NLRB v. Larry Faul Oldsmobile Co.

Decision Date30 April 1963
Docket NumberNo. 13985.,13985.
Citation316 F.2d 595
PartiesNATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Petitioner, v. LARRY FAUL OLDSMOBILE CO., Inc., Respondent.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Marcel Mallet-Prevost, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Lee M. Modjeska, Atty., National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D. C., Stuart Rothman, Gen. Counsel, Dominick L. Manoli, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Allison W. Brown, Jr., Atty., National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D. C., for petitioner.

Murray B. Woolley, Frederick W. Turner, Jr., Chicago, Ill., for Larry Faul Oldsmobile Co., Inc.

Before HASTINGS, Chief Judge, CASTLE, Circuit Judge, and MERCER, District Judge.

HASTINGS, Chief Judge.

This matter is before us on petition of National Labor Relations Board (Board) for enforcement of its order against respondent, Larry Faul Oldsmobile Co., Inc.

Respondent is engaged in the retail sale of new and used automobiles in Oak Park, Illinois where the events involved in this case occurred.

The Board found that respondent violated § 8(a) (5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 158 (a) (5) and (1), by refusing to recognize and bargain with union.1 The Board also found that respondent violated § 8(a) (1) of the Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(a) (1), by interrogating its employees concerning their union membership and activities, by threatening employees with reprisals for engaging in union activity and by promising more favorable treatment to induce employees to abandon their union activity. The Board's decision and order are reported at 138 N.L.R.B. No. 81.

The Board's order requires respondent to cease and desist from the unfair labor practices found, and from in any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their statutory rights. Affirmatively, the Board's order requires respondent to bargain with union upon request, and to post appropriate notices.

Respondent's only contention is that the Board's decision is not supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole.

In the fall of 1961, a campaign was begun to organize respondent's automobile salesmen. Respondent employed six such salesmen and by November 18, 1961, all of them had signed cards authorizing union to represent them for collective bargaining. On November 21, respondent received a letter from union advising respondent of its majority status and requesting a bargaining meeting. In this letter, union offered to submit the cards to a mutually agreeable third party for verification of the signatures. Respondent did not respond to this letter.

On December 9, 1961, respondent received another letter from union, transmitting the six union authorization cards and requesting a bargaining meeting. Respondent's president, Lawrence P. Faul, was satisfied on this date of the authenticity of the signatures on all of the cards. On December 12, respondent wrote union: "I do not believe that you represent a majority of my salesmen. Accordingly, I see no reason for a meeting." There was no meeting between respondent and union.

We agree with the Board that respondent refused to bargain with union on December 12 in violation of § 8(a) (5) and (1) of the Act. We find unconvincing the arguments advanced by respondent that its president harbored a good faith doubt of the majority status of union on December 12. A proper and satisfactory analysis of the refusal to bargain issue appears in the trial examiner's report which was adopted by the Board. We deem it unnecessary to repeat such analysis here.

Several days after respondent's president refused union's request for a bargaining meeting, he called Charles Burian, one of the salesmen, into his office. Burian was asked why the men had joined the union. In the course of the conversation which ensued, Faul proposed that Burian talk to the other salesmen and submit a written list of their grievances. At the close of this conversation, Faul promised to settle the grievances to the employees' satisfaction.

The Board found that by this conversation respondent violated § 8(a) (1) of the Act. Such finding is supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole. This questioning with respect to union membership occurred after Faul became convinced that the signatures on the authorization cards were genuine. Thus, the questioning is not permissible as reasonable interrogation to ascertain whether Burian had in fact signed an authorization card. It could only have had as its purpose an intent to probe into the reasons for Burian's adherence to union. Faul's proposal that Burian consult with the other salesmen concerning their grievances and the promise to take corrective action in response thereto was clearly an allurement to induce defection from union. National Labor Relations Board v. Taitel, 7 Cir., 261 F.2d 1, 3 (1958), cert. denied, 359 U. S. 944, 79 S.Ct. 725, 3 L.Ed.2d 677; National Labor Relations Board v. Bailey Co., 6 Cir., 180 F.2d 278, 279 (1950).

On November 21, 1961, immediately after respondent received union's first letter demanding recognition and bargaining, Lawrence J. Faul, the son of respondent's president and supervisor of new car salesmen, asked Burian and Emil Kush, both new car salesmen, whether or not they had joined union. On December 9, after respondent received union's second demand for recognition and the signed authorization cards, the elder Faul sent a supervisor to ask salesman Hugh Zeeh whether or not he had signed the card which bore his signature.

The Board found these interrogations interfered with the employees' rights. We cannot agree. These interrogations were spontaneous responses by respondent to the letters from union claiming majority status. They were not systematic or methodical. The employees were not called into the employer's office to...

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12 cases
  • N.L.R.B. v. Rich's Precision Foundry, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit
    • December 15, 1981
    ...statements were, and were correctly determined by the Board to be, threats of retaliation. Nor does the case of NLRB v. Larry Faul Oldsmobile Co., 316 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1963), cited by the Company, affect our decision. In Faul, a manager's statement that "he might as well as throw the plac......
  • NLRB v. Deutsch Company, Metal Components Division
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • October 8, 1971
    ...334 F.2d 604 (9th Cir. 1964); Beaver Valley Canning Co. v. N.L.R.B., 332 F.2d 429, 433 (8th Cir. 1964); N.L.R.B. v. Larry Faul Oldsmobile Co., 316 F.2d 595, 597 (7th Cir. 1963); Lincoln Bearing Co. v. N.L.R.B., 311 F.2d 48, 51 (6th Cir. 1962). In light of the evidence adduced at the hearing......
  • N.L.R.B. v. Dorothy Shamrock Coal Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit
    • November 25, 1987
    ...260 NLRB 843, 846-49 (1982) (employer unlawfully told employees that he was not "going to go union"); but cf. NLRB v. Larry Faul Oldsmobile Co., 316 F.2d 595 (7th Cir.1963) (statement that employer "might as well throw business up for grabbs" after successful union election was not a threat......
  • Beaver Valley Canning Company v. NLRB
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • June 26, 1964
    ...intimidation, is not unlawful conduct per se. See S. H. Kress & Co. v. N.L.R.B., 317 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1963); N.L.R.B. v. Larry Faul Oldsmobile Co., 316 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1963); Lincoln Bearing Co. v. N.L.R.B., 311 F.2d 48 (6th Cir. 1962). Wright's innocuous statements could not be constr......
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