Honorable Harry E. Coates, , Corp. v. Fallin

• Citation: 316 P.3d 924
• Decision Date: 16 December 2013
• Docket Number: No. 112167.,112167.
• Parties: The Honorable Harry E. COATES, as a member of the Senate of the State of Oklahoma, The Honorable Emily Virgin, as a member of the House of Representatives of the State of Oklahoma, Professional Fire Fighters of Oklahoma, a not-for-profit Oklahoma corporation by and though its President Rick Beams, who also appears as an individual, Petitioners, v. The Honorable Mary FALLIN, in her Official Capacity only as Governor of the State of Oklahoma, The Honorable Scott Pruitt, in his Official Capacity only as Attorney General of the State of Oklahoma, Respondents.
• Court: Supreme Court of Oklahoma

316 P.3d 924

The Honorable Harry E. COATES, as a member of the Senate of the State of Oklahoma, The Honorable Emily Virgin, as a member of the House of Representatives of the State of Oklahoma, Professional Fire Fighters of Oklahoma, a not-for-profit Oklahoma corporation by and though its President Rick Beams, who also appears as an individual, Petitioners,

v.The Honorable Mary FALLIN, in her Official Capacity only as Governor of the State of Oklahoma, The Honorable Scott Pruitt, in his Official Capacity only as Attorney General of the State of Oklahoma, Respondents.

No. 112167.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

Dec. 16, 2013.

As Corrected Dec. 16, 2013.

ORDER

¶ 1 We assumed original jurisdiction in the above styled and numbered cause on November 25, 2013 to consider a constitutional challenge to Senate Bill 1062, 2013 Okla. Sess. Laws, Ch. 208. The bill repealed the Workers' Compensation Code, 85 O.S.2011 301 et seq., replacing it with the Administrative Workers' Compensation Act (Administrative Act), 85A O.S. Supp.2014 1 et seq. The same bill adopted the Oklahoma Employee Injury Benefit Act, 85A O.S. Supp.2014, 201, et seq., allowing certain employers to adopt and administer benefit plans consistent with the Administrative Act, and the Workers' Arbitration Compensation Act, 85A O.S. Supp.2014 301 et seq. providing for enforcement, and procedures and conditions governing agreements to arbitrate claims for injuries. Finally, the bill provides for the Workers' Compensation Court of Existing Claims, 85A O.S. Supp.2014 400 et seq., governing claims arising before February 1, 2014.

¶ 2 We have considered the briefs filed by all interested entities and the arguments presented during oral presentation. WE DETERMINE THAT:

a) As in all causes involving constitutional challenges to statutory language, we begin with the premise that the Administrative Act is constitutional and should be upheld against a constitutional attack unless it is clearly and overtly inconsistent with the Oklahoma Constitution. Glasco v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Department of Corrections, 2008 OK 65, ¶ 27, 188 P.3d 177. In absence of a constitutional defect, we are duty bound to give effect to legislative acts, not to amend, repeal, or circumvent them. We will not exercise authority not vested in this Court by rewriting statutes merely because the legislation does not comport with our concept of prudent public policy. Burrell v. Burrell, 2007 OK 47, ¶ 17, 192 P.3d 286;Boston Ave. Mgt., Inc. v. Associated Resources, Inc., 2007 OK 5, 11, 152 P.3d 880;Head v. McCracken, 2004 OK 84, ¶ 13, 102 P.3d 670.

b) In its wisdom, the Legislature has repealed the Workers' Compensation Code, 85 O.S.2011 301 et seq., and replaced it with the Administrative Act effective February 1, 2014. The central constitutional challenge to the legislation is that the Legislature, in so doing, acted outside its constitutional authority by enacting a bill containing multiple subjects in violation of the Okla. Const., art. 5, 57. The practice is often referred to as “log-rolling” in which unpopular causes are joined with popular policies on an entirely different subject in the same legislative measure. Fent v. State, 2008 OK 2, ¶ 26, 184 P.3d 467. In determining whether there has been a constitutional violation of the single-subject rule, we determine whether the bill contains multiple provisions reflecting a common, closely akin theme or purpose. Matter of Application of Oklahoma Development Finance Authority for Approval of Bonds, 2013 OK 74, 57 6, 312 P.3d 926;Thomas v. Henry, 2011 OK 53, ¶ 26, 260 P.3d 1251. As all sections of the new law are inter-related and refer to a single subject, workers' compensation or the manner in which employees may ensure protection against work-related injuries,we disagree with the constitutional challenge to the Administrative Act on grounds of log-rolling.

c) Barring violence to the Constitution, this Court has long recognized that the protection of employees from the hazards of their employment is a proper subject for legislative action and that, in providing such protection, the Legislature may commit the details of that defense to an entity which will, in turn, exercise the administrative power so delegated. Stanley v. Mowery, 1949 OK 77 , 207 P.2d 277. The Legislature has done precisely this with the enactment of Senate Bill 1062, 2013 Okla. Sess. Laws, Ch. 208.

¶ 3 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED THAT Senate Bill 1062, 2013 Okla. Sess. Laws, Ch. 208 is not unconstitutional as a multiple-subject bill and that the Legislature has exercised proper authority in a matter over which it has the power to act by adopting a code for the future execution of workers' compensation law in Oklahoma which comports with the Okla. Const. art. 5, 57. Until such time as a case or controversy or a justiciable issue is presented to this Court, we are without jurisdiction to rule further with regard to this Act.

¶ 4 DONE BY ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE THIS 16TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 2013.

COLBERT, C.J., WATT, WINCHESTER, EDMONDSON, TAYLOR, COMBS (writing separately), JJ., Concur.

REIF, V.C.J. (writing separately), GURICH, J., Concurs In Part; Dissents in Part.

KAUGER, J., Not Participating.

COMBS, J., concurring and writing separately:

¶ 1 I agree with the Court's decision that the legislation at issue does not violate the single-subject rule.

¶ 2 As the law has not yet taken effect, it is unclear exactly how these issues will manifest themselves in future cases or controversies, but it is necessary to acknowledge the constitutional problems these Acts will produce when claimants begin to receive disparate treatment in their recourse to the law based upon decisions made by their employers.

¶ 3 I write separately to express my concern that certain provisions of the Administrative Workers' Compensation Act, 85A O.S. Supp.2013 1 et seq., and the Oklahoma Employee Injury Benefit Act, 85A O.S. Supp.2013 200 et seq., are unconstitutional because they provide for differential treatment in appellate procedure for claimants and therefore violate the special law prohibitions of Article V of the Oklahoma Constitution and do not provide adequate due process protections.

¶ 4 The Oklahoma Employee Injury Benefit Act (referred to by Petitioners as the Opt Out Act), 85A O.S. Supp.2013 200–213, sets out a minimum appeals process that must be available for injured workers of employers who have opted out of the new system created by Administrative Workers' Compensation Act. Section 211 requires that all employers who opt-out must provide the claimant with the ability to appeal to a committee of at least three people not involved in the original adverse benefit determination.

¶ 5 If part of the adverse benefits decision is upheld by the committee, then the claimant may file a petition for review with the Workers' Compensation Commission (Commission) sitting en banc, which must “rely on the record established by the internal appeal process and use an objective standard of review that is not arbitrary or capricious.” Title 85A O.S. Supp.2013 211 (B)(6). If the Commission upholds any part of the adverse determination, the claimant may:

appeal to the Oklahoma Supreme Court by filing with the Clerk of the Supreme Court a certified copy of the decision of the Commission attached to a petition which shall specify why the decision is contrary to law within twenty (20) days of the decision being issued. The Supreme Court may modify, reverse, remand for rehearing, or set aside the decision only if the decision was contrary to law.

(Emphasis added).

Title 85A O.S. Supp.2013 211(B)(7).

¶ 6 My concern is that in addition to being somewhat nebulous, this minimum process and standard of review differs markedly from that available to claimants who are employees of an entity who has not chosen to “opt out”. The controlling provision for claimants of those employers who have not opted out is 85A O.S. Supp.2013 78. Section 78(A) provides in pertinent part:

[a]ny party feeling aggrieved by the judgment, decision, or award made by the administrative law judge may, within ten (10) days of issuance, appeal to the Workers' Compensation Commission. After hearing arguments, the Commission may reverse or modify the decision only if it determines that the decision was against the clear weight of the evidence or contrary to law. (Emphasis applied)

85A O.S. Supp.2013 78(C) then provides in pertinent part:

[t]he judgment, decision or award of the Commission shall be final and conclusive on all questions within its jurisdiction between the parties unless an action is commenced in the Supreme Court of this state to review the judgment .. The Supreme Court may modify, reverse, remand for rehearing, or set aside the judgment or award only if it was:

1. In violation of constitutional provisions;

2. In excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the Commission;

3. Made on unlawful procedure;

4. Affected by other error of law;

5. Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, material, probative and substantial competent evidence;

6. Arbitrary or capricious;

7. Procured by fraud; or

8. Missing findings of fact on issues essential to the decision.

¶ 7 A few major differences are apparent between the two appellate procedures. First, a claimant whose employer has opted out and is required to set up the minimum procedures set out in 85A O.S. Supp.2013 200–213 must make their first appeal to what is likely to be an interested party. All 211(B) requires is that no members of the three member (minimum) committee have been involved in the original adverse determination. The members may still be fellow employees, or in other words, interested parties to the dispute with a perceived presumption of partiality on the side of the employer.¹ The claimant under 211 therefore appears to be subject to differential treatment from a claimant employed by an entity that has not chosen to opt out....