315 U.S. 411 (1942), 64, Hysler v. Florida
|Docket Nº:||No. 64|
|Citation:||315 U.S. 411, 62 S.Ct. 688, 86 L.Ed. 932|
|Party Name:||Hysler v. Florida|
|Case Date:||March 02, 1942|
|Court:||United States Supreme Court|
Argued December 12, 1941
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA
1. The procedure adopted bye Florida, whereby a person under sentence of imprisonment or death, who claims that his conviction resulted from some fundamental unfairness amounting to a denial of due process of law, may apply to the Supreme Court of the State, even though that court has affirmed his conviction, for permission to apply to the trial court for a writ of error coram nobis, and who thus is afforded a full opportunity to have a jury pass upon his claim, provided that he first make an adequate showing of its substantiality, is a procedure which meets the requirements of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. P. 415.
According to decisions of the Supreme Court of Florida defining this procedure, a naked allegation that a constitutional right has been invaded is not sufficient; a petitioner must make a full disclosure of the specific facts relied on, not merely his conclusions as to the nature and effect of such facts; the proof must enable the appellate court to
ascertain whether, under settled principles pertaining to such writ, the facts alleged would afford at least prima facie just ground for an application to the lower court for a writ of error coram nobis;
and, in the exercise of its discretion in matters of this sort, the court should look to the
reasonableness of the allegations of the petition and to the probability of their truth.
2. A person who, with others, had been convicted of murder in Florida, and whose sentence of death had been affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State, petitioned that court for leave to apply to the trial court for a writ of error coram nobis, claiming that his conviction had been secured by means of false testimony delivered at the trial by an accomplice who was coerced thereto by state officials and who, four year later, on the eve of his own electrocution for participation in the same crime, had made affidavits exonerating the petitioner. The Supreme Court of Florida, on the basis of the petition and accompanying affidavits and the record of prior cases arising out of the same clime, concluded that the petitioner had failed to make the showing of substantiality which according to the local procedure was necessary in order to obtain the extraordinary relief furnished by the writ of error coram nobis, and this Court, upon an independent examination of the affidavits on which the claim was based, has no doubt that the finding of insubstantiality was justified. P. 421.
146 Fla 593, 1 So.2d 628, affirmed.
Certiorari, 313 U.S. 557, to review a judgment denying a petition for leave to apply to a trial court for a writ of error coram nobis in a case of murder.
FRANKFURTER, J., lead opinion
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER delivered the opinion of the Court.
After the Supreme Court of Florida had affirmed his conviction for murder, the petitioner applied to that court for leave to ask the trial court to review the judgment of conviction. The basis of his application was the claim
that the testimony of two witnesses implicating him was perjured, and that they had testified falsely against him because they were "coerced, intimidated, beaten, threatened with violence and otherwise abused and mistreated" by the police and were "promised immunity from the electric chair" by the district attorney. After twice considering the matter, [62 S.Ct. 690] the Supreme Court of Florida denied the application. 146 Fla. 593, 1 So.2d 628. We brought the case here, 313 U.S. 557, in view of our solicitude, especially where life is at stake, for those liberties which are guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The guides for decision are clear. If a state, whether by the active conduct or the connivance of the prosecution, obtains a conviction through the use of perjured testimony, it violates civilized standards for the trial of guilt or innocence, and thereby deprives an accused of liberty without due process of law. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103. Equally offensive to the Constitutional guarantees of liberty are confessions wrung from an accused by overpowering his will, whether through physical violence or the more subtle forms of coercion commonly known as "the third degree." Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278; Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227; Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219. In this collateral attack upon the judgment of conviction, the petitioner bases his claim on the recantation of one of the witnesses against him. He cannot, of course, contend that mere recantation of testimony is, in itself, ground for invoking the Due Process Clause against a conviction. However, if Florida, through her responsible officials, knowingly used false testimony which was extorted from a witness "by violence and torture," one convicted may claim the protection of the Due Process Clause against a conviction based upon such testimony.
And so we come to the circumstances of this case.
On November 25, 1936, as a result of an attempted robbery, John H. Surrency and his wife Mayme Elizabeth were murdered. On December 16, 1936, Hysler was indicted for the murder of John Surrency; he was tried on January 21, 1937, was convicted on February 12, 1937, with recommendation of mercy, and was thereafter sentenced to imprisonment for life. On February 3, 1938, his sentence was affirmed by the Florida Supreme Court. 132 Fla. 200, 181 So. 350. The record in the case was more than 3,000 pages. On January 15, 1937, Hysler, together with two others, James Baker and Alvin Tyler, was indicted for the murder of Mrs. Surrency. A severance having been granted as to Tyler and Baker, Hysler was placed on trial on March 15, 1937, and on April 5 was found guilty without recommendation of mercy. On April 23, 1937, he was sentenced to death. On April 24, he sued out a writ of error to the state Supreme Court, which, on February 3, 1938, sustained the sentence, and on June 3 denied a rehearing. The record on this second trial was some 2,500 pages. 132 Fla. 209, 181 So. 354.
Surrency kept a restaurant near Jacksonville, and on the fatal day was returning from one of his regular and well known trips to that city to get checks cashed. Hysler had known Baker in connection with Hysler's illicit whiskey business. Baker and Tyler were friends. The principal evidence in both trials against Hysler was their testimony. They testified with circumstantiality that Hysler induced them to hold up Surrency, furnished them a car, a pistol, and some whiskey, gave them detailed instructions for carrying out the plan, and by prearrangement was in the vicinity of the place of its execution. While their testimony doubtless was the foundation of Hysler's convictions, the testimony both of numerous witnesses and Hysler himself sheds much confirming light
on the story told by Baker and Tyler. A careful concurring opinion affirming the conviction now challenged concluded thus:
From the evidence, it is difficult to see or understand how the jury in the court below could have rendered a verdict other than guilty. We have thoroughly considered each assignment and failed to find error in the trial of the cause in the lower court.
Accordingly, the date for the execution was set by the Governor of Florida for the week of February 20, 1939. In the meantime, however, an application for a writ of habeas corpus by Hysler was made to the Supreme Court of Florida, partly on the ground of insanity. This was denied by that Court on February 20, 1939. 136 Fla. 563, 187 So. 261. Tyler broke jail and has apparently remained a fugitive from [62 S.Ct. 691] justice. Baker was tried after Hysler was convicted of murder in the first degree, and sentenced to death. His conviction was affirmed by the Florida Supreme Court on March 14, 1939, and a rehearing denied on April 11, 1939. Baker v. State, 137 Fla. 27, 188 So. 634.
We have now reached the final chapter of this unedifying story in the administration of criminal justice. On April 10, 1941, more than four years after Hysler's conviction for the murder of Mrs. Surrency, he petitioned the Supreme Court of Florida for permission to apply to the Circuit Court of Duval County, Florida (the court before which he was originally tried), for writ of error coram nobis. This common law writ, in its local adaptation, is Florida's response to the requirements of Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, for the judicial correction of a wrong committed in the administration of criminal justice and resulting in the deprivation of life or liberty without due process. See Lamb v. Florida, 91 Fla. 396, 107 So. 535; Skipper v. Schumacher, 124 Fla. 384, 169 So. 58; Jones v. Florida, 130 Fla. 645, 178 So.
404. In brief, a person in Florida who claims that his incarceration is due to "failure to observe that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice," Lisenba v. California, supra, at p. 236, even after his sentence has been duly affirmed by the highest court of the State, has full opportunity to have a jury pass on such a claim provided he first makes an adequate showing of the substantiality of his claim to the satisfaction of the Supreme Court of Florida. The decisions of that Court show that a naked allegation that a constitutional right has been invaded is not sufficient. A petitioner must "make a full disclosure of the specific facts relied on," and not merely his conclusions "as to the nature and effect of such facts." The proof must enable the appellate court to
ascertain whether, under settled principles pertaining to such writ, the facts alleged would afford at least prima facie just ground for an application to the lower court for a...
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