Hart v. United States

Decision Date15 June 1963
Docket NumberNo. 20154.,20154.
Citation316 F.2d 916
PartiesJohn M. HART, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

William H. Izlar, Jr., Robert L. Steed, Atlanta, Ga., John M. Hart, in pro. per., for appellant.

Charles L. Goodson, U. S. Atty., Allen L. Chancey, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., Atlanta, Ga., for appellee.

Before TUTTLE, Chief Judge, and POPE* and JONES, Circuit Judges.

TUTTLE, Chief Judge.

Appellant was indicted, tried and convicted of the crime of transporting and concealing in interstate commerce a motor vehicle which he knew to be stolen, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2312, § 2313. Prior to the trial, appellant filed a motion under Rule 41(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to return and suppress evidence obtained by an illegal search and seizure. This motion recited that defendant's arrest was made without a warrant and without probable cause and that pursuant to this arrest and search without a search warrant, county authorities seized bills of sale, a registration receipt and a license plate. The motion to suppress was denied the day before the trial. This appeal is taken from the conviction and the denial of this motion to return and suppress the evidence. The above evidence was turned over to Federal authorities, and was used as the basis of the conviction here appealed from. The only question on appeal is whether the search and seizure and arrest were lawful.

The order of events, which the trial court could find on the hearing on the motion to return and suppress the evidence, which led to the Federal authorities obtaining the evidence, is quite important. It is as follows: Sometime during the morning of October 12, 1961, defendant was accosted by a Deputy Sheriff, Satterfield, while walking along a street in Ringgold, Georgia. Defendant was "asked" by Deputy Satterfield "to come to the Sheriff's office, the Sheriff wanted to talk to him."1 The reason given at the hearing was that the defendant was approaching a car (the car that was the stolen vehicle), the same make, model and color of a car for which the Deputy had been notified to be on the lookout. A burglary had occurred recently in Ringgold and a 1958 red Chevrolet convertible had been seen near the scene of the burglary. It was to a 1958 red Chevrolet convertible that defendant was proceeding when he was accosted by Deputy Satterfield. The defendant accompanied the Deputy to the Sheriff's office without demur or objection. Testimony is not clear as to what the Sheriff inquired of the defendant, but he probably inquired with respect to the ownership of the automobile to which defendant was proceeding, for the testimony was that defendant went back to the automobile accompanied by the Deputy in order to get the bill of sale and registration of the car.2 Without protest the defendant gave the registration, which was in a pocket of his coat, to the Deputy and produced two bills of sale. The automobile was bearing an out-of-state license plate. It was from the license plate, the registration, the bill of sale and a serial number plated on with screws inside the car door which the Deputy observed that the latter discovered that the automobile was improperly registered under state law. It is not clear whether he opened and searched the car to see this identification plate: There was no proof that he did so. However, he did thereafter search the car and found a new Georgia license plate. The Deputy at this time took the defendant back to the Sheriff's office and, as the Deputy and the Sheriff testified, "formally" arrested the defendant for improper state registration.

After the automobile was later brought to the jail, it was searched by the then notified Federal agents who determined that the car was a stolen vehicle. The registration, bills of sale, and license plates were turned over to the agent by the Sheriff.

The searches were conducted and the arrest made without warrants.

It is appellant's first contention that he was arrested by the Deputy at the time he was first taken to the Sheriff's office, and that at that time there was no probable cause for an arrest without a warrant, and, the arrest being illegal, the search incident thereto was also illegal under Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948). Appellant also argues that if the arrest occurred, as claimed by the Government, only at the time of the second "visit" to the Sheriff's office, the search was also illegal in that it took the search which preceded the arrest, in order to turn up sufficient evidence to warrant the deputy's arrest without a warrant.

If we find that the defendant was arrested at the time he was first taken into the Sheriff's office, the search was clearly illegal, for at that time there was no probable cause or reasonable grounds of suspicion for arresting the appellant for any reason3 and any search incident to an illegal arrest is also illegal. Johnson v. United States, supra. Moreover, even if there was no arrest but if Hart gave up the documents and permitted the inspection of the automobile under duress or compulsion the evidence would be equally tainted. Pekar v. United States, 5 Cir., 315 F.2d 319 (1963). We are called upon to decide whether the circumstances of this case permitted the trial court to find that the evidence sought to be excluded was obtained by the voluntary action of appellant.

The Government contends that the arrest took place only at the time the appellant was "formally" arrested by the Sheriff for improper state registration after the Deputy had determined from the registration and tags that the car was improperly registered and had brought appellant in for the second time. The Government urges that there was nothing unlawful about taking the appellant in to question him about the suspicious automobile, for this was part of "orderly police practice" to make such investigations, and that he went voluntarily and surrendered the papers voluntarily.

In the absence of an applicable Federal statute, the law of the state where an arrest without a warrant takes place determines its validity, United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, at 589, 68 S.Ct. 222, at 226, 92 L.Ed. 210 (1948). In this...

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  • State v. Allen
    • United States
    • North Carolina Supreme Court
    • January 26, 1973
    ...581, 68 S.Ct. 222, 92 L.Ed. 210; Wilson v. Porter, supra; Nicholson v. United States, 355 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1966); Hart v. United States, 316 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1963); People v. Sanchez, 256 Cal.App.2d 700, 64 Cal.Rptr. 331. See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142; Ker v......
  • Lathers v. United States, 24226.
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    • May 23, 1968
    ...law determines the legality of state arrests. Collins v. United States, 5 Cir. 1961, 289 F.2d 129, 130-131 (at 3); Hart v. United States, 5 Cir. 1963, 316 F.2d 916, 919 (at 1-3); Jackson v. United States, 5 Cir. 1965, 352 F.2d 490, 491 (at 1, cert. den., 1966, 385 U.S. 825, 87 S.Ct. 55, 17 ......
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    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • June 23, 1965
    ...no testimony or other evidence that his consent to the search was not genuine or was reluctantly given. Compare Hart v. United States, 5th Cir. 1963, 316 F.2d 916, 917 with Pekar v. United States, 5th Cir. 1963, 315 F.2d 319. See also United States v. Page, 9th Cir. 1962, 302 F.2d 81; Unite......
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    • May 27, 1968
    ...States, 122 U.S.App.D.C. 51, 351 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1965); Fisher v. United States, 324 F.2d 775 (8th Cir. 1963); Hart v. United States, 316 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1963); United States v. Williams, 314 F.2d 795 (6th Cir. 1963); United States v. Kelly, 55 F.2d 67, 83 A.L.R. 122 (2nd Cir. 1932). ......
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