Childs v. Harris Manuf'g Co.

• Decision Date: 01 March 1887
• Citation: 32 N.W. 43,68 Wis. 231
• Parties: CHILDS AND ANOTHER v. HARRIS MANUF'G CO.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

68 Wis. 231

32 N.W. 43

CHILDS AND ANOTHER

v.HARRIS MANUF'G CO.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

March 1, 1887.

Appeal from circuit court, Rock county.

Dunwiddie & Goldin, for respondents.

William Ruger, for appellant.

TAYLOR, J.

The respondents brought an action in the circuit court against the appellant, and in their complaint set up two separate causes of action,--one upon a judgment rendered in favor of the respondents, and against the appellant, in an action pending in the supreme court of the state of New York, for the sum of $3,288.60 damages, and costs; and the other to recover damages for the breach of an express contract. The appellant and defendant demurred to the complaint on the ground that the causes of action were improperly joined. The circuit court overruled the demurrer, and from the order overruling such demurrer the defendant appealed to this court.

The only question to be determined upon this appeal is whether a judgment for the payment of money only is evidence of a contract, either express or implied, on the part of the person against whom the judgment is rendered, to pay the amount of the judgment to the person in whose favor the same is rendered, within the meaning of subdivision 2 of section 2647, Rev. St. This subdivision reads as follows: “The plaintiff may unite in the same complaint several causes of action, whether they be such as were formerly denominated legal or equitable, or both, when they arise out of * * * (2) contract express or implied.” The learned counsel for the appellant contends that a judgment is neither a contract express or implied, within the meaning of said section. When we consider the object of section 2647, we think it very clear that the legislature intended to use the word “contract” in said subdivision in its largest sense, and not in a restricted sense. The object of the section as a whole is to classify causes of action with reference to their joinder in one and the same action; and it attempts to give general rules for the joinder or non-joinder of all actions. We must take it for granted that the legislature knew that actions upon judgments were a common class of actions, and that the legislature contemplated that it had made provision in said section for the classification of such actions. Unless an action upon a judgment is an action upon contract, express or implied, within the meaning of said subdivision 2, then actions upon judgments are not included within any of the provisions of said section, and are entirely unprovided for by the legislative classification. In this view of the subject, notwithstanding the fact that in other parts of the statutes, and for other purposes, the legislature seems to have made a distinction between contracts and judgments, that fact furnishes no good reason for holding that, in said section 2647, the word “contract” was not intended to be used in its larger meaning, so as to cover a case of a judgment for...