Haverstick Enterprises, Inc. v. Financial Federal Credit, Inc.

• Decision Date: 19 August 1994
• Docket Number: Nos. 92-2280,92-2351,s. 92-2280
• Citation: 32 F.3d 989
• Parties: HAVERSTICK ENTERPRISES, INC. (d/b/a North American Equipment Company); James Haverstick; and Glenn Belcher, Plaintiffs-Appellants/Cross-Appellees, v. FINANCIAL FEDERAL CREDIT, INC., et al., Defendants, City of Romulus; and City of Romulus Police Department, Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 989

32 F.3d 989

HAVERSTICK ENTERPRISES, INC. (d/b/a North American Equipment

Company); James Haverstick; and Glenn Belcher, Plaintiffs-Appellants/Cross-Appellees, v. FINANCIAL FEDERAL CREDIT, INC., et al., Defendants,

City of Romulus; and City of Romulus Police Department,

Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants.

Nos. 92-2280, 92-2351.

United States Court of Appeals,

Sixth Circuit.

Submitted May 12, 1994.

Decided Aug. 19, 1994.

Haverstick Enterprises, Inc., James E. Haverstick, President (Briefed), Westland, MI, for Haverstick Enterprises, Inc. d/b/a North American Equipment Co. and James E. Haverstick, Individually and as President of Haverstick Enterprises, Inc., pro se.

Glenn Belcher (Briefed), pro se.

Sheryl L. Toby and Malcolm B. Campbell, Honigman, Miller, Schwartz & Cohn, Detroit, MI, for Financial Federal Credit, Inc., an Illinois Corp. and Thomas Fahl, individually and in his representative capacity as Regional Sales Manager for Financial Federal Credit, Inc.

Gail P. Massad (briefed), Edward E. Salah, and Marcia L. Howe, Cummings, McClorey, Davis & Acho, Livonia, MI, for City of Romulus, a Mun. Corp. and Romulus Police Dept.

Before: RYAN and NORRIS, Circuit Judges; and KRUPANSKY, Senior Circuit Judge.

KRUPANSKY, Senior Circuit Judge.

This action has asserted alleged violations of federal constitutional rights, perpetrated by private individuals and by a state officer, purportedly actionable under congressional civil rights enactments. Plaintiffs Haverstick Enterprises, Inc. (d/b/a North American Equipment Company) ("H.E.I."), James E. Haverstick ("Haverstick"), and Glenn Belcher ("Belcher") complained that a private repossession effected under Michigan law by defendant Financial Federal Credit, Inc. ("F.F.C.I."), a secured creditor of H.E.I., with the assistance of defendants the City of Romulus, Michigan ("the City"), the City of Romulus Police Department ("the Department"), ¹ and John Doe, a Romulus police officer, offended their rights under the Constitution of the United States. The plaintiffs urged that these infringements comprised actionable wrongs under 42 U.S.C. Secs. 1983, 1985(3), and 1986. The plaintiffs on appeal challenged the district court's dismissal of all federal civil rights claims against the municipal defendants via a grant of summary judgment. The municipal defendants cross-appealed the trial court's denial of sanctions against the plaintiffs under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. See Haverstick Enterprises v. Financial Fed. Credit, 803 F.Supp. 1251 (E.D.Mich.1992).

At all relevant times, H.E.I. engaged in the business of customizing trucks for resale to customers engaged in heavy construction. On December 7, 1989, it purchased a 1989 International Truck Model F-2275 from a dealership. Defendant F.F.C.I. financed this acquisition through an installment sales contract which transferred H.E.I.'s equity interest in the machinery to F.F.C.I. as collateral for the loan. H.E.I. integrated an NRC Industries Model WL 25 ton Hydraulic Twin Line Wrecker into the unit, which allegedly added approximately $50,000 to the truck's value.

During subsequent months, H.E.I. defaulted under the loan agreement. Ultimately, F.F.C.I. elected to employ the Michigan "self-help" statute, M.C.L.A. Sec. 440.9503 (West 1967 & Supp.1994), by which the state legislature empowered secured creditors to nonjudicially seize collateral upon dishonor of a security agreement as long as the repossession could be achieved peacefully. ² On December 20, 1990, F.F.C.I.'s Regional Sales Manager, defendant Thomas Fahl, arrived at the H.E.I. business premises accompanied by another F.F.C.I. employee, with the intention of confiscating the wrecker. The two men rendezvoused with Officer John Hlinak of the Romulus Police Department, who the Department dispatched on "civil standby" to the scene pursuant to Fahl's request. Officer Hlinak ostensibly attended the private seizure as an observer to ensure that it transpired in an orderly, peaceful, and lawful manner as directed by M.C.L.A. Sec. 440.9503.

Upon arriving at the H.E.I. premises the defendants observed the wrecker inside a fenced area enclosed by an unlocked gate. After a brief conversation with Fahl and Hlinak, plaintiff Glenn Belcher, who tended the H.E.I. office and garage on that day, locked the gate to the enclosure and secured himself inside the H.E.I. office. While Hlinak attempted to attract Belcher's attention by tapping on the office window, the F.F.C.I. agents commandeered the wrecker and drove it through the locked gate onto the public street.

In response, Belcher quit his fortified position and approached his automobile with the intent of pursuing the errant wrecker and aborting the incipient repossession. At this point, Officer Hlinak briefly questioned Belcher to obtain identification necessary for incorporation into his official report. Belcher produced his driver's license, which the policeman promptly returned after recording the necessary information. Although conflict existed in the testimony respecting certain particulars of the short interrogation, Belcher attested that the detention lasted no longer than five minutes, that he was not taken into custody, searched, or charged, and that he at all times felt at liberty to walk away from the patrolman.

The plaintiffs initiated an eight-count legal action in state court on September 30, 1991, which articulated six state claims anchored in Michigan law plus two causes of action which arose under federal law. Count Two alleged a conspiracy by the defendants to deprive the plaintiffs of their equal protection and due process rights actionable by virtue of 42 U.S.C. Secs. 1985(3) and 1986. Count Six averred violation of the appellants' equal protection and due process rights by the City, the Department, and John Doe pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. The defendants removed the case to the United States District Court, Eastern District of Michigan, on December 13, 1991.

After a hearing conducted on September 2, 1992, the district court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all federal civil rights claims, denied the plaintiffs' oral motion to amend the complaint to substitute Hlinak for Doe as moot, and remanded the pendent state causes of action to the Michigan state courts. The district judge also denied the non-Doe defendants' motion for sanctions. Haverstick, supra. The plaintiffs have appealed the summary dismissal of their federal civil rights claims against the municipal defendants and the refusal of the trial court to permit the amendment to join Hlinak as a party defendant, and have also asserted a motion before the appellate panel for remand to the lower court for inclusion of a Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure of property claim. The municipal defendants have cross-appealed the district judge's disallowance of Rule 11 sanctions against the plaintiffs.

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), "[t]he [summary] judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." On summary judgment motions, all reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the parties opposing the motion. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). However, "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no 'genuine issue for trial.' " Id. [citation omitted].

Summary judgment must be entered against a party who failed to provide sufficient evidence in support of an essential element of that party's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The appellate court must review de novo the summary dismissal of the plaintiffs' federal civil rights claims in this case. Hansard v. Barrett, 980 F.2d 1059, 1061 (6th Cir.1992).

Initially this panel considers the substance of the plaintiffs' civil rights causes of action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1985(3), which addresses conspiracies committed by private actors. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 101, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 1798, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971); Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 753, 758, 122 L.Ed.2d 34 (1993). Griffin postulated four elements necessary to support a cause of action for a conspiracy under Sec. 1985(3):

To come within the legislation a complaint must allege that the defendants did (1) "conspire or go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another" (2) "for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws." It must then assert that one or more of the conspirators (3) did, or caused to be done, "any act in furtherance of the object of [the] conspiracy," whereby another was (4a) "injured in his person or property" or (4b) "deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States." Griffin, supra, 403 U.S. at 102-03, 91 S.Ct. at 1798-89.

The first element of the test having been satisfied, this court next assesses the plaintiffs' compliance with the second Supreme Court dictate of a section 1985(3) conspiracy, namely that they must prove that the conspiracy was motivated by "some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus[.]" United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 829, 103 S.Ct. 3352, 3356, 77 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1983). A class protected by section 1985(3) must possess the characteristics of a discrete and insular minority, such as race, national origin, or...