Lucas v. Township of Bethel

• Decision Date: 11 February 2003
• Docket Number: No. 01-3946.,01-3946.
• Citation: 319 F.3d 595
• Parties: William A. LUCAS; August Lucas; David J. Kushon; Janie B. Kushon, Appellants v. TOWNSHIP OF BETHEL; James Riederer; Robert E. Prunty; Margaretta Reed; Allegheny Valley Land Trust
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

319 F.3d 595

William A. LUCAS; August Lucas; David J. Kushon; Janie B. Kushon, Appellants v. TOWNSHIP OF BETHEL; James Riederer; Robert E. Prunty; Margaretta Reed; Allegheny Valley Land Trust

No. 01-3946.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Argued April 30, 2002.

Filed February 11, 2003.

Andrew G. Kimball, (Argued), Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, P.C., Pittsburgh, for Appellees.

Karen E. Chilcote, (Argued), Lori D. Mendicino, Robb, Leonard & Mulvihill, Pittsburgh, for Appellees.

William C. Smith, (Argued), Pittsburgh, for Appellants.

Before ROTH, NYGAARD and WEIS, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

ROTH, Circuit Judge.

This jurisdictional dispute requires us to decide whether the District Court or the Surface Transportation Board (STB) has authority to resolve a property claim involving a defunct railroad line. The line, known as the Allegheny Secondary Track, was used by the Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail) as a railroad right of way. In 1989, the STB's predecessor, the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC),¹ granted Conrail unconditional authorization to abandon the Allegheny Secondary Track. See Section 308 of the Regional Rail Reorganization Act, 45 U.S.C. § 748(c). Conrail subsequently sold its interest in the right of way to the Allegheny Valley Land Trust (AVLT), which intended to convert the line to a trail use.

Notwithstanding Conrail's sale to the AVLT, plaintiffs, who own real property underlying the Allegheny Secondary Track, claim that Conrail's interest reverted to them when Conrail abandoned its right of way. Thus, when the AVLT permitted the Township of Bethel to enter plaintiffs' property and remove materials from the Allegheny Secondary Track, plaintiffs brought this lawsuit, claiming that the Township trespassed on their property and violated their constitutional rights.

The District Court dismissed plaintiffs' claims on the ground that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to determine whether Conrail had abandoned its line. Despite the ICC's unconditional authorization of abandonment, the District Court held that the STB retained exclusive jurisdiction over the issue of abandonment. The court reasoned that the STB would retain exclusive jurisdiction unless and until it determined that Conrail fully abandoned the rail line and that the abandonment occurred before the AVLT converted the line to a trial use. Otherwise, the current trail use of the Allegheny Secondary Track would provide continued basis for STB jurisdiction under the National Trails Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d), and would prevent the right of way from reverting to plaintiffs.

We will reverse the District Court's dismissal of this action. We hold that the ICC's unconditional authorization of abandonment was sufficient to end its jurisdiction over the Allegheny Secondary Track. First, the abandonment was authorized under § 308, a provision that substantially limits the STB's authority to place the usual conditions on abandonment of a railroad right of way. Second, both the Supreme Court and this Court have noted that the ICC's jurisdiction ends once it grants unconditional authorization to abandon a line, as is the case here. Finally, the ICC was never asked to intervene and prevent abandonment by certifying an interim trail use under the National Trail Act. Thus, the Act's provisions are inapplicable to this case. We address these points in more detail below.

I. Facts and Procedural History

Plaintiffs own two separate parcels of real estate. In 1852, a previous owner of the land subjected both parcels to a railroad right of way, known as the Allegheny Secondary Track. Since that time, a number of different railroad companies have operated trains over the Allegheny Secondary Track. Conrail acquired this right of way on April 1, 1976, and had common carrier obligations on the track from April 1, 1976, until June 8, 1989.

On June 8, 1989, the ICC authorized Conrail to discontinue service over the Allegheny Secondary Track pursuant to § 308(c) of the Regional Rail Reorganization Act. Plaintiffs claim that Conrail's interest in the right of way reverted to them when Conrail abandoned the line pursuant to the ICC's order. Thus, plaintiffs deny that the AVLT was authorized to allow the Town of Bethel to enter plaintiffs' property in order to remove ballast² from the right of way.

A. Abandonment under § 308(c) of the Regional Rail Reorganization Act.

In the Northeast Rail Service Act of 1981 (NERSA), Congress amended the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973 by adding § 308.³ Under § 308(c), Conrail may abandon an unprofitable right of way by filing a notice of insufficient revenues, waiting at least 90 days, and then filing an application for abandonment. See 45 U.S.C. § 748(c). The express language of § 308(c) requires the ICC to grant Conrail's application 90 days after it is filed and allows the agency to delay abandonment only if an offer of financial assistance is made within 90 days of Conrail's application. 45 U.S.C. § 748(c)-(d); 49 U.S.C. § 10904(d)(2). The ICC has also noted that it may delay § 308 abandonments under the interim use provisions set forth in the National Trails Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d). See Rail Abandonments — Use of Right of Ways as Trails, 2 I.C.C.2d 591, 613 (April 16, 1986).

Conrail initiated this abandonment procedure on October 31, 1985. It notified the ICC that it intended to abandon the Allegheny Secondary Track by filing a notice of Insufficient Revenues under § 308(c). Conrail filed an application for approval of abandonment well over 90 days later, on March 8, 1989. On June 8, 1989, and as required by § 308, the ICC authorized Conrail to abandon its line. The ICC's certificate of abandonment states that no offer of financial assistance was made within 90 days of Conrail's application, and, thus, there was no reason to delay approval under § 308(c). The June 8, 1989, certificate does not suggest that the ICC intended to place any National Trails Act conditions on Conrail's abandonment of its line. The ICC neither mentioned the provisions of 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) nor certified an interim trail use.⁴ The ICC's June 8 order has never been appealed and neither the ICC nor the STB has ever reopened abandonment proceedings.

B. Sale of Conrail's Right of Way.

After the ICC issued its order authorizing abandonment, Conrail pursued the sale of its interest in the Allegheny Secondary Track. One of the parties with which it negotiated was the AVLT, a non-profit organization that seeks to convert unused railroad beds into recreational trails while preserving the road beds for future rail uses. Before the AVLT purchased the Allegheny Secondary Track rail corridor from Conrail, it entered into a bridge maintenance agreement with the County of Armstrong and the county's Conservancy Charitable Trust. Both the bridge agreement and a piece of related correspondence sent to Conrail made reference to the AVLT's intention to use the property as a rail trail.

Conrail sold the rail corridor to AVLT on January 7, 1992. At the time of sale, all the equipment for operating trains on the corridor remained intact. The sale agreement explicitly allowed Conrail the right to remove the railroad track and all its appurtenant materials, excluding ballast and bridges. Conrail's sale agreement also stated that it did not contemplate providing rail service on the property.

Several times after the sale, the AVLT declared its intention to preserve the Allegheny Secondary Track as an interim recreational use trail under the National Trails Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d). Conrail, however, refused the AVLT's request to apply for an extension from the ICC to authorize "rail banking" of the corridor, as is require by ICC regulations if the roadbed is to be preserved for trail use. 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29(c)(1). Moreover, the AVLT never filed for an interim use with the ICC, another regulatory requirement for trail use. 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29(a). On April 6, 1992, Conrail requested approval from the Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission (PUC) to remove rails and ties at certain crossings along the Allegheny Secondary Track. After October 15, 1992, when the PUC approved abolishment of all but one of these crossings, Conrail entered an agreement to sell various track materials, excluding ballast, to a salvage company.

C. First state court action.

In August of 1995, plaintiffs filed an action in the Court of Common Pleas of Armstrong County and named as defendants the AVLT, the Conservancy, the Armstrong Rails to Trails Association, Conrail, and the officers of these organizations. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that Conrail had abandoned the Allegheny Secondary Track; an accounting; damages for disparagement and slander of property, trespass and continuing trespass; and injunctive relief barring any continuing trespass. Claims against Conrail were dismissed at the pleadings stage because plaintiffs alleged, and Conrail agreed, that it had abandoned its interest in the land at issue. The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the dismissal of claims against Conrail.⁵ Claims against the remaining parties were remanded to the trial court and proceeded to summary judgment. Because the summary judgment ruling both post-dates and relies upon the District Court's ruling in this case, we will discuss that ruling along with our discussion of the District Court proceedings, below.

D. Removal of ballast.

In approximately July of 1997, the AVLT offered the Township of Bethel the opportunity to remove and keep the ballast on the Allegheny Secondary Track. When the Township accepted, it was unaware of the pending lawsuit and it relied on AVLT's representation that it owned the right to the ballast. Plaintiffs and the Township dispute whether the Township removed survey stakes and additional soil material in addition to ballast. Plaintiffs also testified that they objected when they learned of the Township's...