Robinson v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co.

• Citation: 354 Or. 572,316 P.3d 287
• Decision Date: 19 December 2013
• Docket Number: CC 0904–05047,SC S060226.,CA A143846
• Court: Supreme Court of Oregon
• Parties: Hilary P. ROBINSON, Petitioner on Review, v. HARLEY–DAVIDSON MOTOR COMPANY, an assumed business name for Harley–Davidson Motor Company Group, LLC, a foreign limited liability company, fka Harley–Davidson Motor Company Group, Inc., et al., Defendants, and Grand Teton Harley–Davidson & Buell, an assumed business name for Grand Teton Cycles, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company, Respondent on Review.

354 Or. 572

316 P.3d 287

Hilary P. ROBINSON, Petitioner on Review,

v. HARLEY–DAVIDSON MOTOR COMPANY, an assumed business name for Harley–Davidson Motor Company Group, LLC, a foreign limited liability company, fka Harley–Davidson Motor Company Group, Inc., et al., Defendants,andGrand Teton Harley–Davidson & Buell, an assumed business name for Grand Teton Cycles, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company, Respondent on Review.

CC 0904–05047; CA A143846; SC S060226.

Supreme Court of Oregon, En Banc.

Argued and submitted April 30, 2013.

Decided Dec. 19, 2013.

On review from the Court of Appeals.^*

Kathryn H. Clarke, Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief for petitioner on review. With her on the brief were Michael L. Rosenbaum and Travis J. Mayor, Portland.

Janet M. Schroer, Hart Wagner, LLP, Portland, argued the cause for respondent on review. Majorie A. Speirs, Hart Wagner, LLP, Portland, filed the brief.

Cody Hoesly, Larkins Vacura LLP, Portland, filed the brief for amicus curiae Oregon Trial Lawyers Association.

BALDWIN, J.

Plaintiff, an Oregon resident, sustained injuries in a motorcycle accident that occurred in Wyoming. She subsequently filed an action in Oregon seeking damages for her injuries, naming as a defendant Grand Teton Cycles, LLC, a Harley–Davidson franchisee with a physical presence in Idaho and Wyoming. The trial court determined that it lacked personal jurisdiction over defendant and granted defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Robinson v. Harley–Davidson Motor Co., 247 Or.App. 587, 270 P.3d 367 (2012). We allowed plaintiff's petition for review to determine whether defendant, a nonresident, had sufficient contacts with Oregon for a court in this state to exercise specific jurisdiction over it. We conclude that this litigation did not arise out of or relate to defendant's activities in Oregon. However, we affirm for a different reason than expressed by the Court of Appeals, and, in so doing, we disavow the substantive relevance test to the extent that it was advanced in State ex rel. Michelin v. Wells, 294 Or. 296, 657 P.2d 207 (1982).

I. BACKGROUND

Defendant is an Idaho-registered limited liability company that owns and operates Harley–Davidson dealership franchises. Under the terms of its franchise agreement with Harley–Davidson, defendant operates two dealerships in Idaho—in Idaho Falls and Pocatello—and one dealership in Jackson Hole, Wyoming. Oregon is not included within defendant's “Dealer Assigned Territory” under the terms of its franchise agreement with Harley–Davidson. Nor does defendant maintain a physical presence or maintain bank accounts, officers, employees, or agents within Oregon.

Defendant has sold motorcycles, rentals, and services to Oregon residents who have visited its franchise locations, and it has purchased merchandise from, and sold merchandise to, Harley–Davidson dealerships in Oregon. On isolated occasions, defendant has sold parts and accessories to Oregon residents by orders placed through its interactive website, which is accessible to customers worldwide. On its website, defendant advertises motorcycle sales, repair services, sales of parts and accessories, sponsorship information for local events, and promotions for out-of-state residents to fly to Idaho to purchase motorcycles. Harley–Davidson also separately promotes defendant's franchise locations in its touring handbook, which is distributed nationally and lists all Harley–Davidson dealerships in the United States. In addition, defendant annually advertises in a few trade publications. Defendant's revenue from sales of accessories, parts, services, and rentals to Oregon residents and Oregon dealerships between the years 2002 and 2009 totaled, on average, approximately $60,000 per year. Although some of that revenue was attributable to sales to Oregon residents that occurred through defendant's online website, nearly all transactions involving Oregon residents occurred in Idaho.

In 2004, plaintiff purchased a Harley–Davidson motorcycle from Latus Motors Harley–Davidson (Latus Motors), a dealership in Gladstone, Oregon. Thereafter, she regularly returned to Latus Motors for service and warranty repairs on the motorcycle. Before the accident that gave rise to this litigation, plaintiff also visited defendant's Idaho Falls dealership on two occasions. Plaintiff first stopped at the dealership in 2004 while driving through Idaho, having learned of it through friends and the Harley–Davidson touring handbook. In 2006, she visited the dealership again while attending an Idaho-based motorcycle rally that defendant sponsored. Plaintiff visited defendant's website to register for the 2006 rally.

In early August 2007, Latus Motors serviced plaintiff's motorcycle and installed new tires. A few days later, plaintiff departed on a multistate motorcycle tour. While riding in Idaho, the front end of plaintiff's motorcycle began to “wobble” at highway speeds. Plaintiff took the motorcycle to defendant's Idaho Falls dealership to address the front-end stability problem. Defendant's employee examined the motorcycle and completed warranty repairs. The next day, in Wyoming, plaintiff was riding the motorcycle at highway speeds when it again began to “wobble.” The motorcycle went into an uncontrollable front-end weave, and plaintiff was thrown off the motorcycle and injured.

Plaintiff subsequently commenced an action in Multnomah County Circuit Court against the motorcycle manufacturer, two dealerships that had serviced the motorcycle, including defendant, and two parts manufacturers, alleging claims for products liability, negligent repair, breach of warranty, and other claims. As relevant to defendant, plaintiff specifically alleged that defendant failed to properly diagnose and repair the cause of the front-end problem, failed to contact Harley–Davidson for repair instructions or instruct its employees on proper repairs, and failed to notify plaintiff that the motorcycle could continue to experience a high-speed “wobble.”

Defendant filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint pursuant to ORCP 21 A(2), asserting that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over defendant. After hearing the parties' arguments, the trial court concluded that it lacked personal jurisdiction and granted defendant's motion to dismiss. The trial court entered a limited judgment, and plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment, and we granted review to address the jurisdictional issue presented in this case.

In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, we consider the facts as alleged in plaintiff's complaint, any relevant supporting affidavits, and other evidence submitted by the parties. Willemsen v. Invacare Corp., 352 Or. 191, 195 n. 2, 282 P.3d 867 (2012), cert. den.,––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 984, 184 L.Ed.2d 762 (2013); see alsoORCP 21 A (providing that a trial court considering a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction may rely on the pleadings, affidavits, declarations, and other evidence). The burden is on the plaintiff to allege and prove facts sufficient to establish jurisdiction over a particular defendant. Michelin, 294 Or. at 299, 657 P.2d 207 (citing State ex rel. Sweere v. Crookham, 289 Or. 3, 6, 609 P.2d 361 (1980)). In this case, the jurisdictional facts are undisputed.

Oregon's long-arm statute, ORCP 4, sets out the grounds for an Oregon court to exercise jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant in a civil case. The rule outlines five general bases for establishing personal jurisdiction under ORCP 4 A, enumerates several more specific bases for personal jurisdiction under ORCP 4 B through K, and also provides a catchall provision under ORCP 4 L that confers jurisdiction to the extent permitted by due process. State ex rel. Circus Circus Reno, Inc. v. Pope, 317 Or. 151, 154–56, 854 P.2d 461 (1993); see also Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, ––– U.S. ––––, ––––, 131 S.Ct. 2846, 2850, 180 L.Ed.2d 796 (2011) (“A state court's assertion of jurisdiction exposes defendants to the State's coercive power, and is therefore subject to review for compatibility with the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.”).

Although plaintiff asserted at trial that defendant's contacts—particularly its presence through its interactive website—were sufficient to establish jurisdiction in accordance with ORCP 4 A, plaintiff does not reprise that argument before this court. Plaintiff also does not invoke any basis for jurisdiction enumerated in ORCP 4 B through K. Rather, plaintiff asserts that, pursuant to ORCP 4L, defendant's contacts with this state were sufficient to permit an Oregon court to exercise jurisdiction over defendant to the extent permitted by this state's constitution and the Constitution of the United States.¹See State ex rel. Hydraulic Servocontrols v. Dale, 294 Or. 381, 384, 657 P.2d 211 (1982) ( ORCP 4 L confers jurisdiction to the “outer limits of due process”). Because Oregon does not have a due process clause in its constitution that would impose a state constitutional limit on jurisdiction, we are guided by decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States that address the constitutionality of an invocation of jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.²Circus Circus, 317 Or. at 156, 854 P.2d 461.

Under Supreme Court jurisprudence, an exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant comports with due process if there exists “minimum contacts” between the defendant and the forum state such that maintaining suit in the state would “not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” World–Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291–92, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66...