314 F.Supp. 1217 (N.D.Tex. 1970), Civ. A. 3-3690, Roe v. Wade
|Docket Nº:||Civ. A. 3-3690|
|Citation:||314 F.Supp. 1217|
|Party Name:||Roe v. Wade|
|Case Date:||June 17, 1970|
|Court:||United States District Courts, 5th Circuit, Northern District of Texas|
[Copyrighted Material Omitted]
Linda N. Coffee, Dallas, Tex., Sarah Weddington, Austin, Tex., for plaintiffs.
Fred Bruner, Daugherty, Bruner, Lastelick & Anderson, Ray L. Merrill, Jr., Dallas, Tex., for intervenor.
John B. Tolle, Asst. Dist. Atty., Dallas, Tex., Jay Floyd, Asst. Atty. Gen., Austin, Tex., for defendant.
Before GOLDBERG, Circuit Judge, and HUGHES and TAYLOR, District judges.
Two similar cases are presently before the Court on motions for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules Of Civil Procedure. The defendant in both cases is Henry Wade, District Attorney of Dallas County, Texas. In one action plaintiffs are John and Mary Doe, and in the other Jane Roe and James Hubert Hallford, M.D., intervenor. 1
From their respective positions of married couple, single woman, and practicing physician, plaintiffs attack Articles 1191, 1192, 1193, 1194, and 1196 of the Texas Penal Code, 2 hereinafter referred to as the Texas Abortion Laws. Plaintiffs allege that the Texas Abortion Laws deprive married couples and single women of the right to choose whether to have children, a right secured by the Ninth Amendment.
Defendant challenges the standing of each of the plaintiffs to bring this action. However, it appears to the Court that Plaintiff Roe and plaintiff-intervenor Hallford occupy positions vis-a-vis the Texas Abortion Laws sufficient to differentiate them from the general public. Compare Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925), and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965), 3 with Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 43 S.Ct. 597, 67 L.Ed. 1078 (1923). Plaintiff Roe filed her portion of the suit as a pregnant woman wishing to exercise the asserted constitutional right to choose whether to bear the child she was carrying. Intervenor Hallford alleged in his portion of the suit that, in the course of daily exercise of his duty as a physician and in order to give his patients access to what he asserts to be their constitutional right to choose whether to have children, he must act so as to render criminal liability for himself under the Texas Abortion Laws a likelihood. Dr. Hallford further alleges that Article 1196 of the Texas Abortion Laws is so vague as to deprive him of warning of what produces criminal liability in that portion of his medial practice and consultations portion of his medical practice and consultations involving abortions.
On the basis of plaintiffs' substantive contentions, 4 it appears that there then exists a 'nexus between the status asserted by the litigant(s) and the claim(s) (they present).' Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968).
Further, we are satisfied that there presently exists a degree of contentiousness between Roe and Hallford and the defendant to establish a 'case of actual controversy' as required by Title 28, United States Code, Section 2201. Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 89 S.Ct. 956, 22 L.Ed.2d 113 (1969).
Each plaintiff seeks as relief, first, a judgment declaring the Texas Abortion Laws unconstitutional on their face and, second, an injunction against their enforcement. The nature of the relief requested suggests the order in which the issues presented should be passed upon. 5 Accordingly, we see the issues presented as follows:
I. Are plaintiffs entitled to a declaratory judgment that the Texas Abortion Laws are unconstitutional on their face?
II. Are plaintiffs entitled to an injunction against the enforcement of these laws?
Defendants have suggested that this Court should abstain from rendering a decision on plaintiff's request for a declaratory judgment. However, we are guided to an opposite conclusion by the authority of Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 248-249, 88 S.Ct. 391, 19 L.Ed.2d 444 (1967);
'The judge-made doctrine of abstention * * * sanctions * * * escape only in narrowly limited 'special circumstances.' * * * One of the 'special circumstances' * * * is the susceptibility of a state statute of a construction by a state courts that would avoid or modify the constitutional question.'
The Court in Zwickler v. Koota subsequently quoted from United States v. Livingston, 179 F.Supp. 9, 12-13 (E.D.S.C.1959):
'Regard for the interest and sovereignty of the state and reluctance
needlessly to adjudicate constitutional issues may require a federal District Court to abstain from adjudication if the parties may avail themselves of an appropriate procedure to obtain state interpretation of state laws requiring construction. * * * The decision in (Harrison v. N.A.A.C.P., 360 U.S. 167, 79 S.Ct. 1025, 3 L.Ed.2d 1152), however, is not a broad encyclical commanding automatic remission to the state court of all federal constitutional questions arising in the application of state statues. * * * Though never interpreted by a state court, if a state statute is not fairly subject to an interpretation which will avoid or modify the federal constitutional question, it is the duty of a federal court to decide the federal question when presented to it. Any other course would impose expense and long delay upon the litigants without hope of its bearing fruit.' 6
Inasmuch as there is no possibility that state question adjudication in the courts of Texas would eliminate the necessity for this Court to pass upon plaintiffs' Ninth Amendment claim or Dr. Hallford's attack on Article 1196 for vagueness, abstention as to their request for declaratory judgment is unwarranted. Compare City of Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co., 357 U.S. 77, 84, 78 S.ct. 1063, 2 L.Ed.2d 1174 (1958), with Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82, 90 S.Ct. 788, 25 L.Ed.2d 68 (170).
On the merits, plaintiffs argue as their principal contention 7 that the Texas Abortion Laws must be declared unconstitutional because they deprive single women and married couples of their right, secured by the Ninth Amendment, 8 to choose whether to have children. We agree.
The essence of the interest sought to be protected here is the right of choice over events which, by their character and consequences, bear in a fundamental manner on the privacy of individuals. The manner by which such interests are secured by the Ninth Amendment is illustrated by the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Goldberg in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 492, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965):
'The Ninth Amendment shows a belief of the Constitution's authors that fundamental rights exist that are not expressly enumerated in the first eight amendments and intent that the list of rights included there not be deemed exhaustive.' * * * 'The Ninth Amendment simply shows the intent of the Constitution's authors that other fundamental personal rights should not be denied such protection or disparaged in any other way simply because they are not specifically listed in the first eight constitutional amendments.' 9
Relative sanctuaries for such 'fundamental' interests have been established
for the family, 10 the marital couple, 11 and the individual. 12
Freedom to choose in the matter of abortions has been accorded the status of a 'fundamental' right in every case coming to the attention of this Court where the question has been raised. Babbitz v. McCann, 312 F.Supp. 725 (E.D.Wis.1970); People v. Belous, 80 Cal.Rptr. 354, 458 P.2d 194 (Cal.1969); State v. Munson, (South Dakota Circuit Court, Pennington County, April 6, 1970). Accord, United States v. Vuitch, 305 F.Supp. 1032 (D.D.C1969). The California Supreme Court in Belous stated:
'The fundamental right of the woman to choose whether to bear children follows from the Supreme Court's and this court's...
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