In re Sidney J.

• Decision Date: 10 May 2010
• Docket Number: No. W2008-01354-SC-R11-PT.,W2008-01354-SC-R11-PT.
• Citation: 313 S.W.3d 772
• Parties: In re SIDNEY J.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

313 S.W.3d 772

In re SIDNEY J.

No. W2008-01354-SC-R11-PT.

Supreme Court of Tennessee, at Nashville.

February 11, 2010 Session.

May 10, 2010.

David W. Camp and Randy C. Camp, Jackson, Tennessee, for the appellants, Donald J. and Wanda J.

Jeff Mueller, Jackson, Tennessee, for the appellees, Donald R. and Lois R.

OPINION

JANICE M. HOLDER, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which CORNELIA A. CLARK, GARY R. WADE, WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., and SHARON G. LEE, JJ., joined.

We granted appeal to determine whether a trial court may grant an intervening adoption petition pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-116(f)(1) when the intervening petitioners did not have physical custody or the right to receive physical custody of the child sought to be adopted at the time they filed their petition. The maternal grandparents petitioned to adopt the child, who was in their physical custody, and the paternal grandparents filed an intervening adoption petition. After engaging in a comparative fitness analysis, the trial court granted the paternal grandparents' petition. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in considering the paternal grandparents' petition because they did not meet the physical custody requirement in section 36-1-116(f)(1) and remanded the case to the trial court to enter an order granting the maternal grandparents' petition. We hold that section 36-1-116(f)(1) includes an exception to the physical custody requirement when the petitioners have filed an intervening adoption petition and the child sought to be adopted is in the physical custody of the original petitioners. We also hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's findings that the paternal grandparents were fit, that they were financially capable of providing for the child, and that the child's best interests would be served by granting their petition. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial court in all respects.

I. Facts and Procedural History

Sidney J. was born on November 29, 2000. On January 11, 2005, Sidney's father shot and killed her mother and two other individuals. Immediately thereafter, Sidney's maternal grandparents undertook her care and petitioned the Madison County Juvenile Court for temporary custody. On January 18, 2005, the juvenile court found Sidney to be dependent and awarded temporary legal custody to the maternal grandparents. The juvenile court further ordered that Sidney's paternal grandparents be permitted to visit with Sidney one weekend per month.

In September 2006, Sidney's father was convicted of the three homicides and sentenced to death. On December 8, 2006, the maternal grandparents filed a petition to adopt Sidney in juvenile court. The petition was transferred to the Madison County Chancery Court where, on January 29, 2007, the paternal grandparents filed an intervening adoption petition. On May 6 and 7, 2008, the trial court held a hearing regarding both adoption petitions. The trial court stated that it would "engage in a comparative analysis of the competing parties in order to arrive at the best interest of the child" as though it were making "an initial custody determination between two parents."

On May 14, 2008, the trial court sent a signed letter to counsel granting the paternal grandparents' adoption petition and awarding the maternal grandparents visitation with Sidney. The trial court also directed that Sidney's transition from the maternal grandparents' home to that of the paternal grandparents take place between 11:00 a.m. and 2:00 p.m. on May 31, 2008.¹

The trial court entered the final decree of adoption reflecting its ruling on June 16, 2008. The next day, the maternal grandparents filed a notice of appeal and a motion for stay pending appeal, which the trial court denied. The maternal grandparents filed in the Court of Appeals a motion for review of the trial court's order denying the motion for stay pending appeal, which the Court of Appeals denied.

The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in considering the paternal grandparents' petition because the paternal grandparents did not meet the physical custody requirement in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-116(f)(1) (2005) and remanded the case to the trial court to enter an order granting the maternal grandparents' petition.

II. Interpreting Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-1-116(f)(1)

We granted the paternal grandparents' application for permission to appeal to determine whether a trial court may grant an intervening adoption petition pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-116(f)(1) when the intervening petitioners do not have physical custody or the right to receive physical custody of the child sought to be adopted. Issues of statutory construction are questions of law, which we review de novo with no presumption of correctness afforded to the lower court's conclusions of law. Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Morgan, 263 S.W.3d 827, 836 (Tenn.2008).

Our role in construing statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent without unduly restricting or expanding the statute's intended scope. Owens v. State, 908 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tenn. 1995). To this end, we presume that every word in a statute has meaning and purpose and should be given full effect if the obvious intention of the General Assembly is not violated by so doing. In re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d 714, 722 (Tenn.2005). When a statute is clear, we apply the plain meaning without complicating the task. Eastman Chem. Co. v. Johnson, 151 S.W.3d 503, 507 (Tenn.2004).

Section 36-1-116(f)(1) governs, among other things, a trial court's authority to grant an adoption petition. This section provides, in pertinent part:

Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all matters pertaining to the child ... except for allegations of delinquency, unruliness or truancy of the child pursuant to title 37; provided, that, unless a party has filed an intervening petition to an existing adoption petition concerning a child who is in the physical custody of the original petitioners, the court shall have no jurisdiction to issue any orders granting custody or guardianship of the child to the petitioners or to the intervening petitioners or granting an adoption of the child to the petitioners or to the intervening petitioners unless the petition affirmatively states, and the court finds in its order, that the petitioners have physical custody of the child at the time of the filing of the petition, entry of the order of guardianship, or entry of the order of adoption, or unless the petitioners otherwise meet the requirements of § 36-1-111(d)(6) validly executed surrender.

(Emphasis added).

Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-116(f)(1) generally prohibits a trial court from granting an adoption "unless the petition affirmatively states ... that the petitioners have physical custody of the child at the time of the filing of the petition." By its plain language, however, the statute also includes an exception to the physical custody requirement when the petitioners "have filed an intervening petition to an existing adoption petition concerning a child who is in the physical custody of the original petitioners." Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-1-116(f)(1); See Dawn Coppock, Coppock on Tennessee Adoption Law 80 (2005).

Although the language of section 36-1-116(f)(1) is clear and unambiguous, we are required to construe a statute "so that the component parts are consistent and reasonable." Cohen v. Cohen, 937 S.W.2d 823, 827 (Tenn.1996). We must therefore address the maternal grandparents' argument that other provisions in the statutory scheme require us to depart from the plain language of section 36-1-116(f)(1).

We first note that the plain language of section 36-1-116(f)(1) is consistent with section 36-1-115(b), which governs standing to file an adoption petition. This section states that "petitioners must have physical custody or must demonstrate to the court that they have the right to receive custody of the child sought to be adopted as provided in the statute governing a validly executed surrender at the time the petition is filed, unless they are filing an intervening petition seeking to adopt the child." Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-1-115(b) (2005) (emphasis added). Thus, intervening petitioners are not required to have physical custody or the right to receive physical custody of the child sought to be adopted for purposes of filing their petition.

On the other hand, there are two adoption provisions that do not appear to contemplate an exception to the physical custody requirement. Section 36-1-116(b)(5), which governs the contents of an adoption petition, requires that the petition include a statement "that the petitioners have physical custody of the child or that they meet the requirements of a validly executed surrender." Likewise, section 36-1-120(a)(4), which governs the contents of a final order of adoption, requires that the final order include "the date when the petitioners acquired physical custody of the child and from what person or agency or by which court order." Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-1-120(a)(4) (2005).

To conclude that these requirements apply to intervening petitioners would, however, render inoperative the exception to the physical custody requirement for those "filing an intervening petition seeking to adopt the child" in section 36-1-115(b). We have a duty "to construe a statute so that no part will be inoperative." Tidwell v. Collins, 522 S.W.2d 674, 676 (Tenn.1975). We suspect, moreover, that the General Assembly simply did not deem it necessary to reiterate for purposes of these particular subsections that intervening petitioners are exempt from the physical custody requirement. We therefore conclude that the requirements of sections 36-1-116(b)(5) and -120(a)(4) do not apply when the petition was...