United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Company, 68-239-Civ.-J.

• Decision Date: 16 April 1970
• Docket Number: No. 68-239-Civ.-J.,68-239-Civ.-J.
• Citation: 316 F. Supp. 567
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, by John N. MITCHELL, Attorney General, Plaintiff, v. JACKSONVILLE TERMINAL COMPANY, a corporation, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

316 F. Supp. 567

UNITED STATES of America, by John N. MITCHELL, Attorney General, Plaintiff, v. JACKSONVILLE TERMINAL COMPANY, a corporation, et al., Defendants.

No. 68-239-Civ.-J.

United States District Court, M. D. Florida, Jacksonville Division.

May 5, 1970.

Order on Costs April 16, 1970.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

William B. Fenton, Atty., Civil Rights Division, U. S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., for plaintiff.

Luke G. Galant, Dawson, Galant, Maddox, Boyer, Sulik & Nichols, William H. Adams, III, Guy O. Farmer, II, Mahoney, Hadlow, Chambers & Adams, Delbridge L. Gibbs, Marks, Gray, Conroy & Gibbs, Jacksonville, Fla., E. Smythe Gambrell, Harold L. Russell, Lloyd Sutter, and William O'Callaghan, Gambrell, Russell, Moye & Killorin, Atlanta, Ga., Clarence M. Mulholland, Richard R. Lyman, Mulholland, Hickey & Lyman, Toledo, Ohio, William J. Hickey, Washington, D. C., Donald Bennett, Harold A. Ross, Robert Hart, Cleveland, Ohio, William J. Donlon, Cincinnati, Ohio, for defendants.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

SCOTT, District Judge.

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Nature of the Case.

This is an action filed by the Attorney General of the United States¹ ("the Government") under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("the Act"), 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq., alleging that the defendants Jacksonville Terminal Company ("the Company") and sixteen (16) named international labor organizations (the "unions" or the particular union)² are engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of the rights of Negroes to equal employment opportunities and that this alleged pattern or practice is of such a nature and is intended to deny Negroes the full exercise of rights secured by Section 703(a), (c), (d) of the Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a), (c), (d).

B. General Contentions of the Parties.

From a review of the complaint, the answer and amendments thereto including affirmative defenses raised by the Company, the pre-trial stipulation filed pursuant to Rule 10(D) of the Rules of this Court (and later admitted into evidence as Joint Exhibit No. 1), the pre-trial briefs submitted pursuant to Rule 10(E) (2) of the Rules of this Court, the transcript of the pre-trial conference of January 6-7, 1970, and the arguments and statements of counsel (including the various memoranda in support thereof) during the course of the seven-week trial, the general contentions of the respective parties are clear. The Government contends as follows:

(1) The defendant Company is engaged in acts and practices which limit, segregate, classify or otherwise discriminate against its Negro employees in ways which deprive or tend to deprive them of employment opportunities or adversely affect their status as employees because of their race.

(2) All of the defendant unions have entered into collective bargaining agreements with the Company, and each such agreement contains provisions which perpetuate, or tend to perpetuate, the effects of certain of the discriminatory acts and practices of the defendant Company.

(3) The defendants BRAC and BMWE maintain racially segregated locals which deprive Negro members of employment opportunities and adversely affect their status because of their race.

(4) That such acts and practices of the Company and the defendant unions constitute a pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of the rights of Negroes to equal employment opportunities, and that this pattern or practice is of such nature and is intended to deny the full exercise of the rights secured by Section 703(a), (c) and (d) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a), (c) and (d).

The Company has answered as follows:

(1) The Company denies that it is engaged in acts and practices which limit, segregate, classify or otherwise discriminate against its Negro employees in ways which deprive or tend to deprive them of employment opportunities or adversely affect their status as employees because of their race.

(2) The Company denies that the collective bargaining agreements it has entered into with the defendant unions contain any provisions which perpetuate or tend to perpetuate the effects of any discriminatory acts and practices.

(3) The Company denies that its acts and practices constitute a pattern or practice of resistance to the right of Negroes to the full enjoyment of equal employment opportunities, and that this pattern or practice is of such a nature and is intended to deny the full exercise of the rights secured by Section 703(a), (c) and (d) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a), (c) and (d).

(4) The Company denies each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 7, 9 and 10 of the Government's Complaint.

(5) The Company interposed the following affirmative defenses in an amendment to its Answer, filed September 4, 1969:

(a) Any preferences, distinctions and differences among company employees with respect to compensation or terms, conditions or privileges of employment result from (a) standards fixed pursuant to bona fide seniority systems; (b) the work content and classifications of positions or operating requirements of the Company; and (c) determinations with respect to (a) and (b), supra, made by Federal boards or agencies pursuant to the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.; furthermore, such preferences, distinctions and differences are not the result of any intention, past or present, to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.

(b) Any written or oral tests used by the Company were developed by professional railroad supervisors to measure ability to perform satisfactorily in certain specific job classifications; and such tests, their administration, and action taken upon their results are not designed, intended or used to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin (see Section 703(h) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(h)).

(c) By virtue of Section 703(j) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(j), the Company is not required to grant, and is prohibited from granting, preferential treatment to any individual or to any group because of the race, color, religion, sex or national origin of such individual or group in order to eliminate any "imbalance."

(6) The Company further submitted the following:

(a) As to work done by Negroes, compensation or terms, conditions or privileges of employment are equal to that received for similar work (as done by whites or any others) on other railroads anywhere in the country;

(b) The Company gives its Negro employees employment benefits superior to those Negroes receive elsewhere in the Jacksonville, Florida area; and

(c) The Company affords its Negro employees employment opportunities and benefits equal or superior to the employment opportunities otherwise available to them outside the Company.

(7) The Company³ also contends⁴ that —

(a) Evidence of employment acts and practices which occurred prior to July 2, 1965, the effective date of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq., is irrelevant, immaterial and incompetent, and therefore, inadmissible in this action; and

(b) The Government has the burden of proving by the preponderance of evidence that defendant intentionally committed specific acts and practices violative of Section 703 of the Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2, subsequent to July 2, 1965, the effective date of Title VII, of such a nature and number as to constitute a "pattern or practice" of racial discrimination such as contemplated by Section 707(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-6 (a).

The defendant unions deny that:

(1) the collective bargaining agreements each has entered into with the defendant company contain any provision which constitutes an act or practice proscribed by the Civil Rights Act, or is so intended;

(2) such agreements contain any provisions which perpetuate, or tend to perpetuate, the effects of any alleged discriminatory acts or practices of the Company;

(3) each is engaged in acts or practices which constitute a pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of the rights of Negroes to equal employment opportunities secured by the Act or which are intended to deny the Negroes the full exercise of such rights;

(4) any provision of any of said collective bargaining agreements in and of itself constitutes an act or practice proscribed by the Act; and

(5) any act or practice engaged in by the Company pursuant to, because of, and in compliance with any provision of any of said agreements constitutes an act or practice proscribed by the Act.

The defendants BRAC and BMWE also deny that they maintain racially segregated locals in a pattern or practice of resistance to the rights of Negroes to the full enjoyment of any of the rights secured by Section 703(a), (c) and (d) of the Act, and that the pattern or practice is of such a nature to and is intended to deny to Negroes the full enjoyment of rights secured by the Act.

C. Pre-trial Proceedings.

This action was filed on June 24, 1968, by the Government. During the ensuing 19 months prior to trial, the Government undertook through extensive discovery and investigative procedures the accumulation of facts to support its allegations. The Government filed and served upon the various defendants 15 sets of interrogatories and 10 sets of requests for admissions. Depositions of 11 Company officials and employees and six officers of the unions were taken. Pursuant to a motion to produce, the Government counsel were given access to files of the Company and files of the various union defendants. Copies of thousands of documents found in the files of the various defendants were obtained by the Government.

Defendants propounded 6 sets of interrogatories and 2 sets of requests for admissions.

In view of the protracted nature of this litigation and the lengthy discovery activity, two pre-trial conferences and three other...