U.S. v. Colin

• Citation: 314 F.3d 439
• Decision Date: 31 December 2002
• Docket Number: No. 01-50140.,No. 01-50152.,01-50140.,01-50152.
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Eric COLIN, Defendant-Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Efrain Estrada-Nava, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)

Page 439

314 F.3d 439

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Eric COLIN, Defendant-Appellant.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Efrain Estrada-Nava, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 01-50140.

No. 01-50152.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted May 9, 2002.^*

Filed December 31, 2002.

James H. Locklin, Deputy Federal Public Defender, Los Angeles, CA, for defendant-appellant Efrain Estrada-Nava.

Michael J. Treman (brief), Santa Barbara, CA, and James H. Locklin (argument), Deputy Federal Public Defender, Los Angeles, CA, for defendant-appellant Eric Colin.

Joseph H. Zwicker (on brief) and Brian Hoffstadt (argued), Assistant United States Attorneys, Los Angeles, CA, for plaintiff-appellee United States of America.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California; Margaret M. Morrow, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CR-99-01212-MMM-02, D.C. No. CR-99-01212-MMM-01.

Before LAY,^** CANBY, JR. and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

PAEZ, Circuit Judge.

Efrain Estrada-Nava and Eric Colin were indicted on one count of possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). They moved in the district court to suppress the evidence on which the charge was based, claiming it was the fruit of an illegal stop and search. The district court denied the motion. Estrada-Nava and Colin then pled guilty to the charge.¹ We reverse and hold that the police officer who discovered the evidence did so only after he stopped Estrada-Nava and Colin's car without reasonable suspicion, in violation of the Fourth Amendment.²

BACKGROUND

On November 12, 1999, at approximately 2:05 a.m., Sergeant Thomas Carmichael observed a blue Honda traveling at 70 m.p.h. northbound in the right lane on Interstate 15. Carmichael first observed the Honda from his patrol car, which was positioned 75 yards behind it. He observed the car drift onto the solid white fog line on the far side of the right lane and watched the car's wheels travel along the fog line for approximately ten seconds. The Honda then drifted to the left side of the right lane, signaled a lane change, and moved into the left lane. Carmichael next observed the car drift to the left side of the left lane where its left wheels traveled along the solid yellow line for approximately ten seconds. The car then returned to the center of the left lane, signaled a lane change, and moved into the right lane. Carmichael pulled the car over for possible violations of California Vehicle Code § 21658(a) (lane straddling) and California Vehicle Code § 23152(a) (driving under the influence).

Appellant Efrain Estrada-Nava ("Estrada-Nava") was the driver of the car and appellant Eric Colin ("Colin") was his passenger. When Carmichael advised Estrada-Nava of the reasons for stopping him and asked for his license and registration, he noticed that both Estrada-Nava and Colin were nervous and shaking. He also noticed that the glove compartment contained a bottle of air freshener and a radar detector, that there were only three keys on Estrada-Nava's key ring, and that neither Estrada-Nava nor Colin owned the Honda. Suspecting that the car might have been stolen, Carmichael separately questioned Estrada-Nava and Colin about the ownership of the vehicle. On the basis of their slightly conflicting stories, their nervous appearances, and his own training and experience, Carmichael concluded they might be involved in drug trafficking. Estrada-Nava and Colin separately consented to a search of the Honda, which revealed marijuana and methamphetamine.³

Colin filed a motion to suppress the narcotics evidence, in which Estrada-Nava joined, arguing that Carmichael illegally stopped the Honda and illegally detained the two of them thereafter. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied the motion, concluding that Carmichael had reasonable suspicion to stop the car and that the evidence therefore was legally obtained. Estrada-Nava and Colin appealed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo the district court's determination of reasonable suspicion. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 275, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002) (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996)); see also United States v. Mariscal, 285 F.3d 1127, 1129 (9th Cir.2002). We review the district court's findings of fact for clear error. Mariscal, 285 F.3d at 1129; see also United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir.2000).

DISCUSSION

The Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures applies to investigatory traffic stops. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273, 122 S.Ct. 744; United States v. Sigmond-Ballesteros, 285 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir.2002), reh'g en banc denied by 309 F.3d 545 (9th Cir.2002). To justify an investigative stop, a police officer must have reasonable suspicion that a suspect is involved in criminal activity. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d at 1104-05. Reasonable suspicion is formed by "specific articulable facts which, together with objective and reasonable inferences, form the basis for suspecting that the particular person detained is engaged in criminal activity." Id. at 1105 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Mariscal, 285 F.3d at 1130; United States v. Twilley, 222 F.3d 1092, 1095 (9th Cir.2000). An officer's inferences must "be grounded in objective facts and be capable of rational explanation." Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d at 1105 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Mariscal, 285 F.3d at 1130; Twilley, 222 F.3d at 1095. In reviewing the district court's determination of reasonable suspicion, we must look at the "totality of the circumstances" to see whether the officer had a "particularized and objective basis" for suspecting criminal activity. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273, 122 S.Ct. 744 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also United States v. Diaz-Juarez, 299 F.3d 1138, 1141-42 (9th Cir.2002). Officers are encouraged to draw upon their own specialized training and experience in assessing the "totality of the circumstances." Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 272-75, 122 S.Ct. 744.

A. Standing

To challenge their stop on Fourth Amendment grounds, Estrada-Nava and Colin must have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the Honda. United States v. Dorais, 241 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir.2001). We have held that occupants of a vehicle have standing to challenge on Fourth Amendment grounds an officer's stop of their vehicle even if they have no possessory or ownership interest in the vehicle. Twilley, 222 F.3d at 1095 (citations omitted). We therefore conclude that Estrada-Nava and Colin have standing to challenge the stop.

B. The Stop

Carmichael stopped Estrada-Nava and Colin for possible violations of California Vehicle Code section 21658(a) (lane straddling) and section 23152 (driving under the influence). We will address each of these potential violations in turn. Carmichael also thought that Estrada-Nava may have been fatigued. We will address this issue together with section 23152.

1. California Vehicle Code § 21658(a) ("lane straddling")

Carmichael stopped Estrada-Nava and Colin in part for violating California's "lane straddling" statute. The statute states:

Whenever any roadway has been divided into two or more clearly marked lanes for traffic in one direction, the following rules apply: (a) A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practical entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from the lane until such movement can be made with reasonable safety.

Cal. Veh.Code § 21658(a). Under the proper construction of this statute, Estrada-Nava and Colin's conduct was not a violation.

When interpreting California Vehicle Code section 21658(a), we are bound to follow the decisions of the California Supreme Court. Paulson v. City of San Diego, 294 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir.2002). If the California Supreme Court itself has not interpreted the meaning of this code provision, then we must predict how the court would interpret the code in light of California appellate court opinions, decisions from other jurisdictions, statutes, and treatises. Id.; see also S.D. Myers, Inc. v. City & County of San Francisco, 253 F.3d 461, 473 (9th Cir.2001); In re Watts, 298 F.3d 1077, 1082-83 (9th Cir.2002) (adopting state's interpretation of a state law in light of two subsequent state appellate court opinions at odds with federal court's prior interpretation of the law).

The California Supreme Court has not issued an opinion directly addressing section 21658(a). The Los Angeles Superior Court, Appellate Department, however, interpreted this statute in People v. Butler, 146 Cal.Rptr. 856 (1978). In Butler, the court interpreted "and" as used in section 21658(a) to mean "or;" that is, to be read disjunctively. Id. at 857. The court reasoned:

It is our view that section 21658, subdivision (a) simply states two affirmative duties placed upon the operator of a motor vehicle. One of these is to drive as nearly as practicable entirely within one lane. A separate duty is not to move from that lane until the movement can be made with reasonable safety.

Id. Although the driver in Butler made no unsafe lane changes, the court held that he failed to drive within a single lane, thus violating section 21658(a). Id.

The California Supreme Court has cited Butler with approval for the proposition that:

The inadvertent use of `and' where the purpose or intent of a statute seems clearly to require `or' is a familiar example of a drafting error which may properly be rectified by judicial construction.

See People v. Skinner, 39 Cal.3d 765, 217 Cal.Rptr. 685, 704 P.2d 752, 758 (1985). The court's approval of the reasoning in Butler suggests it is likely to agree with the Butler court's interpretation of section 21658(a). See also Friedman v. City of Beverly Hills, 47 Cal.App.4th 436, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 882, 886 (19...