Treglia v. Town of Manlius

• Decision Date: 16 December 2002
• Docket Number: Docket No. 01-9350.
• Citation: 313 F.3d 713
• Parties: Joseph V. TREGLIA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TOWN OF MANLIUS, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

313 F.3d 713

Joseph V. TREGLIA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TOWN OF MANLIUS, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 01-9350.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Argued: October 31, 2002.

Decided: December 16, 2002.

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John L. Valentino, Green & Seifter Attorneys, PLLC, Syracuse, NY (Melinda J. Hartnett, on the brief), for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Alan R. Peterman, Hiscock & Barclay, LLP, Syracuse, NY, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before: FEINBERG, CARDAMONE and SACK, Circuit Judges.

FEINBERG, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff-appellant Joseph Treglia appeals from two orders of the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Munson, J.). The first, entered in October 1999, dismissed Treglia's federal and state employment discrimination claims brought against defendant-appellee Town of Manlius pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, and the New York State Human Rights Law ("NYHRL"), N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq. The first order also dismissed Treglia's New York State common law claim against defendant-appellee for intentional infliction of emotional distress.¹ The second order, entered in October 2001, granted summary judgment to defendant-appellee on Treglia's claims of retaliation under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the NYHRL. For the reasons stated below, we vacate the district court's judgment in part and remand the case for further proceedings.

I. Background

In December 1990, plaintiff Joseph Treglia began working as a road patrol officer for the Town of Manlius Police Department (hereafter the "Town" or the "department"). Before that, Treglia was employed as a sergeant by the neighboring Village of Chittenango Police Department. In April 1996, while off-duty and at home, Treglia experienced a new onset seizure disorder, commonly referred to as an epileptic seizure. Two Town police officers responded to the 911 call from Treglia's wife, and one of them was with Treglia in the ambulance when he had a second seizure. Treglia returned to work several days later under only one restriction — not to drive or operate heavy machinery until cleared to do so by his doctor.

Treglia alleges that the department's attitude toward him changed dramatically after his seizures. Although he had previously been viewed as a hard-working, valuable officer on track for promotion, he was now considered a liability and was watched and scrutinized at every turn. Treglia asserts that he was not allowed to perform investigative interviews by himself, as was the usual practice, but was now accompanied by another officer in that work. Although he had received medical clearance to return to work, Treglia was ordered to go home until he could provide further medical information demonstrating his specific ability to perform his duties. Further, Treglia alleges he received more administrative and less investigative work, was given fewer assignments to work overtime, and was not allowed to participate in training classes without explicit medical authorization. In November 1996, Treglia allegedly complained to one of his superiors, then-Sergeant Barry, that it was illegal for the department to treat him differently because of his seizures.

In February 1997, Chief of Police Richard E. Carbery promoted two other Town officers to sergeant over Treglia, even though Treglia had the highest score on the civil service examination for that position.² At the time, Treglia was under the impression that he was next in line when a position for sergeant became available. When Treglia confronted Chief Carbery about the failure to promote him, the Chief allegedly responded that Treglia had always done a good job but that he would not receive a promotion to sergeant "now or ever" and that now was a "good time for him to get out of the business."

Shortly thereafter, Treglia contacted the Police Benefit Association ("PBA") about filing a charge against the department for discriminating against him because of his disability. In April 1997, Treglia filed charges of discrimination with the New York State Division of Human Rights ("NYDHR") and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). Treglia alleges that these filings only made matters worse as the Town retaliated by escalating its negative treatment of him in various ways. For example, Treglia asserts that although he had never before been the subject of a formal internal investigation, he soon became the subject of three. He was also involuntarily transferred to an administrative, non-enforcement position and received a negative performance evaluation, which was inconsistent with his earlier favorable work evaluations.

According to Treglia, these retaliatory actions continued as he pursued his discrimination claims. For example, in March 1998, shortly after he informed several members of the department that they might be contacted as part of a NYDHR investigation, Treglia claims that he was the only officer required to work three different shifts in one month. Although he was trained as a hostage negotiator, he was not called on to assist in a hostage situation until the year 2000. Similarly, Treglia was also assigned to cover the front-desk responsibilities on what he alleges was a full-time basis. In December 1998, Treglia was assigned as a road patrol officer to the night shift, although there were less senior officers available to cover the shift. After providing a note from his doctor requesting that he work only days, Treglia was involuntarily placed on disability leave and not allowed to return to the day shift for another six weeks. Finally, in March 1999, he was again passed over for a promotion to sergeant, in favor of an officer who had scored lower on the civil service exam.

Later that month, Treglia filed his second charge with the NYDHR and EEOC, this time alleging retaliation for the filing of his first charge. Treglia filed his complaint in this action in June 1999.³ As already indicated, the complaint principally alleged violations of the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the NYHRL.

In a Memorandum-Decision and Order filed in October 1999 (the 1999 Opinion), the district court granted the Town's motion to dismiss the federal and state discrimination claims, holding that Treglia failed to allege that he had a disability or that the Town perceived him as having a disability as that term is defined by the ADA and corresponding state law. The court also granted the Town's motion to dismiss the state claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, but denied the motion with regard to plaintiff's state and federal retaliation claims. After further proceedings and discovery, the Town moved for summary judgment on the remaining retaliation claims. In an Order filed in October 2001 (the 2001 Opinion), the court granted the motion, holding that Treglia had not produced any admissible evidence that the Town's stated legitimate reasons for its allegedly retaliatory actions were pretextual. The court also appears to have held that Treglia did not suffer any adverse employment action because "he is still a member of the Manlius Police Department." This appeal followed.

II. Discussion

In this court, Treglia argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the Town on his federal and state retaliation claims. His principal arguments are that (1) the court applied the wrong standard in determining whether he was the subject of any adverse employment actions, and (2) the record contains ample evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that the Town's stated reasons for the actions were a pretext for retaliation. Treglia also argues that the district court erred in its earlier decision to dismiss his state claim of discrimination.⁴ We turn first to the district court's treatment of the retaliation claims.

A. The federal and state retaliation claims

We review de novo the district court's grant of summary judgment on Treglia's retaliation claims, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 593 (2d Cir.1999) cert. denied sub nom. City of New York v. Tenenbaum, 529 U.S. 1098, 120 S.Ct. 1832, 146 L.Ed.2d 776 (2000). In doing so, we must resolve all ambiguities and draw all factual inferences in favor of the non-movant. Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246, 251 (2d Cir.2001). Summary judgment is not appropriate where a review of the record reveals sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to find in the plaintiff's favor. See Maresco v. Evans Chemetics, 964 F.2d 106, 110 (2d Cir.1992).

The ADA makes it unlawful for an employer to "discriminate against any individual because such individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this chapter or because such individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this chapter." 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). The Rehabilitation Act and NYHRL contain similar provisions against retaliation and are governed in this respect by the same standards as the ADA. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(d); N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(7); Weixel v. Board of Educ. of the City of New York, 287 F.3d 138, 148-49 (2d Cir.2002) (elements of a retaliation claim under Rehabilitation Act are same as the ADA); Weissman v. Dawn Joy Fashions, Inc., 214 F.3d 224, 234 (2d Cir.2000) (applying ADA analysis to plaintiff's retaliation claim under both ADA and NYHRL).

At the outset, we note that Treglia's decision not to appeal his federal discrimination claim does not affect his ability to pursue his federal retaliation claim. See Cifra v. Gen. Elec. Co., 252 F.3d 205, 218 (2d Cir.2001) (affirming the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's discrimination claim but vacating dismissal of retaliation claim); Quinn v. Green Tree Credit Corp., 159 F.3d 759, 770 (...