Mitchum v. Foster, PCA 2224.

CourtUnited States District Courts. 11th Circuit. United States District Courts. 11th Circuit. Northern District of Florida
Citation315 F. Supp. 1387
Docket NumberNo. PCA 2224.,PCA 2224.
PartiesRobert MITCHUM, d/b/a the Book Mart, Plaintiff, v. Clinton E. FOSTER, as Prosecuting Attorney of Bay County, Florida, M. J. "Doc" Daffin, as Sheriff of Bay County, Florida, and the Honorable W. L. Fitzpatrick, as Circuit Judge of the Fourteenth Judicial Circuit in and for Bay County, Florida, Defendants.
Decision Date22 July 1970

Paul Shimek, Jr., Pensacola, Fla., for plaintiff.

Clinton E. Foster, Mayo Johnston, Panama City, Fla., Raymond Marky, Tallahassee, Fla., Joe J. Harrell, Pensacola, Fla., for defendants.

Before SIMPSON, Circuit Judge, and SCOTT and ARNOW, District Judges.

OPINION—ORDER

PER CURIAM.

Before this statutory three-judge court (28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2284) for decision upon argument and submission after due notice are plaintiff's application for preliminary injunction in accord with prior temporary restraining orders issued herein by Judge Arnow as a single judge, and motions of the several defendants to vacate or dissolve said temporary restraining orders.

Also presented are motions of the defendants to strike and to dismiss addressed to the amended or supplemental complaint.

The facts necessary to our determination are briefly stated. Not in dispute, they are drawn from the pleadings and admissions therein and from stipulations entered into by counsel before Judge Arnow on July 8, 1970.

In late March 1970, the defendant Foster, in his official capacity brought suit in the Circuit Court for Bay County, Florida, under that state's general nuisance statutes, Sections 823.05 and 60.05, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., seeking abatement as a nuisance of plaintiff Mitchum's business "The Book Mart", 19 Harrison Avenue, Panama City, Florida. The defendant Fitzpatrick on April 6, 1970, in his official capacity as Judge of that court, granted interlocutory relief based upon the offering for sale by plaintiff of certain books determined by the state court after examination to be obscene under Section 847.011, Florida Statutes, F.S.A.

Review of that interlocutory order and later contempt proceedings against plaintiff thereunder is presently pending upon plaintiff's appeal before the appropriate Florida appellate court, the Florida District Court of Appeals for the First District.

After the state court had taken jurisdiction and entered its original order this suit was instituted. Judge Arnow as a single judge on May 12, 1970 and June 5, 1970, entered temporary restraining orders directed to the state prosecuting attorney, the state circuit judge, and the executive officer of the state court, Sheriff Daffin, enjoining further proceedings in and under the state court suit. Without detailing the exact dates of entry of the competing restraining orders of Judge Arnow and the injunctive orders of the state court, it is important to note that the state court suit was brought earlier in time and that the state court had assumed jurisdiction when the instant case was commenced. Judge Arnow's restraining order of May 12 was addressed to the original state court temporary injunction and his further restraining order of June 5 was based upon and addressed to the state court contempt proceedings.

Without discussing or determining the propriety or legality of Judge Arnow's temporary restraining orders as a means of preserving the jurisdiction of this court pending presentation of the questions involved to this three-judge court, we determine that dissolution of said temporary restraining orders is required by a significant decision rendered by the Supreme Court of the United States after Judge Arnow had acted for this court. The opinion referred to came down June 8, 1970, Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers et al., 398 U.S. 281, 90 S.Ct. 1739, 26 L.Ed.2d 234. There in construing the anti-injunction statute first adopted by the Congress in 1793 and now carried forward through subsequent amendments as 28 U.S.C., Section 22831, the court quoted its pronouncement in Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America et al. v. Richman Brothers Co., 348 U.S. 511, 75 S.Ct. 452, 99 L.Ed. 600 (1955), as follows: "This is not a statute conveying a broad general policy for appropriate ad hoc application. Legislative policy is here expressed in a clear-cut prohibition qualified only by specifically defined exceptions" and proceeded:

"Since that time Congress has not seen fit to amend the statute and we therefore adhere to that position and hold that any injunction against state court proceedings otherwise proper under general equitable principles must be based on one of the specific statutory exceptions to § 2283 if it is to be upheld. Moreover since the statutory prohibition against such injunctions in part rests on the fundamental constitutional independence of the States and their courts, the exceptions should not be enlarged by loose statutory construction. Proceedings in state courts should normally be allowed to continue unimpaired by intervention of the lower federal courts, with relief from error, if any, through the state appellate courts and ultimately this Court." 398 U.S. 287, 90 S.Ct. 1743.

The injunctive relief sought here as to the proceedings pending in the Florida courts does not come under any of the exceptions set forth in Section 2283. It is not expressly authorized by Act of Congress, it is not necessary in the aid of this court's jurisdiction and it is not sought in order to protect or effectuate any judgment of this court.

Dealing with the "necessary in aid of its jurisdiction" exception the Supreme Court in Atlantic Coast Line said further:

"First, a federal court does not have inherent power to ignore the limitations of § 2283 and to enjoin state court proceedings merely because those proceedings interfere with a protected federal right or invade an area preempted by federal law, even when the interference is unmistakably clear. This rule applies regardless of whether the federal court itself has jurisdiction over the controversy, or whether it is ousted from jurisdiction for the same reason that the state court is. Cf. Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros., supra, 348 U.S. at 519-520, 75 S.Ct. at 457-458. This conclusion is required because Congress itself set forth the only exceptions to the statute, and those exceptions do not include this situation. Second, if the District Court does have jurisdiction,
...

To continue reading

Request your trial
6 cases
  • Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • December 10, 2021
    ...cases are even further afield. Mitchum v. Foster did not involve state-court clerks, but a judge, prosecutor, and sheriff. See 315 F.Supp. 1387, 1388 (ND Fla. 1970) (per curiam ). When it came to these individuals, the Court held only that the Anti-Injunction Act did not bar suit against th......
  • Mitchum v. Foster 8212 27
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • June 19, 1972
    ...statute absolutely barred its enjoining a pending state court proceeding under any circumstances whatsoever. Pp. 228—243. 315 F.Supp. 1387, reversed and Robert Eugene Smith, Atlanta, Ga., for appellant. Raymond L. Marky, Tallahassee, Fla., for appellees. Mr. Justice STEWART delivered the op......
  • Hartsville Theatres, Inc. v. Fox, Civ. A. No. 70-245.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 4th Circuit. United States District Court of South Carolina
    • February 23, 1971
    ...U.S. at p. 287, 90 S.Ct. 1739, 1743. 5 See, Washington v. Garmire (D.C.Fla. 1970) 317 F.Supp. 1384, 1386, note 1. 6 See Mitchum v. Foster (D.C.Fla.1970) 315 F.Supp. 1387 (Three-Judge Court), (U. S. appeal pending) which arose in the Fifth Circuit, as did both the Garrison and Wallace Cases,......
  • Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • December 10, 2021
    ...cases are even further afield. Mitchum v. Foster did not involve state-court clerks, but a judge, prosecutor, and sheriff. See 315 F.Supp. 1387, 1388 (ND Fla. 1970) (per curiam). When it came to these individuals, the Court held only that the Anti-Injunction Act did not bar suit against the......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • THE STRANGE CAREER OF THE THREE-JUDGE DISTRICT COURT: FEDERALISM AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1954-1976.
    • United States
    • Case Western Reserve Law Review Vol. 72 No. 4, June 2022
    • June 22, 2022
    ...(holding that [section] 1983 actions were an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, though Younger principles were left intact), rev'g 315 F. Supp. 1387 (N.D. Fla. 1970) (per curiam) (three-judge court). See CLARKE D. FORSYTHE, ABUSE OF DISCRETION: THE INSIDE STORY OF ROE V. WADE 19-24, 361 ......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT