Underwood v. People
| Decision Date | 27 April 1875 |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
| Parties | William T. Underwood v. The People |
Heard April 14, 1875
Error to Recorder's Court of Detroit.
Judgment reversed, and the prisoner discharged.
Henry M. Cheever, for plaintiff in error.
Andrew J. Smith, Attorney General, for the People.
Underwood brings error upon a judgment of the recorder's court of Detroit, whereby he was committed to the state prison insane hospital, as a person charged with murder and acquitted on the ground of insanity. He claims that the statute is invalid.
The statute in question, being act No. 168 of the Laws of 1873, entitled "an act to provide for the custody and safe keeping of persons who are tried for murder and other high crimes, and are acquitted by reason of insanity," provides, in substance, that when the defense of insanity is set up in the cases provided for, the jury shall find specially whether the respondent was insane when the alleged crime was committed, and if acquitted on that ground the verdict shall so declare. In such case, the court is to sentence him to confinement in the insane hospital of the state prison until discharged in the manner pointed out. This can only be done when the prison inspectors summon (as they are empowered to do) the circuit judge of the circuit from which he is sent, and the medical superintendent of the Kalamazoo insane asylum, who are thereupon to examine into his condition, and if they certify he is not insane, the governor is to discharge him.
The finding of the jury is confined to the prisoner's condition at the time of the commission of the alleged criminal act. The indictment or information embraces, and can lawfully embrace, no issue except the prisoner's guilt as charged. The right of trial by jury is secured by constitutional provisions, and it would not be competent to make any substantial changes in its character. As suggested in People v. Marion, 29 Mich. 31, one of its substantial elements is the right of the jury to give a general verdict on the merits. Any collateral inquiry would be foreign to the issue. And as no insane person is subject to be put on trial, a finding that they had been trying such a person would be somewhat inconsistent with the notion that the trial could have been proper. The statute has avoided this error by confining their attention to the time of the offense; and while it is not competent to prevent an acquittal on a reasonable doubt of insanity, which would require a general verdict of not guilty, yet if the jury agree that the prisoner was insane, and that he would have been guilty if not so, they are undoubtedly at liberty, though they cannot be compelled, to find that fact specially. We cannot hold a special verdict or finding unauthorized, as the common law furnishes abundant precedents to the contrary.--1 Hale P. C., 38.
The questions to be considered must be determined on the assumption that the verdict itself is authorized.
As insanity, when discovered, was held at common law to bar any further steps against a prisoner, at whatever stage of the proceedings, it was always competent to institute an inquiry into his condition. This investigation was sometimes had by the court alone, and sometimes by aid of a jury of inquest,--which is regarded as the safest and most regular practice.--See 1, Hale P. C., 29 to 37, passim. There are some English statutes providing for most cases. In England the detention is during her majesty's pleasure, whether on an acquittal by reason of insanity, or upon an inquest.--See Oxford's case , 9 C. & P., 525; Regina v. Goode, 7 A. & E., 536; Reg. v. Hodges, 8 C. & P., 195; Rex v. Pritchard, 7 C. & P., 303; Rex v. Dyson, 7 C. & P., 305. In Oxford's case the jury evidently had doubts whether he had actually done the act charged, and subsequent events showed that it was not likely he was dangerous, if insane at all, yet he was never discharged. Our compiled laws, long before this statute, authorized the judge to conduct such an inquiry, when the jury render such a verdict,--C. L., § 7957,--and this is a better course.
There can be no reason to doubt the propriety of making provision to secure to such unfortunate persons protection and care, in such a way as to prevent them injuring or being injured, if they are dangerous or in need of seclusion. The state has an ultimate guardianship over non compotes, in cases where it is necessary.
But inasmuch as such authority can...
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