Shull v. Pilot Life Insurance Company

• Decision Date: 06 February 1963
• Docket Number: No. 20013,20013
• Parties: Myrtle S. SHULL and Walter G. Shull, Appellants, v. PILOT LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

313 F.2d 445 (1963)

Myrtle S. SHULL and Walter G. Shull, Appellants, v. PILOT LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee.

No. 20013

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

February 6, 1963.

Thomas J. Schwartz, William P. Doyle, Pompano Beach, Fla., for appellants.

Walter Humkey, Harold L. Ward, Miami, Fla., Fowler, White, Gillen, Humkey & Trenam, Miami, Fla., of counsel, for appellee.

Before BROWN, GEWIN and BELL, Circuit Judges.

JOHN R. BROWN, Circuit Judge.

This diversity suit was to recover for personal injuries sustained by the Plaintiff — the Assured under a life insurance policy — allegedly caused by the Defendant-Insurer having changed the named beneficiary without the Assured's consent and in violation of the express policy terms. The Defendant urges that as a matter of Florida substantive law, there is no liability for personal injury unaccompanied by bodily contact arising from a tortious violation of a contract unless the "act is such as to reasonably imply malice, or where, from the entire want of care of attention to duty, or great indifference to the persons, property, or rights of others, such malice will be imputed as would justify the assessment of exemplary or punitive damages." Kirksey v. Jernigan, 1950, Fla., 45 So.2d 188, 189, 17 A.L.R.2d 766. This legal standard is developed in these cases. International Ocean Telegraph Co. v. Saunders, 1893, 32 Fla. 434, 14 So. 148, 21 L.R.A. 810; Dunahoo v. Bess, 1941, 146 Fla. 182, 200 So. 541; Crane v. Loftin, 1954, Fla., 70 So.2d 574; Griffith v. Shamrock Village, 1957, Fla., 94 So.2d 854; Slocum v. Food Fair Stores of Fla., 1958, Fla., 100 So.2d 396; Clark v. Choctawhatchee Elec. Co-Op., 1958, Fla., 107 So.2d 609; Kimple v. Riedel, 1961, Fla. App., 133 So.2d 437. Accepting for present purposes this reading of Florida law, we nevertheless conclude that the District Court erred in dismissing the complaint for failure to state a claim under F.R.Civ.P. 12(b) (6). So long as it stands this dismissal with prejudice is res judicata and effectually bars any effort, in any court, at any time to find out what the true facts were.

This case is nowhere near ripe for determination that there can be no liability as a matter of Florida law. Like so many others, after the delay and expense of appeal, it must go back to determine whether the facts, as distinguished from the pleaded allegations, show a case meeting Florida principles. The allegations, though in the broad general terms permitted by the Rules, are quite sufficient to satisfy the test of Conley v. Gibson, 1957, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80. We repeat again what we have said before that within these very broad guide lines, a dismissal with prejudice on the "basis of bare bones pleadings is a tortuous thing." Arthur H. Richland Co. v. Harper, 5 Cir., 1962, 302 F.2d 324, 325; Santiesteban v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 5 Cir., 1962, 306 F.2d 9; Millet v. Godchaux Sugars, Inc., 5 Cir., 1957, 241 F.2d 264; Moritt v. Fine, 5 Cir., 1957, 242 F.2d 128, 132 (dissenting); Smoot v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 5 Cir., 1962, 299 F.2d 525; Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Central of Georgia Ry., 5 Cir., 1962, 305 F.2d 605; Camilla Cotton Oil Co. v. Spencer Kellogg & Sons, Inc., 5 Cir., 1958, 257 F.2d 162; Carss v. Outboard Marine, 5 Cir., 1958, 252 F.2d 690. We have, however, pointed out that this does not mean that there must necessarily be a full-blown trial....