Braverman, In re

Citation316 A.2d 246,271 Md. 196
PartiesIn the Matter of the Petition for Reinstatement to Practice Law of Maurice L. BRAVERMAN. Misc. (Subtitle BV) 7.
Decision Date01 March 1974
CourtCourt of Appeals of Maryland

John F. King, Baltimore, for Maurice L. Braverman.

Argued before MURPHY, C. J., and BARNES, * SINGLEY, SMITH, DIGGES, LEVINE and ELDRIDGE, JJ.

MURPHY, Chief Justice.

Maurice L. Braverman was admitted to the Maryland Bar on October 7, 1941, and, thereafter, practiced law in Baltimore City for eleven years. On April 1, 1952, he was convicted in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland of conspiracy to teach and advocate and to organize the overthrow of the government by force or violence in violation of § 2 of the Smith Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2385. He was fined $1,000 and sentenced to imprisonment for three years. On appeal, his conviction was affirmed. Frankfeld v. United States, 198 F.2d 679 (4th Cir., 1952) cert. den. 344 U.S. 922, 73 S.Ct. 389, 97 L.Ed. 710 (1952). As the result of a petition filed by the Bar Association of Baltimore City, Braverman was disbarred from the further practice of law by order of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City dated June 28, 1955. On appeal, we affirmed the order of disbarment. Braverman v. Bar Association of Baltimore City, 209 Md. 328, 121 A.2d 473 (1955). In 1957, Braverman was disbarred from federal practice. In re Braverman, 148 F.Supp. 56 (D.Md.). On May 21, 1973, eighteen years after his original disbarment, Braverman filed a petition in this Court for reinstatement to practice law. He alleged that during the period following his disbarment, he established his trust-worthiness, demonstrated his good moral character, and was now worthy of reinstatement to the Maryland Bar. In his affidavit accompanying the petition, Braverman recited that his association with the Communist Party ceased shortly after his release from prison in 1955; that he had established and conducted a bookkeeping service catering to small business concerns in the Baltimore metropolitan area, an occupation he continues to this day; that he was active in the political mainstream of our country, seeking to influence the passage of legislation and the election of men and women to office who best represent his concerns; that for the past four years he served as Treasurer of the New Democratic Coalition, Fifth District Club; that he serves on the executive board of his community association; that he has become active in efforts to improve the criminal justice system, serving as President of the St. John's Council on Criminal Justice, Inc.; that at the invitation of the Attorney General of the United States, he had recently participated in the four-day National Conference on Criminal Justice in Washington, D. C.; and that for the last two years, he has been teaching courses on poverty and criminal justice in the Baltimore Free University held on the Johns Hopkins University campus. Numerous communications from citizens, including many lawyers, personally acquainted with Braverman's qualifications for readmission to the Maryland Bar were submitted in support of his petition for reinstatement.

On October 1, 1973, we ordered that Braverman's petition for reinstatement to practice law in this State be referred for an evidentiary hearing to a three-judge panel comprised of Judges J. Harold Grady and David Ross of the Eighth Judicial Circuit of Maryland and Judge Mary Arabian of the District Court of Maryland. See In re Braverman, 269 Md. 661, 309 A.2d 468. We directed that Braverman, the Maryland State Bar Association and the Bar Association of Baltimore City, and other proper parties, be permitted at the hearing to offer relevant and material evidence, to cross-examine, and fully argue the merits of the petition for reinstatement to determine whether, in light of the principles articulated in In re Meyerson, 190 Md. 671, 59 A.2d 489 (1948) and Maryland State Bar Association v. Boone, 255 Md. 420, 258 A.2d 438 (1969), Braverman had in the period following the rendering of the judgment of removal, become rehabilitated and a proper person to be admitted to the bar, viz., whether he could demonstrate 'fitness acquired since unfitness was established by the disbarment.' 190 Md. at 687, 59 A.2d at 496. We directed that in making its recommendation to us, the three-judge panel should evaluate, in particular, these four factors:

1. The nature and circumstances of Braverman's original misconduct.

2. His subsequent conduct and reformation.

3. His present character.

4. His present qualifications and competence to practice law.

The evidentiary hearing was held before the three-judge panel on October 15, 1973. Braverman testified on his own behalf, as did a number of citizens, including lawyers, judges, educators, and state officials. Each gave testimony clearly tending to demonstrate that Braverman had rehabilitated himself in the period following his disbarment and had become a proper person to be admitted to the Bar of Maryland. No contrary testimony or evidence was adduced. The Maryland State Bar Association, acting through its Board of Governors, and after conducting its own investigation, unequivocally recommended that Braverman be readmitted to practice law in this State. The Bar Association of Baltimore City, acting through its President, told the three-judge panel that 'there has not been a scintilla of evidence presented to the Executive Council of the Bar Association of anything derogatory about Mr. Braverman . . . (and it had no) information that is contradictory to what these individuals (those persons testifying and writing letters on Braverman's behalf) state about his character and his honesty and his trustworthiness since his release from prison and during the period subsequent to his release.'

The three-judge panel concluded that Braverman had established 'by clear and convincing proof his fitness to practice law' and recommended that he be reinstated as a member of the Bar. The panel's recommendation was supported by these observations and findings succinctly set forth in its opinion:

'NATURE AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF ORIGINAL MISCONDUCT

'The Court of Appeals in Braverman vs. Bar Association of Baltimore City, 209 Md. 328, (121 A.2d 473) found that the misconduct for which the Petitioner was disbarred consisted of his conviction of conspiracy to violate Section 2 of the Smith Act, that this conviction was one involving moral turpitude, and that these facts constituted sufficient cause of disbarment. In its per curiam opinion in the present proceedings (269 Md. 661, 309 A.2d 468 (1973)) the Court of Appeals points out that this panel must proceed in its deliberation from the premise that Petitioner's conviction above referred to is conclusive proof of his guilt of the crime of which he was convicted. Maryland Rules BV4 f 1 and BV9 d 4. Consequently, this panel cannot consider as having any effect Petitioner's testimony before us that his conviction was founded on insufficient evidence and that he was innocent of the crime charged. Rather he remains a convicted, unpardoned felon.

'Proceeding from this restricted basis, what consideration can this panel give to the nature and circumstances of Petitioner's original misconduct? We find relevant the position taken by the Maryland State Bar Association that Petitioner's misconduct which resulted in his conviction was largely political in nature and should be viewed in the light of present realities. Although we do not consider court decisions rendered after Petitioner's conviction as undermining the conclusive proof of his guilt, we do consider as relevant the change in attitude which is evidenced by such decisions. We find it amply demonstrated that developments in the law have necessitated a change in judicial and prosecutorial attitude. We also believe that since Petitioner's disbarment public acceptance of the change in legal attitude, public attention to civil rights generally and the right of dissent particularly, and public emphasis on detente with communist nations in our foreign affairs all have tempered the attitude of the public toward one in the Petitioner's position. Great weight must also be given to the fact that Petitioner's reinstatement is recommended by the Maryland State Bar Association representing the majority of attorneys practicing in this state.

'Considering today the nature and circumstances of the Petitioner's misconduct, we conclude that his reinstatement would not be prejudicial to the administration of justice.

'PETITIONER'S SUBSEQUENT CONDUCT AND REFORMATION

'The evidence produced by Petitioner concerning his conduct since disbarment satisfies us that not only has he not conspired to teach and advocate the violent overthrow of the government but that his subsequent disassociation from the Communist Party and disenchantment with communism as it exists in the Soviet Union have characterized his activity. We find that Petitioner's evidence has overcome the weight of the facts adjudicated against him by his conviction, i. e. advocacy of violent overthrow, and that his activities of a political nature have been entirely within the mainstream of our system. In addition, no evidence to the contrary was presented.

'As to Petitioner's reformation, the Baltimore Bar Association raises the philosophical question of how Petitioner has proven his reformation when he refuses to recognize the existence of any misconduct from which to reform. Since Petitioner is adamant in his belief in his innocence, he is consistent in not expressing any repentance. While he seems to hinder his cause by not taking what might be the easier way of confession and contrition, the intellectual honesty of his position must be recognized. Reform has been defined as: to change from worse to better, to bring from a bad to a good state. We believe Petitioner has demonstrated his reformation without an expression of contrition from him. Starting...

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  • In re Smith
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • November 25, 1980
    ... ... In re Reed, 341 So.2d 774 (Fla. 1977); Lester v. Kentucky Bar Association, 532 S.W.2d 435 (Ky.1976) ; In re Braverman, 271 Md. 196, 316 A.2d 246 (1974) ; In re Hiss, 368 Mass. 447, 333 N.E.2d 429 (1975); 7 Am.Jur.2d Attorney at Law § 72 (1963)." (Footnote omitted) ...          See also Annot. 70 A.L.R.2d 268, 297 (1960) ...         These two points are entirely ignored by the majority ... ...
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    ... ... This is the universal rule from other jurisdictions with only differences as to how clear the proof must be. E. g. In re Reed, 341 So.2d 774 (Fla.1977); Lester v. Kentucky Bar [166 W.Va. 230] Association, 532 S.W.2d 435 (Ky.1976); In re Braverman, 271 Md. 196, 316 A.2d 246 (1974); In re Hiss, 368 Mass. 447, 333 N.E.2d 429 (1975) (heavy burden); In re Peterson, 274 N.W.2d 922 (Minn.1979) (clear and satisfactory evidence); Petition of Simmons, 71 Wash.2d 316, 428 P.2d 582 (1967) (affirmative showing); 7 Am.Jur.2d Attorney at Law § 72 (1963); ... ...
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