Sharpe v. Cureton
| Decision Date | 13 February 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 00-6361.,No. 00-6362.,No. 00-6089.,No. 00-5805.,00-5805.,00-6089.,00-6361.,00-6362. |
| Citation | 319 F.3d 259 |
| Parties | Gary G. SHARPE; William G. Potter; Kenneth F. Scarbrough; Frank E. Potter; William H. McGinnis, Plaintiffs-Appellants/Cross-Appellees, Plaintiffs-Appellees/Cross-Appellants, v. Bruce CURETON, Chief, in his individual and official capacities; Victor Ashe, Mayor, in his individual and official capacities; City of Knoxville, Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants, Defendants-Appellants/Cross-Appellees, Robert Pressley, Deputy Fire Chief, in his individual and official capacities, Defendant-Appellee, Defendant, Defendant/Cross-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Diane Marie Messer (briefed), Wanda G. Sobieski (argued and briefed), Sobieski, Messer & Associates, Knoxville, TN, for Plaintiffs-Appellants Cross-Appellees in 00-5805, 00-6089, Plaintiffs-Appellees Cross-Appellants in 00-6361, 00-6362.
Robert H. Watson, Jr. (argued and briefed), John C. Duffy (briefed), Watson, Hollow & Reeves, Knoxville, TN, Michael S. Kelley (briefed), City of Knoxville, Law Department, Knoxville, TN, for Defendants-Appellees Cross-Appellants in 00-5805, 00-6089, Defendants-Appellants Cross-Appellees in 00-6361, 00-6362.
Before: NORRIS and BATCHELDER, Circuit Judges; FORESTER, Chief District Judge.*
Immediately after being re-elected as Mayor of Knoxville, Tennessee, in September, 1995, Victor Ashe ordered Bruce Cureton, Fire Chief of the City of Knoxville, to transfer five Knoxville Fire Department firefighters to undesirable locations, ostensibly in retaliation for the firefighters' support of Ashe's opponent in the election. When these firefighters, Gary Sharpe ("Sharpe"), William Potter ("W.Potter"), Kenneth Scarbrough ("Scarbrough"), Frank Potter ("F.Potter"), and William McGinnis ("McGinnis"), were denied merit and bonus pay for 1995 and 1996, they filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff W Potter added a claim alleging that he was transferred by the City of Knoxville in an effort to circumvent overtime pay requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et seq.
The jury awarded the plaintiffs a total of $30,645 in damages, but this amount was reduced when the district court ruled as a matter of law that recovery for the plaintiffs' retaliatory transfers was barred by the statute of limitations because the continuing violation doctrine did not apply. The district court also made the following rulings: it held that Offers of Judgment made by the defendants pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 68 were unenforceable because they were void for vagueness; it enjoined Ashe from retaliating not only against the plaintiffs, but against other Knoxville Fire Department employees; it denied W. Potter's FLSA claim; and it granted the plaintiffs only a portion of the attorney fees they requested. The plaintiffs appeal the district court's Judgment as a Matter of Law against their transfer claims, the reduction of their attorney fees, and the dismissal of the FLSA claim, and they request this Court to take notice of post-judgment facts. The defendants cross-appeal the grant of the injunction and the holding that the Rule 68 offers were invalid.
W. Potter became a member of the Knoxville Fire Department ("KFD") in 1956, and by September of 1995 had advanced to the position of Administrative Deputy Chief of Firefighting.
Scarbrough joined the KFD in 1967, and by September, 1995, served as a fire officer at a north Knoxville station located conveniently near his home.
F. Potter (a younger brother of W. Potter) joined the KFD in 1972, and by September, 1995, served as assistant chief for a district in east Knoxville.
McGinnis joined the KFD in 1960, and by September 1995 served as an assistant chief for a district in west Knoxville.
In a 1995 Knoxville mayoral race between incumbent Mayor Victor Ashe and challenger Ivan Harmon, W. Potter and the other plaintiffs openly supported Harmon, with the exception of plaintiff McGinnis who remained politically neutral. Ashe ultimately won the September 26, 1995, election, and shortly thereafter transferred all of the plaintiffs from their positions except for Sharpe.
On September 26, W. Potter received a letter delivered by Chief Cureton, informing him that he was being transferred from the administrative offices to the main fire hall, where he would no longer have access to a city car, and his new job would encompass evaluating fire and emergency service responses, tasks for which he was unfamiliar and did not feel qualified to undertake. W. Potter was assigned an office at the new location that was formerly used primarily as a storage closet and remained in disrepair. W. Potter worked at this location until February 1996, when he was transferred to become a shift chief, a position at which his hours per week were increased from 40 to 56.
Scarbrough was also informed of his transfer on September 26 when he was told that he should report the next morning to an unfamiliar station in south Knoxville. Scarbrough testified that the transfer damaged his performance because it is important for firefighters to be familiar with the territory they protect.
F. Potter learned on September 25 that he would be transferred to a station in north Knoxville effective September 26. F. Potter and Ashe had been friends, but the evidence indicated that F. Potter had deceived Ashe by voicing his political support, but appearing at a Harmon fundraiser. F. Potter spent four months at the north Knoxville location before being transferred to west Knoxville. He testified that the transfers to unfamiliar locations had an immediate impact on his performance.
McGinnis similarly learned of his transfer on September 25 and testified that being in the unfamiliar territory was humiliating and damaged his performance.
On October 2, 1995, all four officers filed grievances with the Knoxville Civil Service Merit Board alleging that their transfers were in retaliation for the exercise of First Amendment rights. A stay was ultimately entered and the grievances were not resolved.1
In August 1996, Ashe moved F. Potter, Scarbrough, and McGinnis back to their original locations, and McGinnis retired in 1997. In October, 1997, F. Potter was moved back to a forty hour per week position that he continues to hold. This position includes an office comparable to his former office, and allows access to a city vehicle, but involves working a swing shift.
In early 1996, the KFD announced its merit pay awards for 1995. Cureton controlled the merit pay decisions, and neither the plaintiffs nor any other KFD member who supported Harmon received merit pay. The firefighters were again denied merit pay for 1996 and appealed this denial; but Cureton sent them letters stating that the KFD could not respond because merit pay was an issue in litigation. McGinnis testified that at Cureton's deposition, Cureton indicated that none of the firefighters were even considered for merit pay in 1996. The KFD abandoned its merit pay policy after 1996.
On October 24, 1996, the firefighters filed this action in federal district court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that defendants Bruce Cureton, Victor Ashe, Robert Pressley, and the City of Knoxville conspired, through discrimination and retaliation, to violate the firefighters' First Amendment rights of political belief and association. The plaintiffs sought front and back pay, compensatory, nominal, and punitive damages, as well as an injunction, attorney fees, and taxation of costs. In addition, W. Potter sought damages under the FLSA and reinstatement to his prior KFD position; Sharpe also sought a promotion.
On January 7, 1997, the plaintiffs amended their complaint to allege two additional retaliatory acts that occurred since the initial complaint, namely, that Cureton had denied their requests for merit and bonus pay increases for 1996, and Ashe refused to consider a reasonable request to modify their pension plans. The individual defendants moved for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds; however, the district court denied the motion and this Court affirmed the lower court's decision on interlocutory appeal. See Sharpe v. Cureton, 1999 WL 55274, 1999 U.S.App. LEXIS 531 (6th Cir. Jan. 13, 1999). The defendants' petition for writ of certiorari was denied. See Cureton v. Sharpe, 528 U.S. 812, 120 S.Ct. 47, 145 L.Ed.2d 42 (1999).
A jury trial commenced on January 31, 2000, with the jury returning the following verdicts: Sharpe was awarded $2,500 in compensatory damages because Cureton and Ashe had retaliated against him for filing the complaint; however, he suffered no pre-complaint discrimination; W. Potter was found to have not suffered pre-complaint discrimination, but was awarded $6,500 in compensatory damages from Cureton and Ashe due to retaliation for filing the complaint; Scarbrough was awarded $6,500 in compensatory damages because Cureton and Ashe transferred him and denied a merit pay increase in retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights, and the jury also found that Cureton retaliated against him for filing the complaint; F. Potter was awarded $7,500 in compensatory damages because Ashe transferred him in 1995 for retaliatory reasons, and Cureton and Ashe also retaliated against him for filing the complaint and denying a merit pay increase; finally, McGinnis was awarded $7,645 due to Cureton and Ashe's retaliation for filing the complaint and in transferring him for retaliatory reasons.
Additional evidence indicated that Ashe was observed crossing out the names of potential new KFD hires recommended by a committee and explained his actions by stating that the crossed-out names were the sons of firemen who had not done much for him during a recent election. In addition, evidence...
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