Perry v. Capital Traction Co.

• Decision Date: 06 May 1929
• Docket Number: No. 4774,4775.,4774
• Citation: 32 F.2d 938,59 App. DC 42
• Parties: PERRY v. CAPITAL TRACTION CO. (two cases).
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

59 App. DC 42, 32 F.2d 938 (1929)

PERRY v. CAPITAL TRACTION CO. (two cases).

Nos. 4774, 4775.

Court of Appeals of District of Columbia.

Submitted April 5, 1929.

Decided May 6, 1929.

Walter B. Guy and Frederic B. Warder, both of Washington, D. C., for appellants.

Frank J. Hogan and Edmund L. Jones, both of Washington, D. C., for appellee.

Before MARTIN, Chief Justice, and ROBB and VAN ORSDEL, Associate Justices.

ROBB, Associate Justice.

Appeals from judgments in the Supreme Court of the District in actions (consolidated for trial) for personal injuries alleged to have been suffered by appellants (plaintiffs below) as the result of a collision between an automobile in which plaintiffs were riding and a street car of the defendant. The automobile was owned and was being operated by Lulu K. Perry.

The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff Frances Perry for $50 and for plaintiff Lulu K. Perry in the sum of $269, she having paid $209 for repairs on her automobile.

According to the bill of exceptions: "The collision threw Lulu K. Perry forward and Frances Perry was thrown upward, striking the back of her head against the permanent top of the automobile, then both plaintiffs settled back. As a result of the collision both plaintiffs suffered a severe impairment of their nervous systems which manifested itself and continued to the time of trial, in the case of Miss Lulu K. Perry, in crying spells, headaches, stammering, sleeplessness, inability to select the proper word in conversation, bad dreams, inability to work a full day as she could prior to the accident, inability to concentrate her thoughts, mental anguish and pains, and the plaintiff, Miss Frances Perry, suffered substantially the same results, in a lesser degree. * * * The plaintiffs called as witnesses, Dr. Roy D. Adams and Dr. John M. Ladd, who testified regarding their treatment of the plaintiffs and said witnesses stated that the impairment to the nervous systems of the plaintiffs was brought about solely by nervous shock or fright caused by the accident, and that the said nervous condition or impairment of the nervous systems of the plaintiffs was in no way attributable to or caused by any other injuries." A medical witness called by the defendant testified to the same effect.

During the argument on prayers offered by the respective parties, counsel for plaintiffs inquired of the court whether he would "be permitted to comment to the jury on the headaches, nervousness, loss of sleep, tremor, inability to conduct their business, crying fits, and other manifestations that they (plaintiffs) had." The court replied: "As I stated, the right to recover will be limited to damages resulting from physical injuries caused by the accident; and mental pain and suffering incident to such physical injuries, but not any mental pain or suffering caused by shock from the accident, not traceable to the physical injuries." The charge of the court was in accordance with this statement; plaintiffs excepted, and here contend that the charge was not a correct statement of the law.

In Washington & Georgetown R. Co. v. Dashiell, 7 App. D. C. 507, this court, in an opinion by its then Chief Justice, announced the rule which we think applicable to the present cases; the facts in that case not being distinguishable from the facts in these. The court said: "By the first prayer of the plaintiff, which was granted, the jury were instructed that if they found for the plaintiff, then, in estimating the damages, they had a right to take into consideration the evidence, if any, of the pain and suffering undergone by the plaintiff in consequence of her injuries. This was all right enough. But the court went farther,...