontown, New Castle and New Kensington-Arnold) upon a finding by the Commission of a violation by each district of section 5(i)(1) of the Human Relations Act, Oct. 27, 1955, P.L. 744, as amended, 43 P.S. § 955 (Supp. 1973--74). 1

I.

In September of 1967 this Court held that under the section of the Human Relations Act set forth in note 1, the Commission was empowered to correct De facto segregation occurring in the public schools of this State. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission v. Chester School District, 427 Pa. 157, 233 A.2d 290 (1967). Although we noted at the outset that the term 'de facto segregation' was not fully defined, 2 we found it unnecessary in Chester to state any particular definition because we there observed that 'the . . . figures, which are not disputed, satisfy Any definition of de facto segregation.' 3 (Emphasis added). 427 Pa. at 178, 233 A.2d at 301. While we did not think that it followed from the absence from the Human Relations Act of any particular definition that the General Assembly had unconstitutionally delegated its law-giving power to the Commission, we pointed out that the availability of judicial review under the Administrative Agency Law would 'provide adequate standards . . . (s)hould the Commission at some future date abuse its authority', Id., and that in so empowering the Commission to act against De facto segregation, 'the Legislature undoubtedly envisioned a case-by-case approach.' 427 Pa. at 179, 233 A.2d at 301. Since the date of our decision in Chester, the Legislature has not amended the Human Relations Act in a manner which would suggest disagreement, and we therefore persevere in our belief that indeed the Human Relations Act does speak to segregation that does not arise from official policy or acts. 4

On March 29, 1968, subsequent to Chester, the Human Relations Commission together with the Department of Public Instruction adopted through a procedure not elucidated by the records in these appeals a document entitled 'Desegregation Guidelines for Public Schools', which described itself as 'set(ting) forth guidelines for school districts' and which contained the following paragraph:

'1. Segregation as a factor in public education

When any one public school building comes to be viewed as improperly exclusive in fact or in spirit; when it is viewed as being reserved for certain community groups; when morale, teacher and pupil motivation and achievement are affected by the racial imbalance, the school system is being adversely affected by segregation. In other words, segregation is not an arbitrary numerical relationship of one group to another. Segregation becomes a factor adversely affecting education when an untoward concentration of any racial group in one building begins to destroy the functioning of the entire system as a 'common school.'

The common school has long been viewed as a basic social instrument in attaining our traditional goals of equal opportunity and personal fulfillment. The presence in a single school of children from varied backgrounds is an important element in the preparation of young people for active participation in the social and political affairs of our democracy.

Insofar as possible every school building should reflect in its enrollment a cross section of the entire community.'

Shortly thereafter, on May 15, 1968, the Commission and the Department of Public Instruction adopted a document entitled 'Recommended Elements of a School Desegregation Plan', one of the tests of which was--

'3. How nearly does the desegregation plan bring the per cent Negro pupils in each building to within 30% Of the per cent Negro pupils among the buildings of the same grade span?' 5

In its undertaking to apply these principles to the 634 odd school districts in Pennsylvania, the Commission resolved for purposes of administrative manageability to proceed first against those districts (17 in number) in which any one school building contained more than 80% Negro pupils and in which the permissible deviation (30%) was violated. When in the early Spring of 1970 all but two (Philadelphia and Pittsburgh) of these districts had adopted or were in the process of adopting a plan of desegregation acceptable to the Commission, the Commission then approached the eight school districts in which any one school building contained more than 5% Negro pupils and in which the permissible deviation was exceeded. 6 To that end the Commission sponsored in June, 1970 a conference at Allenberry, Pennsylvania to which representatives of the school districts of New Castle, Uniontown and New Kensington-Arnold, among others, were invited and at which the Commission explained its 'Desegregation Guidelines for Public Schools' and its 'Recommended Elements of a School Desegregation Plan.' The three appellant-school districts, however, failed to submit desegregation plans acceptable to the Commission. In late 1970 or early 1971, therefore, the Commission issued complaints against the three individually and, after a hearing in each case, found As a fact that--

'VI. A racially-segregated or racially-imbalanced school is one whose concentration of Negro or white pupils is disproportionate to the enrollment of that particular racial group in all of the schools of the same grade span of a school district.

VII. A disproportionate racial concentration of pupils in a public school consists of a pupil enrollment in which the percent of Negro pupils is less than or more than thirty (30%) percent of the percent of the Negro pupils in schools of the same grade span of a school district, as defined by the Complainant and Pennsylvania Department of Education in 'Desegregation Guidelines for Public Schools' and 'Recommended Elements of a School Desegregation Plan.' 7

Applying that 'fact' to the statistics of the appellant districts (set out in the Appendix to this opinion), the Commission found as a conclusion of law that each district was in violation of section 5(i)(1) of the Human Relations Act. 8 Consequently, the Commission entered a final order directing each district to 'develop and submit' a plan and timetable for implementation that would eliminate racial imbalance as defined by the Commission.

The appeals of New Castle, Uniontown and New Kensington-Arnold were consolidated for decision with similar appeals taken by Philadelphia and Pittsburgh in the Commonwealth Court, 9 and the Commission's 'develop and submit' orders were affirmed. The court held that the school districts' arguments--that a finding of de facto segregation was unwarranted and that the standards employed by the Commission (the 30% Test, supra) were arbitrary and capricious--were 'put to rest' in Chester, supra, and in our more recent decision in Balsbaugh v. Rowland, 447 Pa. 423, 290 A.2d 85 (1972). The latter case was read by the Commonwealth Court as approving the very definition involved in these appeals, but with a permissible deviation of 10% Instead of 30%. The argument against the Commission's definition of racial imbalance, the Commonwealth Court concluded, 'is one that must be made to the Human Relations Commission and not to this Court.' 6 Pa.Cmwlth. at 286, 294 A.2d at 412. 10 We granted review at the request of the appellant-school districts and in light of the public importance of the issue presented. We now affirm. 11

II.

All agree that the core issue here is the power of the Commission to adopt its definition of racial imbalance, or, put somewhat differently, whether its definition in fact accurately interprets section 5(i)(1) of the Human Relations Act.

We begin by observing that we have not decided this question previously. In Chester, as pointed out earlier, we found it unnecessary to adopt any particular definition of what degree of racial imbalance constituted De facto segregation. In Balsbaugh taxpayers in Harrisburg filed a complaint in equity against the Harrisburg City School District, seeking to enjoin the implementation of a desegregation plan drawn up by the school district at the request of the Human Relations Commission. 12 The Commission was not a party to that action and, as we noted, 'no challenge of any kind has been made by appellants to the legality or propriety of the directive of the Commission that steps be taken to create a better racial balance, nor was this directive contested by the school Board.' 447 Pa. at 443, 290 A.2d at 90. Instead we viewed the Balsbaugh issue as that of the power of the appellee school board under the Public School Code of 1949 to implement such a plan; we did not there interpret section 5(i)(1) of the Human Relations Act, nor were we called upon to examine the power here asserted by the Commission to adopt its definition.

The appellant-school districts ask us to say that the Legislature's intention...

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