Atlantic Seaboard Corporation v. Van Sterkenburg

• Decision Date: 03 June 1963
• Docket Number: No. 8811.,8811.
• Citation: 318 F.2d 455
• Parties: ATLANTIC SEABOARD CORPORATION, a corporation, Appellee, v. Madeleine Kneppelhout VAN STERKENBURG and Cornelis Kneppelhout Van Sterkenburg, her husband, Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

318 F.2d 455 (1963)

ATLANTIC SEABOARD CORPORATION, a corporation, Appellee, v. Madeleine Kneppelhout VAN STERKENBURG and Cornelis Kneppelhout Van Sterkenburg, her husband, Appellants.

No. 8811.

United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.

Argued January 10, 1963.

Decided June 3, 1963.

Herbert M. Brune, Baltimore, Md. (R. Edwin Brown, Rockville, Md., and Sidney C. Miller, Jr., Baltimore, Md., on brief), for appellants Jesse Slingluff, Baltimore, Md. (John W. Avirett, 2d, Baltimore, Md., Herbert W. Bryan, Charleston, W. Va., Morton P. Fisher, Jr., and Piper & Marbury, Baltimore, Md., on brief), for appellee.

Before HAYNSWORTH, BOREMAN and BELL, Circuit Judges.

HAYNSWORTH, Circuit Judge.

Without questioning the condemnor's right to condemn or the amount of the award as determined by the District Court, the condemnees have appealed, raising a number of procedural points in the apparent hope of obtaining a new trial before a jury and, possibly, damages for trespass on account of the condemnor's acts upon the land during the pendency of this appeal. We find no merit in any of the several points raised.

Atlantic Seaboard Corporation is a Delaware Corporation and, within the meaning of the Natural Gas Act,¹ is a "natural-gas company" engaged in the transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce. It obtained from the Federal Power Commission a certificate of public convenience and necessity for the construction of a new 30-inch natural gas transmission line designed to serve the Baltimore area. By negotiation, it obtained most of the necessary easements for construction and maintenance of the pipe line, but had not obtained by that means easements through three tracts of land. It undertook to condemn easements through those three tracts of land by virtue of the authority contained in § 7(h) of the Natural Gas Act.²

One of those tracts of land in Montgomery County, Maryland, was owned by the defendants, Van Sterkenburg. Process and notice of filing of the complaint were served on Mr. Van Sterkenburg on April 25, 1962. Service on Mrs. Van Sterkenburg had been effected earlier. The answer of Mr. Van Sterkenburg was thus due on May 15, 1962. On May 14, 1962, the owners, Van Sterkenburg, jointly filed a Motion for a More Definite Statement. The condemnor opposed this motion on the ground that it was untimely, in any event as to Mrs. Van Sterkenburg, and that, as to Mr. Van Sterkenburg, it was interposed solely for the purpose of delay and sought detailed information, going to the question of damages only, which was unnecessary for the preparation of a responsive pleading. At the same time, by letter, it gave to the owners the information the owners had sought by their motion. The Motion for a More Definite Statement was denied by order dated June 15, 1962, which contained a provision that answers should be filed within ten days from the date of that order.

On June 22, 1962, the owners filed a Motion To Dismiss The Complaint For Failure to State a Claim on Which Relief Can Be Granted. The motion was upon various grounds, such as failure of the complaint to allege that the plaintiff was qualified to do business in the State of Maryland. Later, on the same day, the defendants filed an answer reserving their rights under their motion to dismiss. The motion to dismiss was heard on June 26. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court indicated that the motion to dismiss would be denied, and a formal order to that effect was later entered.

During the hearing on June 26, 1962, the owners, for the first time, demanded a jury trial. That demand was followed on June 29, 1962 by a formal motion for a jury trial. On July 5, 1962, a hearing was held on the jury demand, after which the demand was denied on the ground that it was untimely and the Court was not disposed to exercise its discretion to waive the procedural default.

The plaintiff, from the outset, had been pressing for an early trial and disposition of the proceeding so that it could construct and complete the natural gas transmission line before the onset of winter and provide service to prospective customers during the heating season of 1962-1963. The attorneys for the owners had cooperated to the extent of agreeing on a trial date of July 9, 1962, and the trial of the matter before the Court, without a jury, commenced on that day. At the conclusion of those proceedings, the Court made an award of $7,000 covering just compensation to the owners and their incidental damages.

The owners refused to accept the award. The Court then entered an order, upon the plaintiff's motion, authorizing the plaintiff to pay the amount of the award into the registry of the Court, the effect of which was to authorize the plaintiff to take immediate possession of the easement and to proceed with the construction of the pipe line.

After the plaintiff commenced construction work on the owners' land, they filed an action in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland, against the plaintiff, seeking actual and punitive damages for the alleged trespass of the plaintiff, but the District Court entered an order enjoining their prosecution of that action.

On appeal, the owners complain of a denial of their motions for a more definite statement and for a dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. They complain of the denial of a jury trial and of the Court's order permitting the plaintiff to pay into the Court the amount of the award and proceed with the construction of the pipe line pending this appeal.

We need not consider the dubious merits of the motion for a more definite statement or of the motion to dismiss, for they were not allowable pleadings.

Under Rule 71A(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,³ a defendant in a condemnation proceeding may file a notice of appearance, or, if he has some objection or defense to the taking, he may file an answer within 20 days of the service of the notice upon him. If he files no answer, he is entitled to be heard on the question of just compensation and to participate in the award. The permissive answer is thus specifically designed for the purpose of raising objections and defense apart from the amount of just compensation. In the final sentence of the Rule, it is specifically provided, "No other pleading or motion asserting any additional defense or objection shall be allowed."

The rather summary procedure of Rule 71A was not intended to foreclose defenses or to restrict their presentation by owners of condemned property. Whatever defenses and objections are available may be raised by answer. The prohibition of other pleadings clearly had, as its purpose, an early joinder of issue and the elimination of the possibility of extended delay through the presentation of preliminary pleadings with resultant hearings and orders.⁴ One pleading to raise all objections and defenses to the taking and one hearing to dispose of them are contemplated, not successive pleadings and successive hearings spanning a much longer period of time. The Rule's prohibition of any pleading other than an answer is clear and unequivocal. The preliminary motions tendered here were unallowable.

The complaint here contained a "short and plain statement," fully meeting the requirements of Rule 71A(c) The additional information, going largely to the amount of the damages which the owners sought, was procurable in ordinary discovery proceedings if it was not to be had for the asking. As a matter of fact, the information sought by the motion for a more definite statement was supplied by the plaintiff at the time it filed its objections to the motion.

The question of the sufficiency of the complaint clearly can be raised in the answer. There are no fundamental concepts of...